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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate into the phenomenon of over-reliance on external credit 
ratings by investors and market participants. This phenomenon is traced back to the hardwiring of 
the credit ratings into legislation. In this context, the investigation has a broad scope in that it is not 
only concerned with the phenomenon per se, but also with the current status of implementation of 
the rules which have been set out to tackle this problem. The approaches against over-reliance have 
been elaborated at the international level by the Financial Stability Board (FSB). These were 
incorporated into specific rules at the EU and US levels. This thesis will therefore analyse and 
critically assess the progress which these two legal systems have made for translating into practice 
the international standards against over-reliance on external credit ratings. 
 This subject is of relevant interest from several perspectives. Firstly, the phenomenon was 
brought to attention in the aftermath of the recent financial turmoil. This is a new context, which is 
to be regarded as a segment of the post-crisis reforms on the structure and operation of the rating 
industry. This part of the reforms stimulates to provide an understanding of the nature of over-
reliance on the credit ratings and why investors and market participants are vulnerable to it.
 Secondly, the phenomenon made regulators cast numerous doubts in respect of the 
opportunity of relying on the credit ratings in legislation. This aspect stimulates research with 
regard to the use of the credit ratings by the private and public sector and to investigate the degree 
to which the tie between the regulators and the credit ratings have changed because of the threat of 
over-reliance. 
 Thirdly, normative approaches have been set out and the implementation process is still 
ongoing at the time of writing. A critical evaluation of them permits an assessment of the current 
status of progress in the translation of the approaches, to identify their positive and negative aspects, 
and discuss possible improvements. 
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 Fourthly, the analysis of the progress and its outcomes may stimulate further reflections on 
the premise the debate on over-reliance was based upon. This permits us to wonder which (if any) 
things might have been missed at the beginning, whether the debate is to be considered closed or 
whether there are new, possible, directions to be taken in the future. 
 Overall, this research will provide a thorough investigation into the problem of over-reliance 
from the post-crisis regulatory debate on the CRAs until the issue and implementation of specific 
rules aiming at mitigating this risk. In particular, by explaining the phenomenon of over-reliance on 
external credit ratings, critically reviewing the advantages and shortcomings of the approaches 
against it, and suggesting possible improvements, this research may be the platform for further 
studies on a subject which has so far received marginal attention by the literature on the CRAs.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I.1 SETTING THE CONTEXT 
The context of the present research can be set and understood by preliminarily contrasting two 
words in their respective meanings and implications, namely: reliance and over-reliance. In relation 
to the topic of this thesis, both of them are to be discussed as human behaviours. To begin with the 
first one, its meaning can be analysed in relation to the act of putting trust in something or 
somebody.1 Such a meaning can also be applied to over-reliance. However, in the context of over-
reliance this meaning has a different connotation due to such adverbs as ‘heavily’, ‘excessively’, 
‘blindly’ or ‘unduly’ which characterise the trust placed in something or somebody.2 These adverbs 
demark a line between the two words and help understand that the word reliance, basically, has a 
good connotation, while over-reliance a negative one.  
 In more detail, the interpretation of the meaning of the word reliance vis-à-vis the meaning 
of over-reliance through its adverbs leads us to consider the different degrees of trust that reliant 
and over-reliant people can place on something or somebody. Accordingly, a reliant person will not 
generate a total or entire trust. Specifically, those who rely and, thus, grant their trust, will do this 
with some reservations. In other words, they are neither likely to accept situations with the benefit 
of the doubt, nor are they likely to take anything at face value. In essence, their reliance is 
accompanied by some degree of judgemental autonomy which is supposed to guarantee their 
independence from what or whom they rely on. Significantly, their behaviour is not totally 
influenced by external factors, situations or other people. Through their reliance they are supposed 
to process the information they receive and make use of it in a way which is complementary to their 
                                                          
1
 See <www.oxforddictionaries.com>. 
2
 Ibid. 
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own judgement. Should their trust be measured, it could be said that 50 per cent is on external 
factors while the remaining percentage is traced back to their own judgemental autonomy. 
However, even if the difference is 98 per cent of trust in something or somebody and the remaining 
2 per cent is their own judgement, this would be equally sufficient to exclude an entire external 
influence. Consequently, reliance also implies the freedom of giving whatever measure of trust, 
provided that what or who is relied upon does not receive ‘excessive’, ‘heavy’, ‘blind’ or ‘undue’ 
reliance. This would, in fact, mark the shift from reliance to over-reliance. Clearly, any placed trust 
would assume a negative connotation within this new context. Over-reliance is therefore the other 
side of the coin.  
 Importantly, an over-reliant conduct implies an over-estimation of the information received. 
In practice, this information would assume the characteristic of something not fallacious and, for 
this reason, would receive a 100 per cent of trust. It may be argued that even 100 per cent trust 
could be regarded as the consequence of reliance where such a choice is the result of an 
independent analysis which has considered several perspectives. Nonetheless, where this 100 per 
cent is construed in combination with adverbs such as ‘heavily’, ‘unduly’, and so on, the trust is 
overdue, in one word, blind. This means that the person or information which are given blind trust 
are taken at their face value. When trust is blind, room for undertaking own judgement, aimed at 
understanding the limits of what or who is given 100 per cent trust, is dramatically reduced, if not 
absent. Many factors can play a role with regard to over-reliance: negligence, ignorance, 
imprudence or, sometimes, the impossibility of undertaking one’s own judgement.  
 Over-reliance in its negative connotation and implications is emphasised in numerous 
contexts. For instance, in sports which are based on teamwork, over-reliance may be identified in 
the excessive trust on the capacity of a top-player, which finally leads to believe that he will make 
the difference in any match even when the overall team’s performance is not good.3 In the scientific 
                                                          
3
 Sid Lowe, ‘Argentina See Danger in their Over-reliance on Lionel Messi’ The Guardian (London 24 June 
2014). 
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and technological world, over-reliance is generally identified as the excessive consideration given 
to one factor at the exclusion of others which can serve the same investigative purpose.4 This view 
has also been applied in case law. For example, in Re Greater Niagara General Hospital and 
Ontario Nurses’ Association it was ruled that relying solely on job interviews to fill vacancy to the 
exclusion of other relevant factors may violate collective agreements.5  
 Looking at the issue of over-reliance from a legal perspective, in contract law scholars 
discuss the risk of over-reliance within the relationship between a promisor and a promisee. In more 
detail, in the event of a breach of a bargain contract, reference is usually made to the expectation 
measure of damages. Through the expectation measure of damages the injured party is put in the 
position they would have been in the event that the contract had been performed.6 In this context, 
law and economics scholars developed a theory according to which the expectation measure 
guarantees the promisee’s reliance and may therefore induce him to over-rely, in other words, ‘to 
invest more heavily in reliance than efficiency requires’.7 To provide a better understanding of the 
situation, a promisor is a contracting party who is or may be in breach; a promisee is the contracting 
party who is affected by the promisor’s breach; and over-reliance is defined as the promisee’s 
reliance which inefficiently treats the promisor’s performance as insured.8  
 On the whole, all the above-mentioned contexts bring to attention how over-reliance has the 
potential to undermine one’s judgemental independence since it polarises the trust on one factor 
which receives exclusiveness. This, in turn, jeopardises the possibility of considering other factors 
when a wide spectrum of alternatives could be available; or not to consider accurately the 
shortcomings of one factor when only this factor is available to be relied upon.  
                                                          
4
 Graeme Paton, ‘Over-reliance on Technology is Undermining Spelling Skills’ The Telegraph (London 22 
May 2012). 
5
 Andrew Tremayne, ‘Over-reliance on Job Interview to Fill Vacancy May Violate Collective Agreement’ 
(1999) <http://www.ehlaw.ca/publications/jan99/jobinter.pdf> accessed 20 December 2011. 
6
 Jim Leitzel, ‘Reliance and Contract Breach’ (1989) 52 Law and Contemporary Problems 1, 87. 
7
 Melvin A Eisenberg & Brett H McDonnel, ‘Expectation Damages and the Theory of Over-reliance’ (2002) 
54 Hasting Law Journal 1335. 
8
 Ibid. 
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 All things considered, the line of demarcation between reliance and over-reliance, the 
understanding of them in their respective positive and negative connotations, as well as the risk that 
reliance escalates into over-reliance, are the general paradigms to be applied to the topic of the 
present research. Significantly, the considerations made above are the basis to discuss the attention 
that the problem of over-reliance received in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In 
particular, the word over-reliance was specifically referred to the investors’ and market participants’ 
excessive trust given to the credit ratings assigned by the major credit ratings agencies (CRAs) to 
complex financial products. Within this debate, the risk of over-reliance deriving from the 
hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks was also brought forward.9 
In essence, the wide use of the credit ratings by the public sector as essential components of 
regulatory programmes had, or would have had, the effect of inducing over-reliance on external 
credit ratings by investors and market participants. In other words, legal requirements to invest in 
securities rated investment grade by the CRAs carry the danger of regarding the credit ratings as 
official stamps of approval of creditworthiness imprinted by the regulators.  
 By way of applying the concept of over-reliance introduced above, it can clearly be 
understood that credit ratings are taken at their face value as the exclusive credit risk assessment 
tools. In practice, over-reliance would result in the investors’ and market participants’ 
discouragement from undertaking their own due diligence and credit risk analysis. The credit rating 
references in legislation would therefore provide an incentive to over-rely with the consequence of 
giving the credit ratings exclusiveness for credit risk analysis and, at the same time, discouraging 
any independent analysis which should be at the gist of any investment decision. Significantly, the 
credit ratings are not used as complementary sources for determining an investment decision but as 
substitutes for own, independent, credit risk analysis. Over-reliance deriving from embedding credit 
ratings into legislation has also systemic implications. In short, where legislation requires investing 
in highly rated debt instruments, in the event of downgrades applied by the CRAs a massive sale of 
                                                          
9
 Chapter 2, section II.6. 
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these instruments can occur. This results in a downward price spiral which can pose serious threats 
to the financial stability.10  
 The post-crisis regulatory debate on the CRAs has, inter alia, identified the issue of over-
reliance and proposed specific regulatory intervention aimed at reducing the risk that investors and 
market participants may blindly rely on the credit ratings. In particular, if credit rating references 
provide incentives to consider the credit risk analysis provided by the CRAs as ‘official seal of 
approvals’ of credit quality, and consequently to neglect independent credit risk analysis, the 
strategy to address this problem is based on revisiting the role of the credit ratings in legislation and 
on encouraging more independent credit risk analysis.  
 These issues are the fundamentals of this research work. The purpose of this thesis is to 
investigate into the phenomenon of over-reliance which is traced back to the hardwiring of the 
credit ratings into legislation. In this context, the investigation has a broad scope in that it is not 
only concerned with the phenomenon per se, but also with the current status of implementation and 
feasibility of the strategies which have been set out to tackle this problem. Such strategies have 
been elaborated at the international level by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and then translated 
into normative approaches at the US and EU levels. This thesis will analyse and critically assess the 
progress which these two legal systems have made for translating into practice the suggested 
strategy. As will be discussed, though some significant differences exist in addressing over-reliance 
deriving from the credit rating references in legislation, the US and EU must be regarded as the 
most pro-active legal systems in the implementation of an approach based on redesigning the tie 
between the regulations and the credit ratings. Both the systems have set out normative approaches 
which led to considerable amendments to their existing rating-based regulations. Before introducing 
in more detail how this research will be designed and developed, it is desirable to point out that the 
subject is of relevant interest from several perspectives.  
                                                          
10
 Ibid.  
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 Firstly, the phenomenon was brought to attention in the aftermath of the recent financial 
turmoil. This is a new context, which is to be regarded as a segment of the post-crisis reforms on the 
structure and operation of the rating industry. Hence, this part of the reforms stimulates to provide 
an understanding of the nature of over-reliance on the credit ratings and why investors and market 
participants are vulnerable to it. Secondly, the phenomenon made regulators cast more doubt in 
respect of the opportunity of relying on the credit ratings in legislation. This aspect stimulates 
research with regard to the use of the credit ratings by the private and public sector and to 
investigate the degree to which the tie between the regulators and the credit ratings have changed 
because of the threat of over-reliance. Thirdly, normative approaches have been set out and the 
implementation process is still ongoing at the time of writing. A critical evaluation of them permits 
an assessment of the current status of progress in the translation of the approaches, to identify their 
positive and negative aspects, and discuss possible improvements. Fourthly, the analysis of the 
progress and its outcomes may stimulate further reflections on the premise the debate on over-
reliance was based upon. This permits us to wonder which (if any) things might have been missed at 
the beginning, whether the debate is to be considered closed or whether there are new, possible, 
directions to be taken in the future. Each of these aspects explains the reasons why it is worth 
researching this topic. An in-depth consideration of these aspects, will provide a better insight into 
the opportunity to write on this subject, and into the structure and development of the research 
work. Accordingly, in the following paragraphs the rationale behind this research will be detailed 
by providing a literature review, by highlighting the main research questions, and by illustrating 
how the analysis will be designed and developed. 
 
I.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
I.2.1 Overview 
20 
 
The literature on the rating industry and on the role of the credit ratings in the international financial 
markets is quite vast so that it can be divided into numerous strands. To begin with, the world of 
CRAs has been discussed from a sociological and political standpoint. Within this strand, a 
significant amount of governmental research and legislation has been produced. Secondly, other 
works are more focussed on the organisation, structure and operation of the rating industry in the 
financial markets. Such works often draw on the results of surveys conducted among the users of 
the credit ratings, namely the investors and the issuers. Furthermore, research analysis and data 
provided by the CRAs are of relevance to these studies. Within this general context, it can be 
observed that the largest group of contributions is made by law and economics scholars. Their 
studies are essential to the development of the present research.  
 Narrowly speaking, there are two streams of literature which are relevant to the topic 
addressed by this thesis. One strand is comprised of the studies conducted by law scholars who 
analyse the rating industry from its origins and take stock of the increasing use of the credit ratings 
within the private and public sector. Importantly, their contributions were the groundings for further 
studies relating to the legislative reforms which took place consequently to the role that the agencies 
played in some corporate scandals and in the recent financial crisis. These works provide a critical 
interpretation of the CRAs legislative frameworks which have been developed at the national, 
regional and international levels. In particular, the analysis focuses on the suitability of the CRAs’ 
reforms in tackling the problems that the operation of the agencies has brought to attention.  
 A second strand relates to the studies conducted by economics scholars who assess the 
impact of the credit ratings on the financial markets, investigate their implications for the financial 
stability and provide empirical results based on elaborated models and calculations. Such studies are 
mainly based on surveys about the interaction between the market participants and the credit 
ratings, in particular, they assess the market participants’ reactions to rating downgrades and the 
extent to which these aspects can have repercussions on the financial stability during downturn 
periods. 
21 
 
 
I.2.2 Law studies  
To start with the first stream of literature, reference is to be made to those works which have studied 
the rating industry from a historical perspective and, thus, have provided a valuable understanding 
of the origins, growth, development and worldwide expansion of the rating industry. In this respect, 
Sylla (2001)11 offers a comprehensive analysis detailing the structure, business model, conduct and 
performance of the CRAs from the very origins until the early 1970s, during which the agencies 
changed their initial business model, the consumers-pay model, into the issuers-pay-model. As part 
of his study, the author notes the widespread use of credit ratings in legislation for regulatory 
compliance purposes, and highlights the decisive role that the agencies have been playing in those 
markets that have become more interconnected in recent decades. He concludes by warning against 
the increasing reliance on credit ratings in financial regulations and how this can contribute in 
giving an enormous influence to opinion providers (like the CRAs) among the market participants. 
Similar studies were also undertaken by White (2001)12 with a main focus on the oligopolistic 
structure of the rating market dominated by the most ancient agencies, namely Moody’s Investors 
Services, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings. By referring to the history and consolidated power 
of these three agencies in the rating market, and to the US Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating 
Organization (NRSRO) status that the agencies have to acquire to operate in the US rating market, 
the author expresses the view that this dominance is the result of regulations which have facilitated 
the demand of credit ratings and restricted the supply in favour of few agencies.  
 Both these works address the origin of the industry and the role that the regulation may have 
played in bolstering the importance and power of the CRAs in the financial markets. It is worth 
                                                          
11
 Richard Sylla, ‘An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Ratings’, in Richard Levich, Carmen 
Reinhart & Giovanni Majnoni (eds), Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System (Boston: 
Kluwer 2002). 
12
 Lawrence J White, ‘The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organizational Analysis (2001) 
<https://www.bis.org/bcbs/ca/lwhit.pdf> accessed 10 January 2012. 
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noting that they are based on the seminal work provided by Partnoy (1999). 13  Through an 
investigation into the history of the rating industry Partnoy has sketched his theory on the CRAs’ 
‘paradox’ in the financial markets. The author argues that such a paradox is the result of an 
increasing prosperity of the CRAs in the face of a decline in the credit ratings’ informational value. 
Also, he argues that the CRAs’ anomaly finds its rationale in the practice of linking financial 
regulation to the external credit ratings. According to the author, the use of credit ratings for 
regulatory compliance purposes would have contributed to give the CRAs an elevated status so that 
the agencies sell ‘regulatory licenses’, rather than valuable credit information. Accordingly, he 
suggests eliminating rating-dependent regulations and substituting the credit ratings with credit 
spreads.  
 Overall, these works share the common factor of being published around the same time. 
They all address the relationship between the public sector and the credit ratings and, among other 
things, they were issued at the time in which the CRAs used to be unregulated entities. Thus, they 
are the milestones of all the literature which flourished when the operation of the CRAs came under 
regulatory scrutiny consequent to their role in some major corporate scandals, as well as in the 
recent financial turmoil and ensuing global recession. These facts will have due consideration 
within the development of this thesis.  
 Now, from a literature perspective it must be observed how these events, in particular the 
2007-2009 financial crisis, paved the way for numerous studies on the post-crisis regulatory debate 
and proposed reforms. In this respect, it is interesting to observe that the role of the CRAs in such 
scandals contributed to increase the disagreement among academics as to the optimal regulatory 
reforms to apply. In this context, there are some scholars who emphasise the role of the CRAs as 
gatekeepers holding reputational capital which they use to build up the investors’ confidence in the 
credit ratings. For them, regulatory intervention should not be massive since the performance of the 
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CRAs is relatively good. This is, for example, the view expressed by Schwarcz (2002)14, who 
argues that the CRAs are motivated to provide accurate and efficient services because their image 
and profitability is linked to their reputation. Accordingly, there is no need to overhaul the rating 
industry. More regulation, in the author’s view, would subject the agencies to political 
manipulation. In turn, this would undermine the reliability of the ratings. Similar views are 
expressed by Hill (2004)15 who, in contrast to Partnoy, stresses the informational value produced by 
the agencies through their services. In more detail, the author underlines a ‘stellar job’ done by the 
agencies in the ratings of corporate bonds. Therefore, possible regulation should not aim at 
repealing the credit ratings from regulations; rather, attention should be devoted to the potential for 
conflict of interest deriving from the issuers-pay-model, to the set up of a civil liability framework, 
and to address the oligopolistic structure of the market by reducing any barrier to entry.  
 These works were issued in the wake of the role played by the CRAs in the Enron’s default. 
Afterwards, the role that the agencies played in the 2007-2009 financial crisis contributed to give 
prominence to the view of those scholars who favour strong regulation of the industry and, by 
taking position from Partnoy’s regulatory license theory, call for a downsize of the rating industry’s 
power in the financial markets. According to them, the market should not heavily rely on the 
services of the CRAs, as much as the credit ratings should not be included in legislation, but 
perhaps replaced by alternative mechanisms for measuring the credit risk (Kisgen and Strahan 
200916; Flandreau et al 2009;17 Cornaggia & Cornaggia 2011;18 Iannotta and Pennacchi 2012.19 
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This is, hence, the first strand of legal studies which will be relevant for the start and development 
of this research. Importantly, the pre-crisis and post-crisis literature on the functions and operations 
of the CRAs will help this research build the concept of reliance on the credit ratings by the private 
and public sector; and understand the extent to which this reliance, in particular from the side of the 
regulators, may have changed in the wake of the post-crisis reforms of the rating industry. 
 
I.2.3 Economic studies 
US Senator Joe Lieberman (2002) stated that the CRAs ‘wield immense, quasi-government power 
to determine which companies within the corporate world are creditworthy and which are not’.20 
This statement can be the basis to refer to the second strand of literature which is important for 
shaping the present research: the empirical studies which focus on the degree to which the investors 
are influenced by the credit ratings, in particular, by the rating downgrades. Numerous studies have 
been conducted in this respect, in particular, much of this academic literature empirically assesses 
whether rating announcements contain pricing-relevant information. These studies brought 
significant evidence to the fact that rating announcements, namely rating downgrades, give new 
information which plays a role in the formation of prices.  
 To begin with, early studies date back to the first half of the 1970s and they brought mixed 
results. On the one hand, Katz (1974)21 finds that investors do not anticipate rating changes, rather 
they tend to react with a delay to the announcement of rating downgrades. On the other hand, 
Weinstein (1977)22 does not find any evidence of investors’ reactions to rating changes. Further 
studies are more conclusive. Hand et al (1992)23, for example, show that the announcement of a 
downgrade by the CRAs determines a statistically significant adjustment of corporate bond and 
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equity prices. Such conclusions stimulated new studies which corroborated the argument of the 
credit ratings’ influence on the investors and market participants. Goh and Ederington (1993)24 were 
the first to verify whether the reaction of equity prices is in relation to the announcement of 
downgrades. They find that equity prices drop consequently to downgrades relating to a 
deterioration in the issuer’s financial conditions. Similarly, Kliger and Sarigh (2000)25 find that 
corporate bond and equity prices reacted to Moody’s re-definition of its rating category in 1982, 
when the agency introduced numeric modifiers. Moreover, by analysing a sample of international 
bonds, Steiner and Heinke (2001)26 find that both downgrades and reviews for downgrades exercise 
a significant impact on prices.  
 In the wake of these studies, further empirical literature flourished in relation to other market 
segments such as credit default swaps (CDS) and asset backed securities (ABS). For instance, Hull 
et al (2004),27 as well as Norden and Weber (2004)28 conclude that the reaction of CDS prices is 
considerably pronounced in the event of reviews for downgrades. Finally, Ammer and Clinton 
(2004)29 discuss the impact of the credit ratings on the pricing of ABS and give evidence of a 
significant negative reaction to the CRAs’ downgrades.  
 The 2007-2009 financial crisis events, with massive rating downgrades applied to 
sophisticated structured finance products, gave impetus to new studies analysing the investors’ 
reaction to the rating changes. In particular, the recent sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone gave 
the opportunity to analyse the systemic implications of rating downgrades. Arezki et al (2011)30 
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report that downgrades from investment to speculative grade for sovereigns can have contagious 
effects across countries and financial markets. Similarly, Afonso et al (2012)31 show that rating 
downgrades of lower-rated countries can have spill-over effects onto higher-rated sovereigns. Other 
relevant studies followed. Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2013)32 tested the impact of sovereign credit 
ratings on foreign exchange markets. The authors reveal that currency markets of higher-rated 
countries were significantly responsive to rating downgrades during the crisis period as opposed to 
lower-rated countries’ exchange rates, which were more affected in the pre-crisis periods by 
sovereign ratings. Based on these studies, more recently Baum et al (2013)33 studied the impact of 
the CRAs’ downgrades on the value of the Euro and the yields of French, Italian, German and 
Spanish long term sovereign bonds in the Euro area between 2011 and 2012. They conclude that the 
rating changes influenced crisis-time capital allocation in the Euro zone and forced investors to 
rebalance their portfolios across member countries.  
 This second strand of economic studies is important because it focuses on the investors and 
market participants’ reaction to rating changes. As over-reliance is a behavioural phenomenon, 
these works provide the basis for understanding in respect of: 1) the influence that the ratings may 
exercise; 2) how such an influence can escalate into over-reliance; and 3) the extent to which the 
rating-based regulation may provide incentives to this.  
 
I.2.4 Studies on over-reliance on external credit ratings 
On the whole, both the illustrated law and economics studies on the CRAs are relevant to the 
present research in that they constitute the premises upon which the debate on over-reliance is built 
upon. In fact, as will be explained, the concept of over-reliance on credit ratings presumes that the 
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investors and market participants are negatively influenced by the credit ratings and, thus, they 
neglect to undertake their own credit risk assessment and due diligence. In this context, the credit 
rating references in regulations are regarded as an incentive to this over-reliant conduct. Clearly, 
there is an inter-connectedness between the use of the credit ratings as regulatory tools and the 
degree of influence that these can exert on the investors and market participants. As this work will 
detail in the following chapters, the concept of over-reliance stemming from the hardwiring of 
credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks is traced back to the public sector’s use of 
the credit ratings and how this is perceived by the users of the credit ratings. Consequently, the 
literature which has been illustrated above is essential to understand the reliance of the public and 
private sector on the credit ratings and how this can escalate into over-reliance by investors and 
market participants. The two strands are the preliminary literature which help this study develop 
towards the shift from reliance to over-reliance and to the consequent regulatory approaches which 
have been set out to eliminate the phenomenon or mitigate the potential risk. With this as the 
premise, it is to be wondered which other studies can be relevant to this research work. Importantly, 
this foundation literature must be completed by referring to specific studies into the phenomenon 
that this thesis will address holistically: from its introduction within the regulatory debate on the 
CRAs until the recent regulatory strategies which have been set out at all levels to tackle it. These 
studies should be defined as the third strand of literature made of contributions on over-reliance on 
the external credit ratings. In one word, the third strand should embrace those research works which 
give insights into the subject of over-reliance, and which critically assess the consequent normative 
approaches. These, in turn, are based on the elimination of the credit rating references in legislation, 
substitution of them with valid alternative standards of creditworthiness, and contextual 
enhancement of the investors’ capabilities to conduct more autonomous credit risk analysis. In this 
respect, it must be considered which studies have addressed these issues. 
28 
 
 To start with, the phenomenon of over-reliance has been recently taken into consideration by 
Masciandaro (2013)34 in the context of the recent sovereign crisis in the Euro zone. The author 
applies a definition of market over-reliance (MOR) as ‘the risk that ratings can affect bond yields 
quite independently from the supply of new information’. According to him, MOR depends on the 
rating-based regulation and the communication policy of the rating agencies, namely how CRAs 
channel information into the markets. Masciandaro concludes that to reduce MOR, it is necessary to 
remove the rating-based regulation and set out a principle of liability in the CRAs’ communication 
policy.  
 As to the regulatory strategies to reduce over-reliance, comments have been provided by 
Whelan (2011).35 While illustrating the European package of reforms on the CRAs, the author is 
sceptical as to the possibility of encouraging more independent credit risk analysis from the CRAs 
since not all the financial institutions can afford to deploy adequate resources to this end. 
Specifically, the author welcomes the reform, in particular, the aim of reducing the amount of credit 
rating references into legislation. Nonetheless, he argues that the gains from the improvement of 
independent risk management are likely to be small.  
 In relation to the reduction of credit rating references in legislation, in particular with regard 
to the search of alternatives to credit ratings, proposals have been brought forward by economics 
scholars. Horsch (2014) 36 , for instance, proposes four alternative methods for credit risk 
assessment: 1) credit risk assessment through market prices of debt; 2) credit risk assessment 
through market prices of derivatives; 3) credit risk assessment through market prices of equity; and 
4) credit risk assessment through multi-factor models. According to the author, such alternatives 
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often anticipate the credit ratings and would allow for superior evaluation of the debtors’ credit 
quality.  
 These works have been the most recent since the debate on over-reliance started. 
Nonetheless, they do not deal with the theme of over-reliance from a holistic perspective as this 
research aims to do. For example, the analysis of Masciandaro is circumscribed to the sovereign 
debt crisis and it is based on research questions concerning the relationship between ratings news 
and volatility.37  Hence, his work is more related to the second strand of the abovementioned 
literature which aims at providing a better understanding of the relationship between the rating 
announcements and the markets. Moreover, his conclusion to eliminate rating-based regulation is 
simply in line with the early literature on the disadvantages of relying on credit ratings for 
regulatory purposes. As said, the recent crisis and the debate on over-reliance revamped the views 
of those scholars who have always called for the elimination of the rating-based regulation (Partnoy 
1999;38 Altman 2010).39 Consequently, he simply suggests what has always been suggested.  
 Similarly, Horsch reflects over the possibility of credit rating alternatives from an economic 
perspective. His work is mainly focussed on one aspect of the strategy, that is, the search of a 
unique, valid and universally accepted alternative to the credit ratings.40  As will be shown in 
chapter III, most of the final rules issued at the time of writing have addressed and solved the issue 
of the alternatives to credit ratings. Now, the amendments applied to these rules need to be critically 
assessed.  
 Finally, Whelan expresses his scepticism within a broader illustrative context of the whole 
EU reforms of CRAs. His scepticism was expressed at an early stage of the reforms and should now 
be tested in light of the current status of implementation of the final rules.41  
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 In addition to these three studies, other works on the phenomenon of over-reliance on 
external credit ratings seem to be lacking. In other words, while the first two strands of literature 
mentioned above may be the basis to discuss the post-crisis debate on over-reliance, the third, more 
specific strand still lacks enhancement. Unquestionably, most of the literature on the post-crisis 
reforms on the CRAs is mainly focussed on issues such as conflict of interest, civil liability and 
competition, to mention but a few. Even before the recent crisis these issues were debated and 
studied. Instead, over-reliance on external credit ratings still needs more penetrating attention to 
create a wider academic debate providing insights into the phenomenon, and able to stimulate 
criticism on the approaches and their progress. The few mentioned works are still too little for the 
development of a discussion on this segment of the CRAs’ reforms. Currently, the implementation 
progress of the elaborated rules on over-reliance seems to be only monitored by standards setters 
and policymakers (FSB 2014)42, who ultimately try to push the enactment of the strategies through 
a list of recommendations. However, there is still much to be investigated and analysed as to over-
reliance on credit ratings. 
  
I.3 FILLING THE RESEARCH GAP 
As explained, the literature on over-reliance on external credit ratings is still at an early stage. 
Besides, the contributions mentioned above do not undertake any thorough investigation into the 
phenomenon. Specifically, some of these contributions either side with some features of the 
strategies such as, for instance, removing the credit rating references from legislation, or underline 
some difficulties in the implementation of the approaches. However, all of these analyses do not 
take stock of the progress made so far at the national, international and regional levels to translate 
into practice the elaborated plans to mitigate the risk of over-reliance on the credit ratings. What is 
still needed is a holistic study. Such a work would help understand the phenomenon of over-reliance 
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on credit ratings. Indeed, it would allow for a discussion on the regulatory debate, analyse the 
subsequent normative approaches and their degree of implementation; and in light of these results, 
would pose a reflection over the future of the strategies and, thus, question whether there is 
something which still remains to be seen or remedied.  
 The importance of this research path lies in the fact that over-reliance on the credit ratings 
must be regarded as something new within the broader debate on the CRAs. As will be highlighted 
through the part of the thesis explaining the phenomenon of over-reliance, the regulatory debate, 
which followed the 2007-2009 financial crisis, brought to attention the problem for the first time 
within the discussions aiming at reforming the credit rating industry. In essence, while issues such 
as reducing the possibility of conflict of interest deriving from the CRAs’ business model, 
enhancing competition in the rating market, improving the CRAs’ methodologies and setting up an 
appropriate civil liability regime, had been under the regulatory spotlight even before the recent 
crisis, over-reliance came out as a new problem to be addressed inter alia. The problem in question 
is not strictly related to the operation of the CRAs; it mainly refers to the relationship between the 
private and the public sector with the credit ratings. Nonetheless, the reforms which address over-
reliance are incorporated into the legislation concerning the operation and structure of the CRAs. 
Therefore, over-reliance is a new issue which is finally part of the post-crisis reforms relating to the 
rating industry.  
 Accordingly, it is of relevance to produce views on the problem of over-reliance and 
increase the amount of the literature which, at present, appears to be stagnant and needs to be 
updated from the moment the debate started and progressed towards the implementation of the rules 
against over-reliance. Based on this, there are numerous issues which can be discussed by 
undertaking a thorough investigation into the phenomenon, its introduction, the proposed normative 
approaches, and their implementation process. To start with, it will be observed that there is a sort 
of confusion relating to the use of the word over-reliance. For example, the Financial Stability 
Forum (now Financial Stability Board) used the word over-reliance in relation to the investors’ and 
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market participants’ behaviour, while at the EU level the European Parliament talks about over-
reliance from the part of the regulators. Besides, there is also an interchangeable use of the words 
reliance and over-reliance as if they were synonyms. These situations give a nebulous connotation 
to the phenomenon in itself and raise doubts on what over-reliance is and who over-relies. This 
research will be based on the concept of over-reliance as a behavioural phenomenon concerning 
investors and market participants as it was introduced by the FSB. This will be developed by 
considering the dichotomy between reliance and over-reliance in their respective positive and 
negative connotations.  
 Moreover, another gap which this research will identify is concerned with a lack of proper 
definition of the phenomenon. It will be shown that over-reliance was only introduced at the 
international level and applied to the contexts of the rating-based regulation and the structured 
finance sector. However, there was a failure to provide a clearer understanding of it through a 
definition which could demark the line between the two sectors. This definitional gap is not only 
from the part of the regulators but also from the part of the scholars which illustrated the elaborated 
normative approaches thereafter. Therefore, this research will set out two definitions of over-
reliance according to whether the phenomenon is referred to the hardwiring of ratings into 
legislation or to the structured finance sector. Both definitions will be based on the interpretation of 
the discussions which animated the debate and culminated in the current regulatory approaches 
against over-reliance on credit ratings. In fact, different regulatory approaches reveal two types of 
over-reliance which need proper definition because of the different implications they have. 
Significantly, drawing a line between the two sectors in which over-reliance may arise and 
providing two respective definitions is an important detail that the debate missed. This research will 
deal with this gap while addressing the question of what over-reliance on the credit ratings is, who 
over-relies and why, and which sectors can be identified as over-reliance risky. Among other things, 
the lack of a proper definition and the need to close this gap is corroborated by the fact that only in 
2014 (after five years from the start of the debate), at the EU level the European Supervisory 
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Authority (ESAs) recognised that they had to deal with a lack of specific definition of ‘mechanistic 
and parallel reliance’ on credit ratings.  
 After providing a definition of over-reliance, the research is circumscribed to the over-
reliance stemming from the embedded credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks. To 
this end, an interesting, thought-provoking aspect that this research will identify and discuss is 
concerned with the presumed abandonment of the over-reliance issue within the regulatory debate 
at the US and FSB level. This seems to be the result of major attention given by the regulators and 
policymakers to reliance. This is regarded as something to be (if not eliminated) heavily reduced 
with opportune regulatory intervention. Therefore, an interpretative work will be framed with the 
view to finding reference to over-reliance within the approaches dealing with reliance on the credit 
ratings. The supposed shift from over-reliance to reliance is an aspect that this research has noticed 
and discussed as an evolution of the debate initially started with over-reliance. Accordingly, it will 
be shown how over-reliance is being tackled through an approach which preliminarily requires 
addressing the reliance on the credit ratings.  
 After fixing the way to reduce over-reliance, there will be room for evaluating the normative 
approaches which were finalised consequently. To this end, the focus will be on their contents and 
their current status of implementation. Through this analysis this study will give a twofold 
contribution to the literature on over-reliance. Firstly, there will be a critical assessment of the 
progress which has been made to translate the approaches so far. This will entail analysing the 
initial expectations of the debate vis-à-vis the final rules, and verify the degree of consistency of the 
final rules with the aims of the regulatory debate on over-reliance. In turn, this will permit us to 
discuss the extent to which the final rules are effective in reducing or eliminating the problem. 
Secondly, the outcomes will stimulate further reflections on the future of the strategies and on 
possible issues that the debate could take into consideration. All things considered, undertaking an 
investigation into over-reliance on the external credit ratings from the beginning of the debate until 
now, with a main focus on the risk deriving from the rating-based regulation, is a study which is 
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still missing. Accordingly, this work aims at stimulating new literature and to enhance the 
discussion on a new lively issue. The contribution it will give from a theoretical, policy and future 
studies perspective will be underlined in the final conclusions. In these introductory remarks, it is to 
be emphasised that the present research will give a more complete understanding of the 
phenomenon of investors’ over-reliance stemming from the hardwiring of credit ratings into 
legislation and regulatory frameworks. Also, by way of critically assessing the implementation of 
the normative approaches which have been elaborated to eliminate this risk, it will permit 
identifying and discussing possible improvements to make the approaches more effective in their 
purposes.  
 
I.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
In light of these aims, this research seeks answers to the following main question:  
• After five years since the elaboration of rules at the national, international and regional 
levels for reducing the risk of investors’ over-reliance deriving from the inclusion of credit 
ratings in financial regulations, to what extent are these rules effective to this end? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to give the work a specific direction. In this respect, the title 
of this thesis incorporates a Latin, general question representing the reasoning which will be 
necessary to answer the main question and, in turn, the further reflection which may arise after 
answering this. 
‘Quo vadis?’ is to be regarded as a catch-all phrase which will be of relevance to every 
chapter this thesis is comprised of. Narrowly speaking, this word refers to the future of the plans set 
out at all levels to address the phenomenon of over-reliance deriving from the credit rating 
references incorporated into the legislation and regulatory frameworks. Such a question can be 
answered in light of the results which can be drawn through the investigation into the phenomenon 
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of over-reliance, the elaborated regulatory approaches, and the status of implementation of them at 
the national, international and regional levels.  
 In the first place, this question can have a twofold meaning. If the results of the investigation 
are positive, this may bring into question what further improvements are necessary in relation to an 
approach which has progressed well since its definition and incorporation into the legislative 
frameworks. In this case, the answer to the question ‘quo vadis?’ could be a reflection following a 
positive outcome of the status of the implementation of a strategy dated back to 2010. This would 
be underpinned by the conclusion that the chosen approaches work in their aim to reduce the risk of 
over-reliance. Therefore, a further development of the analysis could either be in the sense that the 
approach needs only few improvements to be consolidated, or improvements are not necessary at 
this stage given the good progress; but they may be needed in the future. Consequently, numerous 
options could be discussed in the event that the overall analysis gives evidence of a workable 
strategy.  
 Conversely, the scenario is different in case the outcome of the analysis is negative or 
reveals an approach which has more shadows than lights. In this case, saying ‘quo vadis?’ entails 
discussing whether the approach is doomed to fail and, thus, the debate should discuss new 
strategies, or whether the shortcomings that the approach has brought to attention may be tackled 
without changing the gist of the strategy. Research based on this question is opportune because five 
years have passed since the start of the debate and the finalisation of the normative approaches 
elaborated by the FSB and the US regulators. As to the EU, it will be shown that the pace of 
implementation was different, but some results can be verified as well since the rules represent the 
full endorsement of the guidelines provided by the FSB. Consequently, there is sufficient room to 
investigate the phenomenon of over-reliance since its introduction in the post-crisis regulatory 
debate and from the perspective of the progress made to reduce its risk through the rules which have 
been set out so far.  
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 Broadly speaking, ‘quo vadis?’ is the basis to answer all the sub-questions which will lead 
to the main question. For instance, the lack of proper definition of the phenomenon will make it 
necessary to provide a better understanding of it through the elaboration of a definition according to 
whether it stems from the rating based regulation or the structured finance sector. This will be the 
first direction this research will have to take. After having identified, understood and properly 
defined the phenomenon, the question ‘quo vadis?’ arises again and refers to a new direction to be 
taken, namely the analysis of the approaches elaborated to reduce the risk deriving from rating-
based regulation and their effectiveness. Finally, this question arises in relation to the results of the 
analysis of these approaches and will be concerned with questioning whether the approaches can be 
improved and how they may be improved. 
 Putting things into a more specific perspective, this research is divided into the following 
core chapters. The second chapter, as its title suggests, ‘in search of a meaning’, deals with the 
phenomenon of over-reliance with the view to providing a clear understanding of it within the post-
crisis debate on the structure and operations of the CRAs. In this respect, the analytical approach 
which will be followed is based on the line of demarcation between reliance and over-reliance in 
accordance with their positive and negative connotations. As will be often remarked in the progress 
of the work, the former is the ‘good’ and the latter the ’bad’ of the credit ratings. To this end, to 
understand over-reliance on the credit ratings it is necessary to start with the credit ratings and 
discuss the role and importance of the CRAs in the global financial markets. In the context of the 
reliance on the credit ratings, namely the ‘good’ aspect, the necessary information will be provided 
by questioning why there is widespread use of the credit ratings in both the private and the public 
sector. This sketches the contours of the reliance on the credit ratings. It will permit us to focus, in 
particular, on the tie between the credit ratings and the investors and market participants, as well as 
between the ratings and the regulators. Specifically, being the subject of this thesis the problem of 
over-reliance deriving from the credit rating references in legislation, this introductory analysis will 
coherently move from those who rely on the credit ratings and are at risk of over-relying from those 
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who, by relying on the credit ratings in their regulatory programmes, may provide an incentive to 
over-rely. Through this understanding, the analysis can be devoted to the other side of the coin, that 
is, the ‘bad’ of the credit ratings. In this context, answers are sought in relation to which unintended 
consequences can derive from the use of the credit ratings. Basically, the discussion will 
concentrate on some specific facts as examples of the negative impact that the rating downgrades 
can have on the financial stability. This will permit us to circumscribe the focus on the rating-based 
regulation and its potentiality to facilitate phenomena such as cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours 
which can have systemic implications for financial stability. This will be the grounding for shifting 
completely from reliance to over-reliance on the external credit ratings since it is argued that these 
systemic relevant phenomena are exacerbated by the investors’ and market participants’ over-
reliance on the external credit ratings. This will mark the beginning of the investigation into the 
phenomenon of over-reliance. To this end, the main question to be answered is concerned with what 
over-reliance is. As already mentioned, it will be discussed how the word was introduced at the 
international level without providing a clear definition of it. In this part of the thesis such a gap will 
be closed by providing a definition which comes at the end of an investigation aimed at verifying 
which sectors can facilitate over-reliance and why. It will be shown that there are two sectors in 
which over-reliance may arise. Both sectors imply a different definition of over-reliance and tackle 
their own risk of over-reliance through different regulatory approaches. Having clarified these 
aspects, the scope of the research can be circumscribed to its central topic, namely over-reliance 
stemming from the hardwiring of the credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks. 
Knowing accurately why there is the risk of over-reliance in this area and its implications, we will 
have a sufficient basis to illustrate the normative approaches which have been set out to address the 
problem. Specifically, attention will be given to the FSB set of principles to reduce reliance on the 
credit ratings, Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
(Dodd Frank Act)43 and to the rules developed at the EU level within the reforms of the CRAs. 
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These are to be regarded as the three macro areas which have provided a strategy finally translated 
into soft or hard rules. However, the discussion will not result in a mere illustration of the 
approaches. On the contrary, by taking stock of the evolution of the debate on over-reliance, this 
research will note a development of it towards reliance on the credit ratings. Both the FSB 
principles and Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act are denominated in this regard. Over-reliance 
seems to have disappeared and hence it will be questioned whether the rules and principles deriving 
from the debate on over-reliance still refer to it despite their primary reference to reliance. This 
investigation will try to give substance to the assertion that the US rules and the FSB guidelines 
implicitly refer to over-reliance by way of addressing, primarily, its potential source, that is, 
regulatory reliance on the credit ratings; and then by enhancing the market participants’ capabilities 
to conduct their own due diligence and credit quality assessment. This will be confirmed through 
the analysis of the US debate on the implementation of Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act, the 
contents of the FSB two-pronged approach and by linking the FSB strategy to the EU rules which 
explicitly refer to over-reliance as a full endorsement of the FSB principles. All things considered, 
this chapter of the thesis sets the context, defines over-reliance and reflects over the development of 
the debate towards the consequent normative approaches.  
 The third chapter of the thesis will accordingly deal with an examination of the current 
status of implementation of the strategies developed at the national, international and regional 
levels. Firstly, a comparison between the US and EU rules will be made with the view to 
highlighting similarities and differences and answer the question of whether their implementation 
process is to be regarded as a coordinated effort under the auspices of the FSB or whether the two 
legal systems pursue different plans. Successively, by taking the FSB approach as the general 
paradigm upon which the implementation at the US and EU level can be assessed, answers will be 
provided as to the question of which final rules have been written in accordance with the FSB basic 
strategy. In this context, the progress made by the US and EU legal systems will be critically 
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reviewed and finally a reflection on the outcomes of the final rules will be provided. This will be 
based on the question concerning the consistency of the final rules with the general strategy, and 
their suitability to reduce the risk of over-reliance. In more detail, this part of the third chapter is 
concerned with the first level of the general strategy which requires the reduction of reliance 
through the removal and replacement of the credit rating references with valid alternatives. On the 
other hand, the second level is concerned with the enhancement of the investors’ and market 
participants’ capabilities of conducting independent credit risk analysis so as not to solely rely on 
the credit ratings. This second level will then be discussed by questioning whether the development 
of independent credit risk assessment and due diligence is feasible for all the investors and market 
participants. Preliminary conclusions will be drawn in light of the results achieved in the overall 
third chapter. In particular, to anticipate some of the results, the implementation of the approach 
currently will slow down due to some intrinsic limits. Besides, it will be discussed that the risk of 
over-reliance is still latent due to the impossibility of completely eliminating the credit ratings.  
 This may raise the question of whether the strategy has failed or will be failing in the long 
term. Such a question would be obvious because of the negative outcome of the translation 
progress.  
 Nonetheless, prior to this, the results stimulate a more in-depth reflection on the post-crisis 
debate on over-reliance on credit ratings. In more detail, the questions are concerned with what the 
debate has missed while elaborating the approach on over-reliance deriving from the credit rating 
references in legislation and whether anything could have been done in the past to anticipate the 
problem of over-reliance. This is the fourth chapter of the thesis in which a reflection is provided as 
to the extent to which over-reliance deriving from the rating-based regulation has been adequately 
proven to support the current approaches. This question will be answered by preliminarily 
discussing the etiological nexus between the rating reforms and the CRAs’ failures. This will 
introduce the question of whether the elaborated approaches are supported and justified in light of 
strong evidence of the existence of over-reliance. In accordance with this aim, it will be argued that 
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the current approaches seem not to have been thoroughly evaluated because over-reliance 
concerning the rating-based regulation has not been sufficiently proven. This result will be 
highlighted by way of comparing the lack of evidence of this type of over-reliance with the strong 
evidence of the over-reliance provided in the structure finance sector. Therefore, not only the 
approach slows down in its progress because of intrinsic limits, but also because it tries to solve a 
problem which has not been adequately demonstrated in its existence. Furthermore, it will be 
discussed and given evidence of the fact that over-reliance is not exclusively a matter of best 
practice by investors and market participants as the debate has always claimed. Regulators might 
have anticipated the phenomenon long before the recent financial crisis. This is not only referred to 
the widespread use of credit ratings by the public sector, but mainly to the fact that even during the 
last century the regulators were constantly warned by the CRAs against the over-emphasis they 
were giving to the credit ratings. The unintended consequences which could have been derived from 
this regulatory over-emphasis, especially in relation to the market participants’ use of the credit 
ratings, were also highlighted and explained by the agencies. However, warnings remained on 
paper. Quo vadis then?  
 This fourth chapter tries to go beyond the present and past shortcomings of the debate on 
over-reliance. The focus will be on analysing whether the ongoing implementation process can be 
out of the quicksand which seems to make it stagnant. It will be argued that the strategy is a no 
turning-back point and, for this reason, it does not make sense to claim that it should be cancelled. 
Furthermore, as will be shown, some positive aspects can be highlighted. Consequently, the 
discussion will try to give some suggestions to enhance the implementation progress so that new 
results can be monitored and discussed.   
 Based on the investigation conducted in these core chapters, the overall results of this 
research will be spelt out in the final conclusions.  
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I.5 BUILDING THE RESEARCH PATH: SOURCES AND MATERIALS 
This thesis pursues an exploratory aim in relation to the phenomenon of over-reliance on the 
external credit ratings. The research also involves a critical assessment of the current status of 
implementation of the approaches elaborated to curb the risk of over-reliance deriving from the 
credit rating references in financial legislation and regulatory frameworks. As mentioned above, the 
investigation will start by drawing a line between reliance and over-reliance on credit ratings. In 
doing so, the former will be construed as the ‘good’ of the credit ratings while the latter as the 
‘bad’, since it represents the negative escalation of reliance into over-reliance. As this analysis is 
primarily based on the question of why the private and public sector rely on the credit ratings, the 
answer will be sought by briefly tracking the history of the CRAs, as well as the nature, 
characteristics and importance of the credit ratings in the financial markets. To this end, the analysis 
is based on secondary sources, in particular, on the strand of literature which provides the historical 
grounding to understand the rating industry, its operation in the financial markets, and the credit 
ratings. This provides a useful insight into the ‘good’ side of the credit ratings. The ‘good’ side of 
the credit ratings is traced back to the advantages deriving from the use of the ratings, such as the 
reduction of the information asymmetries and transaction costs. These secondary sources are also 
combined with references to what the major CRAs say about themselves, when they explain the 
nature of the credit rating, the value of their services, and how they interact with the investors and 
the market participants. This literature is also the basis to expand the analysis on the reliance from 
the private to the public sector. Within this part, it is essential to explain the so-called widespread 
use of credit ratings into legislation. In this case, the questions of where the regulatory use of the 
credit ratings started, which legislative sectors make wide use of them more than others, and which 
legal systems make significant use of them in the legislation, are answered through the study of the 
historical papers and the recent reports which were issued in the wake of the recent crisis. These, in 
fact, permit us to identify a change in the language of the regulators and scholars to define the tie 
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between the regulators and the credit ratings. In practice, the hardwiring of the credit ratings vis-à-
vis the rating-based regulation will be contrasted in their different meanings. While the former is 
interpreted within the ‘bad’ side of the credit ratings and is now a zeitgeist in the context of over-
reliance, the latter is construed within the ‘good’ side of the credit ratings. Such results are 
generated through the understanding of the literature providing an overview of the history of the 
regulatory use of the credit ratings and the role and responsibility of the CRAs in the aftermath of 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
 The post-crisis literature is also the main source for shifting from the good to the bad of the 
credit ratings and thus introducing the phenomenon of over-reliance. In essence, the main objective 
is to illustrate how the negative aspects associated to the rating downgrades are exacerbated by the 
over-reliance on them. At this stage, the phenomenon is discussed and the main sources to this end 
are the reports produced during the post-crisis regulatory dialogue on the CRAs at the national, 
international and regional levels. As mentioned, this thesis will address a lack of definition of the 
phenomenon according to whether it stems from the hardwiring or from the structured finance 
sector. A lack of literature on the phenomenon urges this work to attempt to provide a definition of 
two types of over-reliance which will be identified through the interpretation of the debate’s reports.  
 Then, focussing on the central topic of this thesis, namely over-reliance deriving from the 
regulatory use of the credit ratings, the question to be addressed is whether the phenomenon was 
introduced for the first time after the crisis. In essence, it will be investigated whether, before the 
crisis, the rating-based regulation had ever been regarded as carrying the risk of over-reliance by the 
market participants. This question is answered by comparing the two legal systems, namely the US 
and the EU, which have a normative framework on the CRAs. In more detail, the regulatory 
documents such as the US SEC releases and the EU consultations documents will be analysed with 
the view to searching for clues about the phenomenon before the crisis. These sources will help the 
investigation conclude that over-reliance deriving from the embedding of the credit ratings into 
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legislation came under the regulatory spotlight only in the post-crisis debate and it is a segment of 
the broad post-crisis regulatory reforms on the CRAs.   
 Having contextualised and defined over-reliance, the scope of the research can be widened 
and can deal with the regulatory approaches to address the problem. The approaches set out by the 
FSB, the US and EU regulators will be illustrated. Methodologically, the FSB set of guidelines will 
be regarded throughout the thesis as the general paradigm upon which the implementation of the US 
and the EU rules can be tested. Nonetheless, as mentioned, both the FSB and the US approaches 
deal with reliance instead of over-reliance and this raises the question of the relevance of over-
reliance within these approaches. A positive answer to this question is reached by searching and 
analysing the data provided by the regulators debating the finalisation of their approaches. This 
permits the claim that over-reliance is implicitly referred to in Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act 
and in the second level of the FSB two-pronged approach. This assertion is then concretely tested 
by referring to the EU rules on the CRAs which came into force in June 2013 which explicitly refer 
to over-reliance. This interpretative path, based on legislative documents, soft-law guidelines and 
political reports, leads this research to fix the approach against over-reliance: the phenomenon is 
tackled by addressing its source, namely the credit rating references, and subsequently through the 
enhancement of the investors’ ability to conduct their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. 
 This is the platform to analyse the current status of implementation of the approach. The US 
and the EU are an obligatory reference in that they are the only two systems with rules against over-
reliance and an ongoing implementation process. Such an analysis is consequential to the FSB 
warning that the implementation process of the approach is slow at the global level, while only the 
US and the EU have made significant progress. Therefore, discussing the progress of the two 
systems by way of illustrating their final rules will not be a mere descriptive process. On the 
contrary, it will permit us to take stock of the results since the debate started and evaluate what has 
been produced. This critical assessment takes into consideration the data resulting from the 
consultation periods which were launched in the US and the EU when the rules against over-
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reliance were under discussion. In particular, the written opinions provided by the main users of the 
credit ratings are regarded as fundamental to chart how the final rules were set out and to discuss 
which role the credit ratings may still maintain within legislation.  
 Moreover, the opinions of the users of the credit ratings are crucial to build up the discussion 
concerning the evidence of over-reliance which takes place in the fourth chapter of the thesis. As to 
this, the evidence of over-reliance deriving from the regulatory and the structured finance sectors is 
contrasted and some significant results are drawn by critically considering some pre-crisis and post-
crisis surveys. Finally, the opinions expressed during consultation periods are essential documents 
with regard to what the regulators have missed in the past in relation to the emphasis given to the 
credit ratings in regulations. The assertion that the debate on over-reliance could be anticipated is 
based on the warnings given by the major CRAs back in 1994. These were found among the 
responses given to the consultations launched by the SEC in relation to the NRSROs status.  
 All things considered, this work has an exploratory, holistic approach into the phenomenon 
of over-reliance. Its results are generated through the study of historical materials, the interpretation 
of legislative documents, the comparison and critical assessment of the final rules, as well as 
through the analysis of the views expressed by the users of the credit ratings and the CRAs.  
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CHAPTER II 
OVER-RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL CREDIT RATINGS: IN SEARCH 
OF A MEANING 
 
II.1 INTRODUCTION 
Among all the matters of concern relating to the structure and operations of the rating industry, the 
regulatory debate that the recent financial turmoil triggered at the national, international and 
regional levels also focussed on the degree of influence that external credit ratings may have on 
investors and market participants. In particular, at the outbreak of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the 
massive downgrades applied to structured products and the ensuing, dramatic, sell-off of them 
prompted the regulators to reflect over the investors’ dependence on external credit ratings.44 In 
essence, it was argued that investment grade ratings assigned to debt instruments by CRAs may 
have the effect of discouraging investors from undertaking their own due diligence and credit risk 
assessment. Such an analysis, should always be performed while making investment decisions and, 
thus, credit ratings should be among the sources of information to complement the investors’ 
analysis. 45  Significantly, where a triple A assigned by CRAs is interpreted as a guarantee of 
creditworthiness and no independent, additional, credit risk analysis is performed credit ratings 
become primary credit risk assessment tools.  
 Within the regulatory debate, this situation has been synthesised as follows: over-reliance on 
external credit ratings by investors and market participants. In the first place, it can be understood 
that this is a phenomenon which is not concerned with the CRAs themselves but with the conduct of 
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investors and market participants. In other words, while CRA-related issues such as conflict of 
interest, reducing entry barriers and increasing competition in the rating industry, accuracy of rating 
methodologies and timeliness, as well as CRAs’ accountability are commonly discussed within the 
operation of the CRAs, over-reliance pertains mainly to the behaviour of investors and market 
participants. Put more simply, over-reliance is a behavioural phenomenon which is directly related 
to the way investors and market participants approach the credit ratings. Hence, to understand over-
reliance is necessary to consider the relationship between the credit ratings and investors. This 
context raises numerous questions, such as what over-reliance is, why investors and market 
participants over-rely, and which factors are determinant for the escalation of the reliance on credit 
ratings into over-reliance. The clarification of these aspects permits us to introduce and take chart of 
the regulatory debate and consequent legislative approaches which have been elaborated to address 
the phenomenon in question. 
 This part of the thesis aims to introduce and explain the phenomenon of over-reliance on 
external credit ratings by investors and market participants. In doing so, the following approach will 
be applied. In keeping with the paradigm set out in the introduction to the present work, over-
reliance will be conceived as the negative escalation of reliance. Consequently, given the negative 
connotation that the word has in connection with the use of credit ratings, the analysis will start by 
discussing the reliance on credit ratings. Reliance on credit ratings will be interpreted as the ‘good’ 
part of credit ratings. Indeed, reliance has a positive connotation in that it is concerned with the 
unquestionable benefits which derive from the use of external credit ratings in the financial markets, 
notably, the reduction of information asymmetries and transaction costs. In this respect, the focus 
will be on what credit ratings are, why they occupy a centre stage position in the financial markets, 
who uses the credit ratings and why. In particular, with regard to the users of the credit ratings, the 
analysis will contrast the use of the credit ratings in the private and public sector and identify the 
reasons for reliance. Understanding the ‘good’ aspects of credit ratings also stimulates consideration 
of the potential negative implications deriving from the use of the credit ratings. This permits us to 
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move the analysis from the ‘good’ to the ‘bad’ aspects of the credit ratings. Crucially, this will be 
the context in which the escalation from reliance to over-reliance can be detected. Thus, the 
discussion can concentrate on the phenomenon of over-reliance on external credit ratings. In this 
respect, the concerned paragraphs will undertake a broad investigation into over-reliance. Firstly, it 
will be argued that the debate has never given a specific definition of over-reliance. Consequently, 
this gap will be closed by providing a definition built upon a distinction between two different 
contexts which will be earmarked as over-reliance risky: 1) the hardwiring of credit ratings into 
legislation and regulatory frameworks; and 2) the structured finance sector. Over-reliance stemming 
from the regulatory use of credit ratings will be the central topic of the thesis. Accordingly, this 
chapter will conclude by introducing and discussing the regulatory approaches which have been 
elaborated at the national, international and regional levels to tackle the phenomenon. 
 
II.2 THE ‘GOOD’ ASPECTS OF THE CREDIT RATINGS: A BASIS FOR RELYING 
 
II.2.1 The rating industry: origins and development 
CRAs are key players in the financial markets. Their business is concerned with the assessment of 
the credit risk of borrowers such as corporations, municipalities and sovereign governments.46 
Credit rating services can be traced back to the early nineteenth century when the predecessors of 
the modern CRAs, the US credit reporting agencies, began providing information services on 
railroad bonds. At that time, the US industrial centres and the major cities had rapid growth through 
the high volume of business which the creation and expansion of railroads generated.47 Railroads 
gave a significant surge to the US economic and technological progress. In that context, railroad 
corporations flourished and set up in those territories in which funding could be easily obtained 
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because of the presence of banks and investors.48 The set up of the US railroad corporations and 
their capital needs, in turn, paved the way for the creation of a railroad bond market which grew 
domestically and soon spread internationally.49 
 Importantly, the US railroad bond market changed the way of doing business. Before the 
expansion of the railroad market, transactions were mainly at a domestic level and among people 
who knew each other. This meant that those providing funds did not need much information on 
their debtors’ repayment capacity. 50  However, once the railroad market grew larger, the 
geographical scope of the transactions increased as well. Consequently, lenders needed more 
information on their counterparties’ trustworthiness. To this end, letters of recommendation 
provided by bankers, lawyers or intermediary friends were the only source of information available 
in the early nineteenth century. Nonetheless, these could easily be faked or forged.51 Meanwhile, 
markets and trades kept growing. Such a constant, rapid evolution made it clear that new channels 
to gather and disseminate credit information in a more systematic, reliable and efficient way were 
necessary. In that period, Lewis Tappan, a silk businessman, understood these needs and specialised 
in the supply of commercial information. In essence, over the course of his business he collected 
and kept record of all his current and potential customers’ credit information.52 In 1841, in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the silk business, his data proved to be crucial to other merchants 
involved in the same sector, who wanted to have information on the trustworthiness of their current 
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and potential clients. Hence, he set up his Mercantile Agency with the view of selling information 
on the creditworthiness and business standing of US commercial enterprises.53  
 Other mercantile credit raters followed this example and entered a business which turned out 
to be very profitable for Tappan. In particular, in 1890 the predecessor of the rating agency 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P), Poor’s Publishing Company, published the Poor’s Manual which 
provided a compilation and analysis of business information, mainly on railroad bonds.54 These 
were the roots of the credit rating industry and market which would have started in the early 1900s. 
John Moody, a Wall Street financial analyst, took a close look into the business of the mercantile 
agencies and noticed some significant drawbacks. In essence, the information and data embodied in 
the reports sold by the mercantile agencies were too intricate to be clearly understood by investors. 
Accordingly, he reviewed and simplified the information set out in the mercantile agencies’ reports 
and in 1909 published his Analysis of Railroad Investments.55 His idea was quite revolutionary: 
providing synthetic credit quality information expressed through easy-to-understand alphabetical 
symbols.56 In practice, bonds were assigned alphabetical symbols expressing different grades of 
creditworthiness. For instance, an ‘A’ letter meant high probability of repayment; by contrast, a 
letter ‘D’ indicated a high probability that the issuer of the debt instrument would default in the 
repayment of his debt.57 This method, applied to stocks and bonds, was quite successful. John 
Moody’s book was sold all over the US and paved the way for the creation of the credit rating 
industry. In fact, Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) was set up in 1914 and created its first 
rating department in 1922.58 Following the John Moody’s method, new agencies entered the rating 
business. These included Poor’s Publishing Company in 1916, Standard Statistic Company Inc in 
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1922 and Fitch Publishing Company in 1924.59 These were the first rating agencies which are now 
commonly regarded as the most powerful within the rating market.60  
 Currently, the rating market is characterised by numerous agencies. Also, recent legislation 
which has been issued in the US and the EU in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 financial crisis has 
tried to strengthen competition by setting out specific registration requirements to be met to access 
the rating market. This has undoubtedly increased the number of CRAs. For example, in the EU, 
under the registration and certification system laid down under Regulation 1060/2009 (hereinafter: 
CRA Regulation I),61 there are more than thirty European registered CRAs.62 In the US, there are 
more than ten CRAs which can operate under the status of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs).63 Nonetheless, there is still a high concentration in the rating industry 
which has maintained its oligopolistic structure, characterised by the power and dominance of the 
most ancient, namely Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. These three agencies operate internationally and are 
able to provide a wide range of credit rating services: from corporate and sovereign to structured 
finance credit ratings.64 Other agencies and recent entrants do not have the same size and volume of 
business as the three big. They do not provide a full package of rating services and concentrate their 
business on specific sectors at a domestic level.65  
 
II.2.2 Credit Ratings: categories and formation process 
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As mentioned above, CRAs provide an assessment of the creditworthiness of public and private 
borrowers and of a wide range of debt instruments. These include corporate bonds, sovereign bonds 
and complex structured finance products which result from a securitisation process. Hence, from a 
financial product perspective, credit ratings can be grouped into three categories: corporate ratings; 
structured finance ratings; and sovereign ratings. Narrowly speaking, the agencies provide two 
different types of credit ratings: issue-specific credit ratings and issuer credit ratings. Issue-specific 
credit ratings are concerned with the assessment of the credit quality of an issuer in relation to his 
financial obligation, class of financial obligations, or a specific financial program. This type of 
credit rating, among other things, also forecasts the recovery prospect associated with the specific 
debt being analysed. Conversely, issuer-credit ratings aim to assess the obligor’s overall capacity to 
service its financial obligation. Both of these types of credit ratings can be notched up or down by 
the agencies. Specifically, the term ‘notching’ refers to the practice of differentiating issues in 
accordance with the issuer’s overall credit quality.66  
 The rating assigned by the CRAs is only concerned with the credit risk of borrowers and 
debt instruments. Other risks such as market and liquidity risks are not included.67 In general, to 
assess the credit risk, CRAs apply quantitative (systematic assessment of financial data, the 
calculation of ratios, running of models and so forth) and qualitative methods (business risk, the 
impact of regulatory change, the quality of management, the implied future industry outlook and so 
on).68 Each agency applies its own rating methodologies. Differences in the rating process depend 
on the type of product being rated and the information that the rating analysts have to review. For 
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instance, for the determination of sovereign ratings, the CRAs refer to criteria such as 
macroeconomic and fiscal indicators of a country,69 while for corporate bonds they may refer to a 
company’s financial statements, franchise value, management quality and competitive position.70 
On the other hand, for structured finance credit ratings the analysis aims to assess the credit quality 
of the securitised assets, the payment structure and cash flow mechanics, operational and 
administrative risks of key participants, as well as historical performance data of the underlying 
assets.71  
 Basically, the credit quality analysis provided by the CRAs is the result of a process 
conducted by a rating committee in which decisions are taken by majority vote. Such a process is 
initiated through a contract entered into between an agency and those who ask for the credit 
ratings.72 Credit rating seekers can be issuers of debt instruments or investors who subscribe for 
having the credit rating reports. This highlights an important feature of the rating industry, that is to 
say, CRAs are paid by the entities which solicit a credit rating. Therefore, the CRAs’ business 
model is identified as the issuers-pay-model. Such a business model, however, was only adopted by 
the CRAs during the seventies. From the beginning of their existence, CRAs used to operate under 
the subscribers-pay model according to which they received their revenues from the investors.73 The 
shift from the subscribers-pay-model to the issuers-pay-model was due to a number of reasons. In 
1970 the US’ largest railroad company, Penn Central Transportation, went bankrupt. This resulted 
in an increase in the demand of ratings by investors and market participants who regarded the 
information services provided by the CRAs as valuable for their investment decisions. At the same 
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time, advances in technology, notably, photocopy and fax machines, facilitated the diffusion of the 
information sold by the CRAs.74 This exacerbated a free-rider problem in which some investors 
could take advantage of the information others had obtained and paid for. Put more simply, through 
fax and photocopies, investors could obtain, free of charge, the credit risk information the agencies 
had sold to their subscribers.75 This caused a decline in the business of the CRAs and explains why 
the agencies decided to change their business model. Despite heavy criticism because of the 
potential for conflict of interest between the agencies and the entities they rate, the issuers-pay-
model has remained unchanged.76 Since its introduction, this business model has been applied by 
almost all the CRAs.77  
 Nevertheless, credit ratings are not exclusively solicited and paid by the issuers. The CRAs 
also issue unsolicited credit ratings. These can be distinguished from solicited ratings in two 
features. Whereas solicited ratings are requested and paid by the issuers, unsolicited ratings are 
neither requested nor paid.78 Secondly, solicited ratings are based on the information and data 
provided by the issuers, while unsolicited ratings are exclusively based on public information.79 
This context brings to attention the essentiality of the information supplied and used by the CRAs 
for the determination of their ratings. As opposed to unsolicited ratings, the rating process relating 
to solicited credit ratings is indeed characterised by a synergy between the rating analysts and the 
issuers. In this case, the rating committee will give consideration to the data supplied by the issuers 
as well as to publicly available information. However, the unsolicited ratings lack this synergy and 
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the rating committee will have to base its rating decision only on publicly available data. 80 
Nonetheless, the rating process leading up to the issue of a credit rating follows the same stages in 
either case. To this end, the rating process can be summarised into four phases: 1) collection of 
information; 2) selection of relevant data; 3) credit rating determination; and 4) disclosure of the 
credit ratings.81   
Putting things into the perspective of a solicited rating, the first phase is characterised by the 
demand of credit ratings by issuers and consequent supply of information to the hired agency. For 
example, taking position from corporate credit ratings the data provided may be concerned with the 
issuer’s business environment, policy choices and strategic plans. 82  In essence, the agency’s 
financial analysts will require financial information regarding the audited annual financial 
statements of the last five years, as well as narrative descriptions of operations and products. These 
data will be assessed with the view to selecting the most relevant for a credit risk analysis. Given 
the interaction between the issuer and the agency during the first stages of the rating process, 
additional information can be supplied and, if necessary, meetings can be organised between the 
parties.83 Indeed, these meetings with the corporate management are crucial for the formation of the 
credit rating in that they permit review of the issuer’s financial condition and any other factor which 
can be of relevance for the issuance of the credit rating. Also, the ups and downs of business cycles 
will be taken into consideration for determining the rating. 84  This part of the rating process 
terminates with a preliminary credit rating determination prepared by the agency’s analysts and 
explained in a report which will be submitted to the committee. The final determination is taken by 
the committee by majority vote. This leads to the last stage of the credit rating process in which the 
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credit rating is disclosed and made available to the public. Nonetheless, issuers may decide to 
maintain the credit rating confidential or prevent the publication of a rating they feel dissatisfied 
with. In particular, this may happen in the structured finance sector in which the issuer can accept or 
appeal the rating determination, or ultimately hire another CRA and pay a break-up fee to the 
previous one.85 Finally, the agencies maintain surveillance on an ongoing basis of the issued credit 
ratings. In particular, in the context of the solicited credit ratings, as part of the surveillance process, 
periodic meetings may be scheduled with the company’s management so as to apprise the analysts 
of possible changes in the rated entity which can impact on the assigned rating.  
 
II.2.3 Credit ratings as opinions on creditworthiness 
The credit rating which is disseminated to the public is expressed through alphabetical symbols 
(AAA; BBB and so on). Rating scales are ranks of creditworthiness, from investment grade to 
speculative grade. Historically, the major CRAs have applied separate rating scales for long-term 
and short-term securities. For instance, long-term credit ratings, which normally refer to obligations 
with an original maturity of more than one year are classified into several categories: from those 
expressing the strongest creditworthiness (AAA), to those expressing high probability of default 
(D). Clearly, the credit ratings in the four highest categories, that is, AAA, AA, A and BBB are 
classified as investment grade ratings, while those in categories such as BB or below are classified 
as speculative grade ratings or high yield ‘junk’, to underline the high likelihood of the issuer’s 
default in the repayment of its obligation. This way of expressing the creditworthiness of borrowers 
and debt instruments make the credit ratings easy-to-understand tools. Importantly, the credit risk 
assessment is synthesised into practical symbols which convey information that is useful to 
investors and market participants. On the other hand, these symbols are not cast-iron guarantees of 
creditworthiness. CRAs have always stressed that their credit ratings are forward-looking opinions 
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subject to changes over time. As such, they should not be interpreted as indicators of the suitability 
of an investment, nor as recommendations to buy or sell a financial product.86 
 The credit ratings’ nature as opinions has been acknowledged by regulators as well. For 
example, at the EU level, this is defined under Article 3(a) of the CRA Regulation I.87 By contrast, 
in the US, this nature is somehow controversial in relation to the prospects of a CRAs’ civil 
liability. In more detail, CRAs have always emphasised that the credit ratings are opinions not 
dissimilar to those expressed by journalists. For this reason, they have always claimed that their 
credit ratings come within the freedom of speech immunity under the US First Amendment.88 This 
view has been accepted by the majority of the US Courts and policymakers as well. Based on this, 
US CRAs have always been quite shielded from civil liability.89 The recent financial crisis and the 
contribution given by the CRAs to it, put the agencies under the regulatory spotlight at the national, 
international and regional levels. Among other issues, the establishment of a civil liability 
framework for CRAs under the US Dodd Frank Act 90  and the EU Regulation No 462/2013 
(hereinafter: CRA Regulation III)91 aims at reducing what some academics have defined as the 
‘CRAs’ accountability gap’ due to the abovementioned controversial nature of the credit ratings as 
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freedom of speech.92 At present, the civil liability frameworks that the recent reforms in the US and 
EU have set out aim at closing this accountability gap and guaranteeing an adequate right of redress 
before courts to investors and issuers who claim damages consequently to unbiased credit ratings.93 
 
II.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT RATINGS IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR’S RELIANCE 
 
II.3.1 The CRAs’ informational services 
CRAs occupy a centre stage position in the financial markets. Credit ratings are valuable tools 
which help investors and market participants gauge the credit quality of various debt instruments. 
For this reason, some scholars emphasise that the credit ratings are a fact of life, a culture, or 
‘common language’ so that investors have to deal with them even if they do not want.94 This raises 
the question of why credit ratings play such an essential role in financial markets.  
 As the history of the agencies has shown, the agencies came to existence to provide credit 
risk information. Essentially, the CRAs are information intermediaries which contribute to mitigate 
information asymmetries between the investors and the issuers. The concept of information 
asymmetry is well developed in economic theory. Akerlof explained the information asymmetries 
through the example of the used-car market, which can be summarised as follows.95 Assuming that 
every car is good or bad (‘lemon’),96 the buyer of a new car will know whether this is a good one or 
a ‘lemon’ only after owning the car for a sufficient length of time. Then, following Akerlof’s 
theory, we may suppose that the owner of a good car wants to sell his car. Only the owner of the 
used car knows that his car is a good one, while potential buyers do not. To the extent that sellers 
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have now more knowledge about the quality of a car than buyers, an information asymmetry is 
created. In particular, before a transaction takes place an adverse selection problem is identified in 
the buyers’ inability to select between good and bad products.97 As it is difficult for buyers to 
distinguish between good and bad cars, used good and bad cars risk being sold at the same price. 
Buyers will be reluctant to pay the price offered by the seller for a used car and the seller will be 
unable to get the fair price. In other words, due to their inability to distinguish between high-quality 
products and low-quality products (‘lemons’), buyers will finally offer the same reduced price for 
both. As a result of this, lemons may drive high-quality products out of the market and the market 
may even collapse.98 
 The ‘lemon’ principle can be theoretically applied to credit markets: lenders (used-car 
buyers) may be unable to distinguish high-risk borrowers (lemons) from low-risk borrowers (good 
cars). Consequently, lenders would charge all borrowers for the same rate of interest, that is, the one 
which should cover the risk of lending to a high-risk borrower. Like the seller of a good used car 
may sell this for the price of a lemon, a low-risk borrower may pay the same interest rate as a high-
risk one. Accordingly, the volume of borrowing by low-risk borrowers may be jeopardised and 
lenders may misallocate productive resources away from them.99 As seen, such problems stem from 
the information asymmetries according to which one party has more or superior information than its 
counterparty. Within capital markets, in which financing is sought through the issuance of debt 
instruments, this informational gap pertains to the issuer’s capacity to repay the principal and 
interest to the investors on maturity.100 In short, only the issuer knows whether he will be able to 
service his debt. Numerous consequences can derive from this informational disequilibrium. To 
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begin with, investors may consider issuers as not reliable enough. Consequently, they may decide 
not to provide funds and stay out of the market; otherwise, they may provide funds by charging 
issuers with a high risk premium. Thus, issuers will have to pay higher interest rates.101 These 
situations increase the cost of transactions and may hamper the functioning of the capital markets, 
especially where investors decide not to provide funds or issuers are not available to bear higher 
interest rates.102  
 In this context, CRAs will act as intermediaries in the demand and supply of capital. 
Through the credit risk analysis embodied into the credit ratings, they will help reduce the 
information asymmetry between the two parties and mitigate adverse selection problems.103 Both 
issuers and investors benefit from the CRAs’ service. On the one hand, investors will have more 
information on their counterparties’ credit quality and avoid the costs that they would face where 
they had to acquire the information by themselves. Furthermore, the informational service is 
provided by a neutral third party which is supposed to have qualified people and adequate 
instruments to conduct a proper credit risk analysis.104  Finally, investors who do not have the 
means, time or the capacity to conduct such an analysis may rely on the credit risk analysis 
provided by experts. On the other hand, issuers, by being rated investment grade can access the 
capital markets to obtain financing more easily. Also, they will avoid the higher risk premium that 
the investors may require, as well as an increase in the cost of transactions.105 These advantages 
contribute to the primacy of credit ratings in the financial markets and reliance by investors and 
market participants. In this context, it is discussed by scholars the extent to which, in addition to the 
illustrated advantages, the CRAs’ reputation as good providers of credit risk analysis plays a 
decisive role with regard to the market participants’ reliance. In particular, some empirical studies 
                                                          
101
 Cally Jordan, ‘International Capital Markets, Law and Institutions’ (OUP 2014). 
102
 Gianluca Mattarocci, ‘The Independence of Credit Rating Agencies: How Business Models and 
Regulators Interact’ (AP 2014). 
103
 Ibid. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 Ibid. 
60 
 
view the reputation factor as the agency’s product. In more detail, issuers would buy a share in the 
agency’s good reputation so as to be seen as trustworthy counterparties by potential investors.106 
This is advantageous to little known issuers who seek high ratings to build up their reputation in the 
capital markets, while established issuers can only consolidate their reputation in the markets by 
maintaining their high ratings. Investors, in turn, will be willing to provide their funds because they 
regard the agency which issued the top credit ratings as trustworthy.107 For this reason, they will 
accept a lower risk premium they may otherwise impose on unrated issuers. This means that good 
credit ratings provided by recognised CRAs increase the probability of acceptance of debt 
instruments. Financial products rated investment grade are likely to be attractive to a wide group of 
investors. Good credit ratings create trust and are therefore regarded as a pre-requisite to access the 
capital markets.108  
 
II.3.2 The CRAs monitoring services: outlook and watch-list procedures 
The generation and production of informational services explains why investors and market 
participants rely on credit ratings and why the agencies occupy a centre stage position in the 
financial markets. However, the production and dissemination of creditworthiness information is 
not the only service which makes CRAs important gatekeepers. As explained, the rating process is 
brought to an end through the disclosure of the credit ratings to the public. However, once the 
CRA’s credit risk information is disseminated, the agencies’ task is not over. CRAs also perform ex 
post monitoring services. These services are helpful to mitigate the moral hazard situation which 
arises after the borrowers obtain their financing.  
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 Generally speaking, borrowers may behave opportunistically and use the obtained financing 
for other more risky projects and, above all, different than the one for which the funds were granted. 
This may jeopardise the possibility of repaying the debt if the project fails.109  Monitoring the 
borrowers’ behaviour, perhaps by imposing restrictions on the use of funds, and enforcing them in 
case of violation may be too costly for lenders. In the case of credit ratings, it may be too costly for 
investors to monitor an issuer’s financial performance so as to control whether his level of 
creditworthiness can be maintained in line with an assigned good rating. The CRAs fulfil this task 
as well, by issuing updates to the ratings initially assigned. In particular, monitoring services are 
performed through the outlooks and watch-lists procedures. These work as signals to the issuers that 
downgrades may be applied in the medium or long term and, thus, corrective actions should be 
taken to avoid them.110 In essence, monitoring itself pertains to the production of information during 
the debt instrument’s lifetime.  
 Both issuers and investors benefit from the monitoring services. Issuers through the watch-
list and outlook procedures will be under pressure to maintain a level of credit quality sufficient to 
avoid possible downgrades which could change their credit status from investment to speculative 
grade. At the same time, investors will save the costs that they would bear to monitor by themselves 
the business performance of their debtors. Importantly, negative outlooks and credit watch 
announcements should provide an incentive to the concerned issuers to improve their 
creditworthiness.111 According to some scholars, this would result in an implicit contract between 
an issuer and the CRAs, in light of which the issuer implicitly promises to take all the necessary 
actions to avoid the downgrades.112 Furthermore, downgrades as signals of a drop in the issuer’s 
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credit quality, can help investors to evaluate the possibility of triggering a debt restructuring.113 
Such a possibility would be hard without the constant monitoring of a third party. In fact, the issuer 
might be able to hide his credit quality deterioration and continue with his business. Should a firm 
in financial difficulty continue its business without actions being taken, this would reduce the 
recovery value for the investors. Consequently, rating downgrades applied after the issuer’s failure 
to take opportune actions in the wake of a negative outlook or credit watch announcement can work 
as a signal to investors to undertake appropriate initiatives such as a debt restructuring.114 All things 
considered, the CRAs’ monitoring activities carry an implicit threat that the failure to improve the 
creditworthiness will undermine the issuer’s possibility of having access to funding in the future.115 
 
II.3.3 CRAs’ services users 
The utility of the information and monitoring services that the agencies provide to investors and 
market participants explain why credit ratings are regarded as valuable credit risk assessment tools 
in the financial markets and there is widespread use of them in the private sector. The US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (the SEC) have provided a detailed picture of the main users of credit 
ratings. 116  For example, buy-side firms such as mutual funds, pension funds and insurance 
companies refer to credit ratings as inputs to their own internal credit assessment and due 
diligence.117 Also, buy-side firms use credit ratings in accordance with internal by-law restrictions 
or investment policies requiring specific credit rating thresholds or to conform to various regulatory 
requirements.  
 Sell-side firms are listed among the users of credit ratings as well. Like buy-side firms, they 
use credit ratings as inputs to conduct their own credit analysis for risk management and trading 
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purposes. Besides, sell-side firms maintain rating advisory groups to assist underwriting clients in 
the selection of suitable CRAs for their offerings and guide them through the rating process. 
Furthermore, some sell-side firms are active in markets which give significant value to the 
information provided by credit ratings. For instance, in the over-the-counter derivatives market 
(OTC) investment grade ratings are used to select acceptable counterparties and to determine 
collateral levels for outstanding credit exposure. Finally, sell-side firms seek credit ratings 
themselves to issue short-term or long-term debt instruments.118  
 Among other things, the SEC noted that the importance of credit ratings to the marketplace 
has been enhanced through a wide use of credit ratings in private contracts. In particular, many 
financial contracts include the so-called rating trigger clauses under which lenders or investors are 
allowed to terminate credit availability or accelerate credit obligations in case of downgrades. 119 
 
II.4 PUBLIC SECTOR’S RELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS 
 
II.4.1 The CRAs as certification providers 
Relying on external credit ratings is advantageous for investors and market participants since the 
ratings help reduce information asymmetries and lower transaction costs. As illustrated above, 
credit ratings are expressed through alphabetical symbols. In particular, through the distinction 
between investment grade and speculative grade, the CRAs establish different ranks of 
creditworthiness. So far, investment grade ratings vis-à-vis speculative grade ratings have been 
introduced in their meanings and discussed in relation to the information and monitoring services 
provided by the CRAs. The use of the credit ratings by the private sector was the context which 
served this purpose. In particular, the value of these services provides the basis for understanding 
the private sector’s reliance on credit ratings. Nonetheless, this analysis cannot be considered 
exhaustive. For the topic this research intends to address, it is essential to expand the use of the 
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credit ratings beyond the private sector. To this end, the different credit quality ranks that the 
agencies establish through their alphabetical symbols can be analysed through the lens of a third 
service that they would perform in addition to the information and monitoring ones, namely the 
certification service. Reference to the theoretical literature on the credit ratings will help clarify the 
role of the agencies as providers of certification services.  
 Preliminarily, it must be pointed out that this third function is identified and construed by 
the literature on the CRAs, rather than by the agencies themselves. The CRAs define themselves as 
information providers and acknowledge that their outlook and watch-list procedures are part of 
monitoring activities which take place after the dissemination of the credit ratings. However, they 
do not regard themselves as certification providers because this would imply considering the credit 
ratings as something more than mere opinions. To understand this and the related implications, it is 
desirable to analyse how this third function is introduced in the literature.  
 To start with, Dittrich links the rating agencies’ certification function to the use of the credit 
ratings as regulatory tools for financial market oversight. Specifically, in the author’s analysis the 
word has a twofold meaning. Not only is certification concerned with the assignment of a credit risk 
evaluation in the form of opinions by the agencies, but also to the value of the investment grade 
credit ratings as ‘licenses’ or ‘tickets’ to access the capital markets.120  Clearly, his analysis is 
influenced by the ‘regulatory license’ theory which Partnoy elaborated to criticise the lack of 
informational value of the credit ratings despite large use by the regulators.121 In any case, both the 
authors bring to attention a significant aspect, that is, a tie between the regulators and the credit 
ratings. Dittrich, in particular, uses the word certification to underline the existence of a relationship 
between the credit ratings and the public sector. Significantly, this is sufficient to understand that 
not only the private sector relies on credit ratings.  
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 Secondly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified the CRAs certification function 
in the embedment of the credit ratings in regulatory capital requirements and thresholds, as well as 
in triggers in financial contracts.122 Like Dittrich, the IMF makes it clear that the use of the credit 
ratings is not exclusively circumscribed to the private sector; the public sector also relies on them. 
Lastly, more specifically than the IMF, Deb et al refer to the embedment of the credit ratings into 
regulatory frameworks as a ‘variant’ of the certification function which the CRAs would perform in 
relation to the private sector. Whereas the IMF uses the word certification in a broad sense to 
indicate that the credit ratings are used in both the private and the public sector, Deb et al, with the 
word, ‘variant’ introduce the use of the credit ratings by the public sector as something which 
should be first traced back to the private sector’s use of the credit ratings. Therefore, to understand 
the certification function it is necessary to start from the private sector. In fact, the authors highlight 
that the certification function helps reduce moral hazard problems between individual investors and 
the institutions which manage their portfolios.123 For instance, asset managers may undertake too 
risky investments while managing their clients’ portfolios. In this case, it may be necessary to cap 
the amount of the risk that they can undertake. To this end, investors may require managers to 
invest in highly rated debt instruments. Hence, the credit ratings are useful parameters managers can 
refer to for their investment management strategies.124  
 Clearly, the rating symbolism and the divisional line between investment and speculative 
grade ratings appear to have a new connotation, other than the informational one. The credit ratings 
are used by the private sector as indicators or ‘certifiers’ of credit quality. Unquestionably, this 
widens the nature of the credit ratings as simple, forward-looking opinions, and runs counter to the 
CRAs’ definition illustrated in the previous paragraphs. Moreover, as will be shown in the 
following paragraphs, this connotation will have relevant implications. In other words, the possible 
                                                          
122
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Global Financial Stability Report: Sovereign, Funding and Systemic 
Liquidity’ (2010) Ch 3, 85. 
123
  Deb et al (n 114). 
124
  Ibid. 
66 
 
shift from investment to speculative grade will play a decisive role in relation to the investors’ 
behaviours with consequent repercussions on the financial stability.125  
 However, following the authors’ reasoning, the regulators would have referred to the credit 
quality certification function given by the private sector to the credit ratings to make it a regulatory 
instrument. This means that investing in highly rated debt instruments may also be a legislative 
requirement. Not only does the private sector use the credit ratings because of the above mentioned 
advantages, but also because the regulators require them to. Accordingly, regulation which contains 
references to them is also defined as ‘rating-based regulation’.126 For instance, the EU regulation of 
CRAs refers to the use of credit ratings for ‘regulatory purposes’ and clarifies that this means that 
credit ratings are used for the purpose of complying with Community law.127  
 As stressed, all the above-mentioned works emphasise the certification function of the credit 
ratings and the relationship between the public sector and the credit ratings. However, among these 
three studies the last one is to be regarded as more complete. While Dittrich and the IMF simply 
identify the certification function in the regulatory reliance on the credit ratings, Deb et al provide a 
more insightful explanation in that the certification role would first stem from the line which the 
CRAs’ draw between securities and issuers with different risk characteristics, notably investment 
grade versus speculative grade; and the use that the private sector makes of this as thresholds in 
financial contracts. Secondly, the authors use the word ‘variant’ of the certification role in relation 
to the rating-based regulation. This refers to the use of the credit ratings as ‘certifiers’ of credit 
quality from the private to the public sector.  
 This conclusion stems from the interpretation of these three studies which refer to a third 
CRA’s function and expand the reliance on the credit ratings from the market participants to the 
regulators.  
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II.4.2 Clarifying the CRAs’ certification function 
However, none of these studies have provided a clarification of the meaning of the certification 
function of the CRAs within the public sector. It is understandable that both the private and the 
public sectors use the credit ratings and, thus, that they both rely on them. However, having 
clarified why and how the private sector uses the credit ratings, it must also be discussed why the 
public sector relies on the credit ratings and how the word ‘certification’ must be construed within 
this use.  
 The relationship between the public sector and the credit ratings is explained by Kruck as a 
delegation of authority from public regulators to private third parties.128 According to the author, 
CRAs would set a private standard of creditworthiness which is then made binding by a public 
authority when credit ratings are used in financial regulation. This scheme can be conceptualised 
under the principal-agent framework. The principal and the agent enter into a contractual 
arrangement under which the former delegates some functions to the latter so that it can produce the 
results expected by the principal.129 In the case of the regulators and the CRAs, the rationale behind 
regulatory reliance would not be different to the use of the credit ratings in the private sector. 
Financial market regulators would not have the capacity and the necessary resources to collect 
credit risk information on the issuers and borrowers they seek to regulate. Consequently, by 
referring to the credit ratings in their regulations, regulators and policymakers have transferred this 
task to the CRAs.130 It may be objected that this framework lacks any explicit instruction by the 
regulators to CRAs to conduct credit risk assessment on their behalf. In this respect, Kruck 
underlines that such an objection can be overcome by the fact that the principal-agent theory can 
also be applied in situations in which principals and agents have not entered into any formal 
contract between them. This would connote the agreement between the public sector and the CRAs 
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as an implicit delegation of risk assessment tasks.131 However, this explanation of the tie between 
the public sector and the credit ratings remains within a too abstract framework. In practice, Kruck 
uses the principal-agent theory mainly to discuss the assumptions that the rating-based regulation 
has given the CRAs a quasi-regulatory power that the agencies finally exercise through the 
provision of the credit ratings under implicit delegation from the regulators and the policymakers.132 
Basically, Kruck gives a meaning to the relationship between the credit ratings and the regulators. 
His theory adds something new in comparison to the literature which illustrates the rise and growth 
of the rating industry, mentions the use of the credit ratings by the public sector, but ultimately does 
not provide a theory explaining the choice of the regulators to rely on the credit ratings and the 
purpose of their reliance. However, more concrete details must be provided as to the reasons why 
the public sector relies on the credit ratings. In fact, as will be shown, such a reliance results in 
widespread references to credit ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks. 
 
II 4.3 Understanding the regulatory reliance on credit ratings 
In any case, Kruck’s theory, as well as the studies which have been mentioned above, use some key 
words such as ‘delegation’ (Kruck), ‘ticket for accessing capital market’ (Dittrich), ‘credit quality 
thresholds’ (IMF; Deb et al). These sentences can provide a more concrete understanding of the 
regulatory reliance on the credit ratings if they are analysed in combination with the common 
understanding of the role and activities of financial regulators. In more detail, it is necessary to 
briefly review the basic features of the strategies regulators deploy to achieve the economic and 
social goals of financial regulation.  
 As is known, there are numerous and diverse entities which are subject to regulation. 
Speaking of financial regulation, these encompass depositors, borrowers, lenders, investors, and 
financial intermediaries, to mention but a few. Each of them is indicative of specific financial 
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activities such as securities, banking, insurances, derivatives and investment management.133 This, 
in turn, implies that there is a wide variety of conducts which are disciplined through financial 
regulation and for different purposes. For instance, with regard to the sale and provision of financial 
products and services, the regulation purports to protect consumers and investors through the 
establishment of standards governing the conduct of financial service providers. In this context, 
oversight is exercised on the operation of trading markets and financial intermediaries. In this case, 
regulation seeks to guarantee efficiency in the operation of markets as well as the reduction of 
financial transaction costs. Specifically, this regulation may deal with market abuse practices, 
clearance and settlement requirements, margin requirements and trade execution rules.134 As to the 
financial institutions, the regulation attempts to ensure their safety and soundness by exercising 
adequate oversight over their business operations, financial condition, risk management practices 
and corporate governance.135 In this respect, a distinction is to be made between micro and macro-
prudential regulatory approaches. Whereas the first are concerned with the stability of individual 
financial institutions,136 the second addresses systemic risk across the financial system and implies 
recognising the interconnectedness among institutions and investors across markets, as well as the 
risk inherent to complex financial instruments and the infrastructure of the financial system.137   
Furthermore, prudential oversight is exercised to guarantee the stability of the financial 
system. To this end, monitoring is concerned with the so-called systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs) and the extent to which the financial transactions which connect these 
institutions to each other may pose the threat of systemic risk events which, in turn may impact the 
financial stability. Importantly, in respect of all these areas the regulators’ task is relating to the set 
up of appropriate interventions, when needed. Some scholars have hence provided a taxonomy of 
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these regulatory strategies and identified the building blocks of the financial regulation into the 
following: 1) rulemaking; 2) supervision; 3) certification; and 4) enforcement.138 While the first is 
concerned with the design of rules or standards governing an entity’s, supervision is the monitoring 
by regulators of the entity’s compliance with its regulatory obligations. It is argued that rulemaking 
and supervision are sometimes used interchangeably. Instead, they are conceptually different. In the 
former, an appropriate conduct is decided by the regulator and a rule is formulated to produce and 
discipline such a conduct, whereas in the latter, a control is exercised as to the manner in which the 
regulated entities comply with the rule.139 Significantly, this entails that regulators can exercise 
enforcement powers. Indeed, enforcement is the sanction for failing to comply with the regulation. 
In practice, it is seen as the regulator’s reaction against the regulated entities’ violation or 
circumvention of the rules. In this respect, regulators have a range of civil and criminal penalties in 
accordance with the type of rules which have been violated.140  
 Clearly, in the context of the proposed taxonomy, enforcement appears to be consequential 
or, more accurately put, an extension of rulemaking and supervision. Finally, certification is 
referred to the regulator’s evaluation and approval of products and services. In this regard, 
certification is said to encompass a variety of regulatory actions such as licensing, registration and 
prohibition. Through the certification the regulators try to promote quality by preventing the 
distribution of undesirable products or products that are too risky. Accordingly, certification is the 
regulator’s decision to support or prohibit the distribution of certain products.141 Having sketched 
the contours of the building blocks of financial regulation this discussion must be completed with a 
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further element. In pursuing these regulatory strategies the regulators can decide either to determine 
by themselves the contents of the rules, monitor the degree of compliance with the obligations as 
well as the enforcement of the obligations, or to delegate these responsibilities to private entities. 
This is defined as the choice between public regulatory strategies and private regulatory 
strategies.142 By way of combining this framework with the certification role of the CRAs and 
Kruch’s theory, the reasons why there is regulatory reliance on the credit ratings can be finally 
fixed. As illustrated, the CRAs provide opinions on the credit risk associated to various issuers and 
financial products. In relation to the four above-mentioned regulatory strategies, this basic function 
can be linked to the certification. In more detail, the investment grade thresholds provided by the 
CRAs is the tool regulators rely on to perform their own certification strategy. As mentioned above, 
a regulator certifies, licenses or authorises a firm’s product or service. According to whether this 
certification is public or private, it will be the regulator or a private actor which performs this 
function. In the first place, this sounds as though the regulator determines the merit of the products 
or services. However, certification should be better understood as a form of control in the sense that 
the regulator tries to minimise the impact which may derive to the financial system from the 
distribution and investment in products that are too risky.143  
 The line of demarcation between investment and speculative grade that the CRAs are able to 
establish serves this certification purpose. Significantly, regulators’ certification does not mean that 
they will determine through the credit ratings the quality of a product, nor that they will make 
recommendations as to the suitability of an investment. In fact, as stressed in the previous 
paragraphs the CRAs do not provide such services and their ratings are defined as an opinion. 
Importantly, the investment grade thresholds are relied on by the regulators to determine which 
products the market participants, in particular institutional investors, are permitted to invest in or to 
hold. These are products which have received the highest rating grade. In fact, to anticipate what 
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will be widely discussed in the following paragraphs, prudential regulation allows for less capital or 
reserves to be held against securities which receive top ratings by the CRAs. Furthermore, central 
banks refer to the credit ratings for determining which securities can serve as collateral for their 
money market operations, while asset managers are restricted by investment mandates requiring 
highly rated instruments within the investors’ portfolios.   
 Like in the private sector, this use of the credit ratings seems to give them a connotation 
which is different than their nature as forward looking opinions. Through the regulatory use of the 
credit ratings these become certifiers of what the regulators regard as permissible or not.144 It may 
be discussed whether this can be identified, as Kruch argues, as a form of implicit delegation of 
authority from the part of the regulators to the CRAs, through which the agencies would acquire a 
quasi-regulatory status. Instead, from a practical point of view, this may be seen mainly as an 
outsourcing of the credit ratings by the regulators for certifying through the investment grade scales 
the threshold of risk that the investors should not trespass while making investment decisions. In 
other words, credit ratings are used by regulators to cap the amount of risk that market participants 
can take. Beyond the assertion that this outsourcing fills in for the regulator’s incapacity to conduct 
their own credit risk analysis, practical advantages may be seen in terms of saving the costs which 
the regulators should bear for assigning credit risk thresholds by themselves. In fact, the difference 
between public and private regulatory strategy mainly lies in the immediate costs that the regulators 
may face vis-à-vis the allocation of the burden of certification onto private actors.145 Furthermore, 
the easiness through which the alphabetical symbols used by the CRAs may be understood and their 
consolidated use in the private sector are also decisive in respect of the regulators’ reliance on them. 
As will be detailed below, these factors characterise the tie between the public sector and the credit 
ratings through the so-called rating-based regulation. Also, it will help understand how credit 
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ratings, willing or not, enter de facto the regulatory apparatus and the unintended consequences 
which may derive therein. 
 
II.4.4 Mapping the regulatory use of credit ratings 
 
II.4.4.1 The widespread use of credit ratings in the US legislation 
In 2009 a stock taking on the use of the credit ratings in regulations conducted by the Joint Forum 
on a sample of 12 countries worldwide ascertained that the US boasts the highest number of credit 
rating references in legislation, regulations and supervisory policies (LRSPs).146 This can be easily 
explained in the fact that the US is the country where the rating business arose and the leading 
CRAs, in particular, Moody’s and S&P gained reputational capital and consolidated their 
dominance in the ratings market.147  
 Remaining in the US legal system, the first credit rating reference traces back to the early 
1930s. That was the time of the great depression which affected the US economy and, among other 
things, caused a dramatic decline in credit quality.148 In the wake of these events, the US regulators 
decided to strengthen the protection of investors and required them to avoid risky investments. The 
distinction between securities with different risk characteristics that the credit ratings guaranteed 
through the line of demarcation between investment and speculative grade was deemed to serve this 
purpose. 149  The area which paved the way to the inclusion of the credit rating references in 
legislation was the banking sector. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency required banks to 
hold only investment grade rated bonds in their book value. Lack of investment grade status would 
have impacted on the adequacy of bank capital. Then, such a requirement became a prohibition 
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following the adoption of the US Banking Act of 1936.150 As a result, all banks were banned from 
holding speculative grade rated instruments. This marked the first incorporation of the external 
credit ratings into regulations. 151  However, it must be observed that the rationale behind this 
incorporation did not trigger a widespread use of ratings in other financial legislation. In essence, 
the banking regulator acknowledged the utility of the investment grade threshold provided by the 
CRAs and made this a requirement for banks; but, this remained circumscribed to the banking 
sector. From that period until the 1960s, CRAs were still small firms with modest revenues. 
Consequently, credit ratings were not yet regarded as an essential component of the US financial 
legislation.152  
 The situation changed in the 1970s. At that time, the rating industry experienced significant 
growth because of the expansion of the US private companies in the international capital markets 
and other factors such as greater capital mobility and financial disintermediation.153 The growth of 
the rating industry and viability of the services provided by the agencies increased the interest of the 
US regulators. In this context, two events are crucial for the creation of the US rating-based 
regulation: the introduction of the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) 
status and the amendments applied to rule 15c3-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, otherwise 
defined as the Net Capital Rule.154 In more details, through banking regulation the legislators had 
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started requiring institutional investors to obtain investment grade credit ratings so as to draw a line 
between safe and speculative investments. In 1975, the SEC required these credit ratings to be 
issued by NRSROs.155 Then, NRSRO credit ratings were transposed into the amendments applied to 
the Net Capital Rule. Under the Net Capital Rule, when computing net capital broker-dealers have 
to subtract from their net worth certain percentages of the market value, the so-called ‘haircut’ of 
their proprietary securities position. Rule 15c3-1 specifies, inter alia, that broker-dealers have to 
take reduced haircuts for debt instruments such as commercial paper, non-convertible debt 
securities and non-convertible preferred stocks. To this end, the requirement is that the instruments 
be rated investment grade by one of two NRSROs. 156  Through the NRSRO status the SEC 
conferred a dominant position to the established CRAs. Importantly, those agencies lacking the 
status of NRSROs could not issue the credit ratings required for regulatory purposes.157 On the 
other hand, the requirement of the NRSRO credit rating under the Net Capital Rule was the trigger 
event as to the widespread use of credit ratings into the US LRSPs.158 From that moment onwards, 
the use of credit ratings spread within the federal and securities regulations.  
 Other examples of important rules which were laid down following the introduction of the 
Net Capital Rule can be mentioned. For instance, under the Investment Company Act, Rule 3a-7 
sets out a number of requisites to distinguish between investment companies and structured 
financings. Among these, the requirement that structured financings be rated investment grade by 
NRSROs. 159  Furthermore, Section 10(f) of the Investment Company Act defines municipal 
securities as those debt instruments which can be purchased during an underwriting. To be eligible 
as a municipal security, the rule requires the instrument to be rated investment grade by 
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NRSROs.160 The list could go further, even involving the labour and insurance sector.161 Based on 
these facts, it can be said that the Banking Act of 1936 marked a first in the use of the credit ratings 
into legislation, while the Net Capital Rule paved the way to the widespread use of credit ratings 
which characterised the US financial legislation until the recent amendments applied under the 
reforms taking place after the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In fact, from the 1970s onwards the 
expression rating-based regulation was coined to underline the incorporation of the credit ratings 
into the financial legislation as a consequence of the reliance placed by the US regulators on the 
credit ratings assigned by the NRSROs.162  
 
II.4.4.2 Rating-based regulation at the international and EU levels 
In other countries and legal systems the use of credit ratings as regulatory tools is not as widespread 
as in the US. Nonetheless, the banking sector and its regulation remains the area where the use of 
credit ratings is more predominant than others. Specifically, the Joint Forum identified five main 
purposes in relation to the use of credit ratings in LRSPs: 1) determining capital requirements; 2) 
identifying or classifying assets, mainly in the context of eligible investments or permissible asset 
concentrations; 3) providing valuable credit risk assessment of assets purchased as part of a 
securitisation or covered bond offering; 4) disclosure requirements; and 5) prospectus eligibility.163 
This order of uses of credit ratings is not casual. Not only does it indicate the purpose of including 
credit ratings into legislation, but it also represents a rank of the sectors.  
 The banking sector, through the use of credit ratings for the calculation of capital 
requirements, is the primary one. This is mainly due to the Basel framework which provides for the 
use of external credit ratings for the calculation of risk-weighted assets under the standardised 
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approach (SA).164 Such predominance is not exclusively concerned with the US but also with other 
countries and legal systems; though references to credit ratings in their LRSPs are not as massive as 
in the US. For example, in the EU, the Capital Adequacy Directive and the Banking Directives of 
2006 were the transposition of the Basel II framework providing for the use of external credit 
ratings under the SA.165 However, it has to be observed that the 2006 Capital Adequacy Directive 
constituted the enlargement of the 1993 Capital Adequacy Directive which first pioneered the 
regulatory use of credit ratings in the European Banking Regulation. From that moment until the 
issuance of the 2006 directives, almost all the EU Member States referred to credit ratings in their 
prudential supervision of banks in order to define eligible debt securities for the calculation of the 
capital requirements for specific interest rate risk.166 The pervasive use of credit ratings in banking 
regulation can also be noted beyond the US and EU. For instance, the Argentinean Central Bank 
sets out a list of banks eligible to receive time deposits from institutional investors. A bank’s rating 
is among the factors that the central bank takes into consideration for its decision on membership.167 
Likewise, in New Zealand external credit ratings are considered by the competent authorities useful 
indicators of banks’ credit quality for ‘prudent but not expert investors’ because they are easy-to-
understand symbols. In this respect, banks are required to disclose their own credit ratings and make 
them available in all their branches.168 Moreover, to complete the picture, it is worth noting that also 
at the institutional level central banks have included credit ratings into their collateral rules to select 
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the assets which can be used as a guarantee for central bank loans. This means that central banks 
only accept securities rated investment grade as a guarantee to lend money to borrowers.169  
 Finally, another significant use of credit ratings in LRSPs is for investment limitations. This 
is mainly in the US legislation for the pension funds and the insurance sector. For instance, pursuant 
to rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act, relating to the investment and operation of US 
domiciled money market funds, money market funds are banned from investing in asset-backed 
securities unless the debt instruments have received an investment grade from NRSROs. 170 
Conversely, at the EU level the frameworks referring to investment funds do not significantly rely 
on credit ratings.171 
 
II.5 FROM ‘GOOD TO ‘BAD’: A ROADMAP TOWARDS THE RISK OF OVER-RELIANCE 
 
II.5.1 Rating-based regulation versus the hardwiring of credit ratings in legislation  
The history of the rating-based regulation provides an interesting picture of where the regulatory 
reliance arose and developed, and which sector of the financial legislation makes wider use of 
external credit ratings. As it can be understood, the regulatory use occurred when the private sector 
was already making wide reference to the credit ratings as valuable tools for credit risk assessment. 
The acknowledgement of the viability of ratings from the private sector explains why regulators 
began including them in financial legislation and regulatory frameworks. Credit ratings were 
recognised as easy-to-understand, independent and reliable sources of information. These 
advantages were considered useful by regulators in relation to their objective of setting up adequate 
legislation to protect investors. In particular, among the objectives of the financial regulation there 
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is the protection of market participants and the prevention of excessive risk taking.172 When credit 
ratings were first introduced in the US banking regulation and then in the Net Capital Rule, the aim 
was to prevent speculative investments that were too risky. Even though the inclusion happened at 
different times, on both occasions regulators intervened in times of financial and economic crisis; in 
which investors suffered significant losses consequent to excessively risky investments. 173 
Importantly, regulators noticed that the certification service provided through the investment grade 
threshold could work as a viable tool to cap the amount of risk that investors and market 
participants could undertake. As analysed above, this explains why reliance on credit ratings must 
be broadly referred to the private and public sector. All things considered, regulatory reliance on 
credit ratings means the trust that the regulators put on credit ratings as instruments which can help 
fulfil the financial regulation’s objective to limit risk and promote efficiency in the financial 
markets.   
 Nonetheless, regulatory reliance on credit ratings started being questioned in the aftermath 
of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. CRAs have been regarded as one of the culprits of the recent 
financial turmoil. There is a large body of literature analysing the reasons why CRAs were among 
the causes of the financial turmoil.174 In a nutshell, CRAs were accused of: 1) inflating the ratings 
assigned to some structured products such as residential mortgage backed securities (RMBSs) and 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) because of conflict of interest with the issuers; 2) having 
inadequate rating methodologies and models for assessing the risk inherent to such complex 
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products; and 3) being slow in downgrading them promptly.175 As a result, the rating sector was 
subjected to close scrutiny at the national, international and regional levels. The tie between the 
credit ratings and legislation was under discussion as well. In this context, it can be observed that 
the events of the crisis radically changed the regulators’ approach to the credit ratings. A new 
language has been adopted to describe the role of the ratings within the financial legislation. The 
hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks is the new watchword that 
academics, regulators and policymakers use in the current debate on the role of credit ratings in 
legislation.176 Undoubtedly, this word has a negative connotation as opposed to the term ‘regulatory 
use of ratings’ which was mainly used before the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Accordingly, two 
different meanings can be contrasted. Regulatory use of ratings can be interpreted as referring to the 
credit ratings as essential parts of a regulatory programme. This is consistent with the concept of 
regulatory reliance illustrated above, namely the trust that regulators and policymakers put on credit 
ratings for achieving the goals of protecting investors from excessive risk and preserve the financial 
stability. On the other hand, the hardwiring of ratings into legislation connotes the tie between 
credit ratings and legislation as dangerous. In other words, through this expression regulators and 
policymakers cast doubts on the utility of including credit ratings into legislation.177 This raises the 
question of why credit ratings, from essential elements of financial legislation, are now regarded as 
intrusive and dangerous. This question can be answered by turning to the other side of the coin. In 
the previous paragraphs, attention was devoted to the utility of credit ratings and why they are 
widely used in the private and public sector (‘the good’). The analysis underlined the positive 
aspects of credit ratings in relation to the reduction of asymmetric information and transaction costs. 
Also, it has been highlighted how credit ratings convey information in a simple way through 
alphabetical symbols which are easy to understand. However, these good aspects are simply one 
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side of the coin. The other side is concerned with the negative aspects relating to the credit ratings, 
namely the rating downgrades and their impact on financial stability (‘the bad’). This will be the 
subject of the following analysis.  
 
II.5.2 Downgrades, rating triggers and liquidity problems 
Downgrades applied by CRAs to issuers or debt instruments may trigger large collateral calls and 
massive sales of debt instruments. These can then escalate into liquidity problems which pose 
serious threats to the financial stability.178 This scenario can be better understood by re-analysing 
the use of credit ratings in the private sector through the lens of downgrades. To begin with, in the 
previous paragraphs the widespread use of rating triggers in bond indentures and loan contracts has 
been mentioned. As seen, the purpose of the rating triggers is to protect lenders against the 
borrowers’ credit quality deterioration. Such clauses are advantageous to borrowers as well in that, 
without them, lenders would ask for a higher initial spread on debt contract.179 The design of rating 
trigger clauses depends on the agreement between lenders and borrowers. In this context, it is 
possible to distinguish five types of rating trigger clauses: 1) rating based collateral and bonding 
provisions; 2) pricing grids or adjustments in interest rates and coupons; 3) acceleration trigger; 4) 
rating based put provision; and 5) rating based default provision.180  
 Rating based collateral and bonding provisions are mainly included in bank loan 
agreements. These clauses may be activated consequently to the borrower’s downgrade below the 
investment grade threshold. In this case, the borrower may be required to pledge assets to guarantee 
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its financing over time.181 Pricing grids or adjustments in interest rates and coupons are usually 
written into bond indentures as well as in bank loan agreements. In general, in the event of a 
downgrade, such clauses may require the borrower to increase the lender’s return. In particular, 
when included in bond indentures they require a revision of the initial interest rate or coupon where 
the borrower’s investment grade status shifts from investment to speculative grade.182 Acceleration 
triggers may result in an acceleration of repayment or early termination of credit in case of a 
borrower’s downgrade. Rating based put clauses requires the downgraded borrowers to buy back 
the issued debt from the lenders.183 Finally, according to rating based default triggers the borrower’s 
downgrade may be regarded as an event of default of the obligation protected by the trigger. In this 
case, the downgraded borrower is considered to have failed to comply with the obligation set out in 
the contract.184  
 Clearly, the overview of these clauses show the intertwine between the credit rating 
downgrade and the rating trigger clauses. In practice, to be activated the rating trigger needs the 
certification of the borrower’s credit quality deterioration provided by the rating downgrade. This 
means that even though these clauses have no direct relation with the CRAs because they belong to 
the contractual relationship between the borrowers and their counterparties, their activation is 
directly linked to the downgrade applied by the agencies. This intertwine can escalate the 
borrower’s liquidity problems. In more detail, assuming that a company is performing poorly and, 
for this reason, is downgraded by a CRA, the downgrade per se has the effect of increasing the cost 
of capital and to give the company’s counterparties the signal of credit quality deterioration. In this 
case, the risk is that the company’s counterparties may decide to move away from the downgraded 
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company. To this end, they will activate their rating trigger clauses and, thus, put further pressure 
on the company’s liquidity position.185 Because of this, the ultimate scenario can be the bankruptcy 
of the company unable to deal with its liquidity problems, exacerbated by the intertwine between 
the rating downgrade and the activation of the rating trigger clauses.186 However, not all the rating 
trigger clauses can have such harmful effects. Among those listed above, the acceleration trigger 
clause is the most critical because not only does its activation increase the cost of capital, but it also 
requires an immediate injection of new capital to avoid even worse consequences. In essence, 
whereby in the aftermath of its credit rating downgrade a company also faces the activation of an 
acceleration trigger clause and is unable to get new liquidity, it will finally go bankrupt.  
 The intertwine between rating downgrades and rating triggers as well as the criticality of the 
acceleration triggers can be best captured by referring to the 2001 Enron’s default. Enron was the 
biggest US corporate bankruptcy.187 In substance, it is the story of a multinational company which 
undertook considerable risk to expand its trading and business activities (in the energy options) and, 
to this end, engaged in widespread frauds which were ultimately brought to light when the financial 
press claimed that the company was experiencing serious liquidity problems.188  However, the 
intertwine between its rating downgrade and the rating trigger clauses that Enron had entered into 
with its counterparties were crucial to the company’s bankruptcy. Enron had always sought and 
obtained an investment grade status by the major CRAs, which allowed the company to expand its 
trading business and, above all, to access the capital markets for liquidity needs.189  Once the 
financial press cast doubts on the company’s financial situation, the major CRAs took a closer look 
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at Enron for possible downgrades. A shift from investment to speculative grade might have had 
disastrous effects because of the numerous trigger provisions embedded in the contracts Enron had 
entered into with its counterparties. In particular, in that period it was disclosed that a credit quality 
deterioration would have accelerated repayment of $690 million loan.190  In essence, from the 
CRAs’ perspective, the Enron case is the story of a company which was declared investment grade 
until four days before it filed for bankruptcy. The downgrade was applied by the major CRAs on 28 
November 2001. This triggered the activation of the rating trigger provisions requiring accelerated 
repayment.191 The end of the story is known, but it could be easily imagined following the logic of 
the illustrated intertwine between downgrade and rating triggers: 1) the downgrade to junk status 
certified the worsening of the company’s financial situation; 2) Enron’s downgrade determined its 
counterparties to relinquish their engagement with the company and, thus, they triggered the 
acceleration of the repayment under the trigger clauses; 3) the activation of the trigger provisions 
exacerbated the Enron liquidity position; 4) unable to repay its debts, the company finally filed for 
bankruptcy. Overall, these stages can be embodied into a catch-all word: credit cliff. This is market 
jargon used to indicate a cascade of bad consequences triggered by a negative event.192  
 As discussed, the tie between rating downgrade and rating triggers contribute to credit cliff 
situations and accelerate the pace at which liquidity problems get worse. In parallel, similar effects 
can be analysed in relation to other rating trigger clauses. As already mentioned, borrowers may be 
required by their counterparties to post more or less collateral in accordance with the credit rating 
they receive by the agencies. Also, market participants may require investment grade securities as 
collateral. Consequently, in case of a downgrade of the debt instruments borrowers will be asked to 
post more collateral as guarantees.193 The rating trigger clauses which are relevant in this context 
are the rating based collateral provisions. Like the acceleration clauses, their interplay with the 
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rating downgrades may be critical to the aggravation of a company’s financial situation. A valuable 
example can be provided by referring to the insurance sector, namely to the situation of the 
American International Group Inc (AIG) during the recent financial turmoil.194 Indeed, it can be 
observed that in the years leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis the market did not require 
collateral when purchasing credit default swaps (CDSs) from insurance companies rated investment 
grade by the CRAs. The investment grade ratings assigned to insurance companies selling 
protection was regarded as a security against counterparty risk.195  Before the burst of the US 
subprime mortgage bubble in 2007, AIG was able to sell CDS without collateral because of its high 
rating. When the mortgage market collapsed, AIG experienced the effects of the combination of 
rating downgrade and rating triggers; in its case, these were collateral triggers incorporated into the 
CDS contracts that the company entered into with the purchasers of protection.196  The CRAs 
downgraded the AIG’s CDS position backed up with subprime mortgage-related securities. The 
downgrade was sufficient to trigger the investors’ request for more collateral. AIG was unable to 
post more collateral and, for this reason, was about to be downgraded. This would have made 
investors require even more collateral in the aftermath of a deterioration in the company’s 
creditworthiness signalled by a possible downgrade. This last intertwine would have been lethal for 
AIG, likewise in the case of Enron.197 However, the AIG’s debacle would have endangered other 
financial institutions because AIG was regarded as ‘too interconnected to fail’.198  To avoid a 
domino effect, the US government was stepped in to bail out AIG. AIG avoided the collapse 
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because it obtained an US 85 billion dollars revolving credit from the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York.199 
 
II.5.3 Cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours 
As illustrated, the downgrade signals a deterioration of an issuer’s or borrower’s creditworthiness. 
In the context of an acceleration rating provision it has been mentioned how investors and market 
participants tend to react in the same way once the downgrade is applied.  
 This tendency can be better understood in relation to the rating based put provision. This 
type of clause is usually written into bond indentures and allows investors to sell their debt 
instrument back to the issuer in the event of a downgrade.200 Indeed, such a provision was also 
activated in the wake of the Enron downgrade. However, the criticality of its effects were more 
evident during the recent financial turmoil when many sophisticated structured finance products 
such as RMBSs and CDOs were abruptly downgraded by the major CRAs to junk status. A massive 
sale of these instruments took place as a result.201 It is to be observed that the meaning of ‘massive’ 
is twofold: it refers not only to the large quantity of debt instruments which were sold after the 
downgrade was announced but also to the significant number of investors who reacted in the same 
way following the downgrade. This last aspect is quite complex. It does not exclusively pertain to a 
homogenous behaviour consequent to the rating announcement. First, the rating downgrade triggers 
an investors’ reaction. Then, other investors may behave in the same way; not necessarily 
influenced by the downgrade but by the behaviour of those investors who sold the debt instruments 
after the rating change. In essence, they mechanistically copy someone else’s behaviour.  
 Having clarified these aspects from a practical side, it is now possible to categorise them 
through their technical names: cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours. Cliff-edge effects are 
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concerned with the dramatic sell-off of debt instruments in the occurrence of a downgrade.202 
Clearly, the downgrade has the potential to influence investors who hold the downgraded debt 
instruments and thus trigger a cascade sale of them. In turn, cliff-edge effects are amplified by herd 
behaviours which Persaud defines as follows: ‘by herding behaviour I mean that banks or investors 
like to buy what others are buying, sell what others are buying, sell what others are selling and own 
what others own’.203 Therefore, herd behaviours represent the systematic and erroneous decision-
making by a group.204  
 The 2007-2009 financial crisis brought to attention the phenomenon of the cliff-edge effects 
and herd behaviour through the massive sell-off of the downgraded structured products. Going into 
greater detail, these phenomena were particularly evident in the buy-side sector. As already 
mentioned, asset managers have investment mandates that limit to investment grade rated 
instruments the securities they can hold in their portfolios. In the event that the credit quality of 
these debt instruments go below the investment grade threshold, they are no longer compliant with 
their mandates. Consequently, they are forced to sale their junk debt instruments.205 The situation of 
the US money market funds at the outbreak of the financial crisis can provide a practical 
explanation. Many asset managers held in their portfolios debt instruments issued by the US bank 
Lehman Brothers Holding Inc, which filed for bankruptcy in September 2008. Similarly to Enron, 
Lehman Brothers maintained an investment grade until a few days before it defaulted.206  The 
downgrade and subsequent bankruptcy of the bank reversed its effects on the debt instruments as 
well, which lost their investment grade status. Asset managers could no longer hold the Lehman 
Brothers’ debt instruments in their portfolio. In fact, this would have been against rule 2a-7 of the 
Investment Company Act which, as mentioned above, requires them to only hold triple A 
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instruments in portfolios. Significantly, one of the largest US money market funds, the Reserve 
Primary Fund, had 785 million holdings of Lehman Brothers’ debt instruments. Once the rating of 
these instruments was downgraded, the Reserve Primary Fund’s share value dropped from 1 dollar 
to 97 cents. In other words, the fund ‘broke the buck’.207 The Reserve Primary fund was forced to 
sell its debt instruments and began suffering liquidity problems. The cliff-edge effect triggered by 
the downgrade urged other investors to behave mechanistically in the same way. Finally, the US 
government had to intervene by providing deposit insurance to investments in money market 
funds.208 This shows again the dangerous intertwine between rating downgrades and rating triggers 
and how their combination can escalate liquidity problems. Furthermore, it has been illustrated how 
rating downgrades have the potential to amplify phenomena such as cliff-edge effects and herd 
behaviours.  
 
II.5.4 Systemic risk and spill-over effects across markets 
From the contexts analysed it can be seen that rating downgrades are per se negative events with the 
potential to create a series of other negative events. Having underlined how this combination of 
events exacerbates the liquidity problems of the market participants being downgraded, it is now to 
be discussed to what extent rating downgrades and their wave of effects hamper the financial 
stability. To this end, interesting results have been provided by the sovereign rating crisis which has 
recently affected most countries in the Euro area. Some background facts are in order.  
 In April 2010 S&P downgraded the Greek sovereign debt to junk status. Bond yields rose 
dramatically in the wake of the downgrade209 so that Greece was no longer able to access private 
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capital markets as a funding source.210 This forced the Commission, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (hereinafter: the troika) to discuss a rescue plan 
in order to prevent Greece from defaulting on its debt and, thus, seriously threatening the stability of 
the euro zone. 211  However, criticism against CRAs started mounting between the spring and 
summer of 2011, when S&P declared that it would classify as a default any planned or voluntary 
restructuring of the Greek debt. This announcement was made while the European leaders were 
negotiating a second rescue package for Greece. 212  Other European countries experienced 
downgrades by the major CRAs as well. For instance, Moody’s downgraded Portugal’s sovereign 
debt to junk status soon after the set-up of a bail-out package by the troika.213 As a result, the 
cascade of rating changes seemed to be unstoppable because of the sovereign downgrades applied 
by Moody’s to Ireland214 and by S&P to nine euro area countries between 2011 and 2012.215  
 These events, in particular the downgrades, started being studied from the perspective of 
their impact on financial stability. Namely, the downward price spiral caused by the downgrade of 
sovereign ratings was scrutinised and it was noted to have a contagion effect from the individual 
downgraded country to a global level.216 In essence, the downgrade applied to a Member State can 
have spill-over effects and threaten the financial stability at the global level. This can be traced back 
to the multiple effects that sovereign ratings have on financial markets. Empirical studies have 
demonstrated that sovereign ratings are crucial in the determination of a country’s borrowing costs 
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and have significant effects on yields spreads. 217  Furthermore, not only do sovereign ratings 
influence the assessment of the counterparty risk but they are also regarded by investors and market 
participants as benchmarks for all the credit ratings of the entities located in the country being rated. 
This means that sovereign ratings have influence within the country across markets. 218 
Consequently, sovereign rating downgrades can have spill-over effects to corporate bond markets 
and equity markets. This jeopardises the ability of a wide range of entities to access external 
funding.219 In other words, the rating of financial institutions located in a country will be impacted 
by the downgrade of the concerned country. The facts illustrated above have confirmed this: the 
downgrade of Portugal was immediately followed by the downgrade of four Portuguese financial 
institutions. Similarly, the downgrade of Italy in 2011 caused the downgrade of some of the main 
companies.220  
 Nevertheless, the impact of the sovereign downgrade is not circumscribed to the 
downgraded countries and its financial institutions. Recent empirical studies have demonstrated that 
the sovereign downgrade applied to one country can have contagion effects across countries. In 
practice, due to the market interconnections and linkages among countries, a downgrade applied to 
a single country can reverse its effects to other countries. 221  It is therefore clear that rating 
downgrades have systemic relevance and can pose threats to the financial stability from an 
individual to a global level. 
 
II.5.5 The rating-based regulation and its implications: a critical review 
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All the discussed effects are consequential to rating downgrades. Rating downgrades seem to be the 
source of a spiral process which exacerbates liquidity problems and ultimately impacts on the 
financial stability at the global level. Investors’ and market participants’ behaviours play a crucial 
role in this context. Negative rating announcements also have the effect of aligning the investors’ 
and market participants’ reactions. Cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours are the phenomena which 
can be traced back to rating downgrades and contribute to aggravate liquidity problems with 
possible repercussions to the financial stability at the global level.  
 The analysed relationship between rating downgrades and liquidity crises and all of the 
illustrated negative implications are at the heart of the regulators’ and policymakers’ turnabout in 
their use of credit ratings in financial regulations. The 2007-2009 financial crisis brought to 
attention the danger of the rating downgrades and the extent to which the rating-based regulations 
can give impetus to all the negative implications which have been illustrated. This can be 
understood by considering the rating downgrades and, in particular, the cliff-edge effects in 
combination with the rating-based regulations.  
 As discussed, rating downgrades influence investors and the occurrence of a sell-off of 
downgraded debt instruments could be interpreted as an autonomous decision of not holding any 
more securities whose creditworthiness is deteriorated. However, putting things into the perspective 
of the rating-based regulations, the debt instruments’ sell-off in the wake of the downgrades loses 
its characteristic of autonomous investors’ choice and develops into a constrained behaviour. Some 
practical examples will provide a better understanding. If there are rules which require asset 
managers to invest only in investment grade rated products, can asset managers be considered 
compliant with such rules if they invest in products ranked by the CRAs as speculative grade? 
Obviously, the answer is negative. Similarly, can asset managers be considered compliant with such 
rules if they hold highly rated debt instruments whose status shifts to speculative grade 
consequently to a downgrade? Unquestionably, they were only initially compliant but after the 
downgrade they cannot be regarded as such. Ultimately, they will have to sell the speculative grade 
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instruments they hold in their portfolio. Others can behave mechanistically in the same way while 
observing the conduct of the previous investors. Clearly, market participants react to ratings 
because they are forced to by the rating-based regulation.  
 Another useful example to have a clearer understanding of the impact of rating-based 
regulations following downgrades, can be provided by referring to the use of external ratings in 
banking regulation. As mentioned earlier, capital regulations reduced the capital requirements of 
banks that purchased or retained securities which received top ratings by the CRAs. Nonetheless, 
the other side of the coin was that banks’ capital requirements would have increased in the event of 
a downgrade of these securities. As illustrated, when worries in the subprime mortgage market 
began mounting, a massive downgrade of securities backed by subprime mortgages occurred. In 
this respect, Friedman and Kraus underlined that CDO bonds rated triple A in 2007 were 
downgraded to CCC in 2008. This caused a 4,900 per cent increase in the capital required for these 
financial instruments. This meant that the capital required for $100 worth of bonds rose from $2 to 
$100 and, thus the banks would have had to raise $98 in new capital for every $100 in assets.222 The 
downgrades forced to raise the amount of capital which was necessary to the banks to remain sound 
and, above all, compliant with the regulation which tied up the calculation of the banks’ capital 
requirements to the investment grade credit ratings. This is therefore an example of how the use of 
ratings, as tools regulators refer to in bank capital market regulations, can exacerbate market trends 
and have negative implications on the financial system.  
 Having discussed these aspects, it is clear that rating-based regulation carries the risk of 
facilitating the negative effects associated to rating downgrades. The more market participants have 
to comply with legislation and regulatory frameworks providing for the use of credit ratings for the 
determination of eligible investments, the more they will homogenise their behaviour in the 
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occurrence of rating downgrades; and the more the risk of impacting on financial stability will be 
critical. All of these negative consequences explain the shift in the language of regulators and 
policymakers: from regulatory use of credit ratings to the current ‘hardwiring’ of ratings into 
legislation. The former is relating to the valuable aspects of the credit ratings while the latter is 
concerned with the negative effects of the downgrades that the use of credit ratings in legislation 
facilitates. As will be discussed below, the hardwiring of ratings into legislation means that credit 
ratings are no longer regarded as an essential component of regulatory programmes as they were in 
the past. Currently, such an expression is the paradigm upon which regulatory efforts are devoted to 
reduce or mitigate the negative implications deriving to the financial system from the tie between 
regulation and credit ratings.  
 However, cliff-edge effects, herd behaviours and liquidity crises are not the only drawbacks 
that regulations referring to credit ratings may facilitate. For instance, some scholars analyse the 
possibility that the regulatory use of credit ratings may increase the risk of conflict of interest 
between CRAs and issuers constrained by regulation to obtain high credit ratings to access the 
capital markets.223 Others argue that the use of credit ratings for investment restrictions reinforces 
the oligopolistic structure of the ratings market, in particular, the dominance of established 
CRAs.224 Beyond these issues, central to this research is the analysis of another issue, namely a 
phenomenon which is traced back to the hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory 
frameworks, and is considered to exacerbate cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours. 225  This 
phenomenon is defined as over-reliance on external credit ratings.   
 
II.6 UNDERSTANDING OVER-RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL CREDIT RATINGS  
 
II.6.1 Introducing the phenomenon 
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The hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks also generates over-
reliance on external credit ratings by investors and market participants. Following the dramatic 
events of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, regulators and policymakers worldwide tried to identify the 
opportune regulatory measures to tackle all the shortcomings that the financial system revealed at 
the outbreak of the turmoil. In its 2008 ‘Report on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience’, 
the FSB, among other things, warned investors and market participants to avoid over-relying on 
external credit ratings.226 The FSB underlined that some institutional investors relied excessively on 
credit ratings in their investment guidelines and choices. This had the effect of giving credit ratings 
the role of exclusive benchmarks for the assessment of credit risk. In effect, investors used credit 
ratings as substitutes for their independent credit risk assessment and due diligence.227 The FSB 
identified the source of this specific problem in the embedment of credit ratings in numerous 
regulatory and legislative frameworks at the international and national levels. Specifically, it was 
highlighted that credit rating references in financial regulations may play a critical role in 
encouraging investors’ over-reliance on ratings and in discouraging them to undertake any 
independent credit risk analysis. The FSB addressed the investors’ over-reliance on credit ratings 
and, as it will be discussed further, gave suggestions to regulators and policymakers on how to 
reduce the problem. Before analysing the approach that the international body suggested, some 
considerations are in order.  
 Preliminarily, it can be argued that the FSB introduced a problem without specifically 
defining it. In the first place, the FSB indicated who may over-rely, that is, investors and market 
participants, the context which may facilitate over-reliance and provided some guidelines to 
mitigate this. A clear definition of over-reliance, however, was not provided. This has still to be 
developed even after the regulatory approaches which have been set out following the FSB’s 
guidelines. The lack of a proper definition is the source of confusion in relation to the phenomenon. 
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For example, the European Parliament in its 2011 resolution on CRAs uses the word over-reliance 
on credit ratings in relation to regulators.228 This is a significant difference vis-à-vis the FSB which, 
as indicated above, refers to over-reliance on credit ratings as an investors’ problem. Moreover, the 
current debate discusses the reduction of market participants’ reliance on credit ratings.229 This adds 
further confusion since reliance and over-reliance are perceived and used outside the debate as 
interchangeable words.230 Consequently, it is no longer clear whether reliance is the ‘good’ aspect 
of the credit ratings or is equal to over-reliance (‘bad’). Such a situation stems from a lack of a clear 
definition of the phenomenon in its features, as well as of specific delimitation of the areas in which 
it may arise. To understand the problem which is central to the present research, it is necessary to 
close this definitional gap.  
 This research will attempt to provide a definition of over-reliance to clarify what the 
regulators addressed and are attempting to solve. Such a definition can only be the result of a broad 
investigative process into the phenomenon of over-reliance divided into the following strands. First, 
analysis is to be provided as to the moment in which the phenomenon has been taken into 
consideration by regulators and policymakers. Precisely, the question to be addressed is concerned 
with whether the risk of over-reliance was brought to attention for the first time in the context of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis or was also discussed in the previous regulatory debates on CRAs and 
financial markets. After providing an answer to this, the investigation must consider whether the 
hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks should be regarded as the 
only context in which the phenomenon can arise. This investigation will provide a clearer 
understanding of over-reliance. In particular, addressing the existence of other potential sources of 
over-reliance will delimit the contours of the phenomenon and help to elaborate a definition of 
over-reliance which, in turn, will complete the FSB’s analysis. 
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II.6.2 Detecting the phenomenon: over-reliance in the US pre-crisis regulatory debate on the CRAs 
The first strand of investigation can be addressed by looking at the two legal systems, namely the 
US and EU, in which an approach to reduce over-reliance was set out in specific CRAs’ regulations. 
To start with the US, in the previous paragraphs it has been highlighted that this legal system boasts 
the highest number of credit ratings into LRSPs. The tie between the regulators and the credit 
ratings has always been particularly strong in the US. Nonetheless, this raises the question of 
whether before the 2007-2009 financial crisis the rating-based regulation had ever come under the 
regulatory spotlight for the risk of over-reliance. To answer this question, it is desirable to start 
researching and analysing the SEC consultation documents concerning the operations of the CRAs 
in the financial markets. These documents are of relevance because they are usually issued with the 
view to discussing the optimal regulatory framework to tackle potential or current problems.
 Among those releases concerning the operation of the CRAs, it is essential to analyse 
whether the widespread use of credit ratings in the US regulations is mentioned and why. As 
discussed above, the event which paved the way for the widespread use of rating-based regulation 
was the Net Capital Rule in 1973. The inclusion of credit ratings in this rule had a cascade effect 
since credit ratings where incorporated into other rules relating to other financial sectors. 231 
However, only twenty years after the amendments applied to the Net Capital Rule the SEC started 
monitoring the role of credit ratings into legislations. This SEC’s investigation went on until 2003. 
Consequently, only the releases issued between 1994 and 2003 can be useful to verify whether the 
US regulators considered, among other issues, the risk of over-reliance by investors and market 
participants deriving from the rating-based regulation. 
 As to 1994, the SEC Release No 34-34616 is in order. In this release the SEC acknowledged 
that the use of credit ratings had become widespread into the main pieces of US financial legislation 
since the adoption of the NRSRO concept in the Net Capital Rule.232 Nonetheless, this was not 
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worrisome in that the SEC clearly underlined that the inclusion of the credit ratings provided by 
NRSRO into its legislation was an essential tool for its regulatory strategies.233 Among other things, 
the SEC pointed out that even the US Congress relied on the NRSRO concept since it recognised 
that the ‘term has acquired currency as a term of art’.234 This is the key to understand why the SEC 
in 1994 decided to analyse the use of credit ratings in regulations. Problems, at that time, only 
stemmed from the use of the NRSRO’s concept in the regulations because the term NRSRO had 
been undefined since its introduction in 1973. In greater detail, what this meant was that to 
participate in the credit rating market, rating providers had to obtain the status of NRSRO. This was 
crucial for the CRAs’ business in that the legislation incorporated the requirement to use only credit 
ratings provided by certified NRSROs. However, the criteria to be eligible to obtain the NRSRO 
status, as well as a clear definition of it were quite nebulous. The SEC simply used to release a non-
action letter certifying that the rating providers, seeking the NRSRO status, were eligible to 
consider themselves as such and, thus, could operate in the rating market. 235  Given these 
shortcomings in the definition of the status and criteria, the aim of the 1994 SEC release was to 
consider to what extent the NRSRO concept should have been clarified and what possible solutions 
could have been discussed in relation to the legislation referring to an unclear concept. Importantly, 
relying on credit ratings in regulations as tools to define eligible investments did not have any 
connection with the phenomenon of over-reliance. The tie between regulation and credit ratings 
only needed to consider more accurately the concept of NRSRO. Undoubtedly, at that time there 
was not consideration for all the issues that are now widely discussed in the regulatory debate on 
the CRAs at all levels, such as conflict of interest due to the issuers-pay model, the oligopolistic 
structure of the rating industry, timeliness in the rating announcement and the lack of CRAs’ 
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accountability. As there was no room to discuss these problems, over-reliance was even unknown as 
a potential problem to be included in the regulatory agenda. This was still a period in which the 
‘good’ aspects of credit ratings were the basis upon which the regulators’ reliance on them in their 
legislation finds an explanation.  
 Outcomes are slightly different with regard to the 2003 period. The SEC Release No 34-
47972 of 2003 undertook a new analysis of the role of credit ratings into legislation.236 The 2003 
Release reconsidered the issues that the 1994 Release brought forward with regard to the 
incorporation of the NRSRO concept in the US financial legislation with the view to addressing 
them more effectively. In fact, the solution of such issues had remained on paper. In more detail, a 
proposal to define more specifically the term NRSRO and crystallise this into a specific provision 
was issued in the aftermath of the 1994 Release, but finally the SEC did not act on it.237 The 2003 
Release gave the opportunity to re-start the debate on the definition of the NRSRO status and the 
criteria to access such a status. However, a significant difference with the 1994 Release is that the 
2003 Release was solicited by heavy criticism against the operation of the CRAs. In the years 
before, important corporate defaults such as Enron and WorldCom started an intense debate as 
national fraud scandals. As already mentioned, CRAs were criticised for the slowness of their 
downgrades and, for this reason, they were subjected to regulatory scrutiny. In a nutshell, the 
regulatory debate took a closer look at the potential for conflict of interest inherent to the CRAs’ 
business model, the dominance of the major CRAs in the rating market, their lack of accountability 
and the role of credit ratings in the US legislation.238 The spectrum of the 2003 Release was wider 
than the 1994 Release. It cannot be left unnoticed that the passage from the 1994 Release to the 
2003 Release marked the beginning of the shift from the ‘good’ to the ‘bad’ aspects of the credit 
ratings which would have culminated at the outbreak of the recent financial turmoil. In essence, the 
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2003 Release was issued within a CRAs’ market failure context which would have finally led to the 
issuance of the first piece of US legislation on CRAs, namely the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act 
of 2006.239 From that moment onwards, CRAs would have ceased to operate as unregulated entities 
in the US. Nonetheless, like the 1994 Release, the 2003 Release did not consider the tie between 
regulation and credit ratings in relation to the danger of over-reliance. The 2003 Release addressed 
the possibility of eliminating the NRSRO designation within the financial regulatory frameworks 
only in relation to the argument that such a designation would work as a barrier to enter the rating 
market to the advantage of established CRAs.240 To this end, the NRSRO designation could cease to 
be used, but this could have been feasible only once proper, valid alternatives could have been 
identified. These alternatives, as it was clearly underlined in the 2003 Release, should have 
achieved the same objectives served by the NRSRO designation in the US financial rules.241   
Overall, the second Release addressed a number of issues in line with the possible areas of 
intervention identified and listed in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act after the abovementioned corporate 
scandals;242 but the risk of over-reliance was not contemplated among all the CRA-related-problems 
debated in 2003. Despite the new light that the role played by the leading CRAs in the Enron and 
WorldCom cases cast on their relationship with the public sector, it can be said that the credit 
ratings were still regarded as an important component of the US financial regulation. Among other 
things, in the language used by the SEC in its 2003 Release to refer to the presence of external 
credit ratings, there is not any negative connotation. ‘Rating-based regulation’ was still a term used 
to emphasise the value of credit ratings. Importantly, over-reliance deriving from the hardwiring of 
credit ratings references in legislation was still an undetected phenomenon; a problem that the US 
regulators did not know yet and could not think to include in their regulatory agenda on CRAs 
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either. Therefore, with regard to the US legal system, it can be submitted that the phenomenon of 
over-reliance had never been mentioned or brought forward before the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
 
II.6.3 Over-reliance in the EU pre-crisis regulatory debate on the CRAs 
 
The same outcomes can be discussed with regard to the European context: over-reliance on external 
credit ratings was an undetected phenomenon during all the pre-crisis period. This can be argued by 
analysing the approaches that the European regulators applied to the CRAs before and after the 
recent financial turmoil. In essence, the 2007-2009 financial crisis aligned the US and EU legal 
systems towards the need to elaborate a new legislative framework for disciplining the rating 
industry. However, while in the US the post crisis debate on CRAs had the aim of improving the 
regulatory regime which was issued in 2006, in the EU the purpose was to create the first European 
piece of regulation of CRAs.243 At the EU level, the shift from the self-regulation model to the 
regulatory model occurred in different times than in the US. This means that the European 
regulators and policymakers had different perceptions of the problems which could arise from the 
rating sector. This can be better understood by taking stock of the evolution of the European 
reforms of CRAs.  
 In particular, a corporate default similar to Enron happened in Europe in 2002, namely the 
Parmalat crack. Similarly to Enron, Parmalat S.p.A was rated investment grade until a few days 
before it declared bankruptcy and was put into liquidation.244 Consequently, the operation of CRAs 
came under regulatory scrutiny at the EU level as well. Nonetheless, the European Commission 
(Commission) did not embark on any reform and decided to leave the industry self-regulated on the 
grounds that some of the FSAP directives referring to CRAs, combined with self-regulation in 
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accordance with the IOSCO Code,245 were a robust enough framework to deal with the rating 
sector. 246  The directives that the Commission referred to were the Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD),247  the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD)248and the Market in Financial Instrument 
Directive (MIFID).249  
 Specifically, with regard to the first item of legislation which deals with insider dealing and 
market manipulation, the Commission noted that in the field of conflict of interest, fair presentation 
of investment recommendations and access to inside information, the provision of the MAD could 
constitute a comprehensive legal framework for the rating agencies.250 As to the second item, the 
CRD allows the use of external credit ratings provided by CRAs for the determination of risk 
weights applied to bank or investment firms’ exposures.251 To this end, it is necessary that the 
agencies be formally recognised as European Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAIs) by the 
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Member States’ competent authorities.252 The Commission acknowledged that the CRD did not 
constitute a form of regulation on the operation and conduct of CRAs. Consequently, it encouraged 
European national competent authorities to ensure that CRAs respected the criteria laid down to be 
recognised as ECAIs and to monitor whether CRAs performed their role as ECAIs in accordance 
with the CRD provisions.253  Finally, the main objective of the third piece of legislation is to 
increase competition and ensure consumers’ protection in investment services.254  In relation to 
CRAs, the Commission stressed the applicability of the MIFID provisions concerning conduct of 
business and organisational requirements. In particular, the provisions on conflicts of interest would 
apply to CRAs in case the agencies provided investment services to clients that fell under the 
MIFID.255 This framework was considered to be sufficient for the rating sector. Hence, there was no 
need to discuss new legislation.256 When the financial crisis started in 2007 the European stance 
towards the self-regulation model went into reverse. The Commission became an active player in 
the ensuing regulatory reforms of CRAs. These culminated in CRA Regulation I, CRA Regulation 
II257 and CRA Regulation III.  
 Clearly, both the US and EU systems started scrutinising the operations of the CRAs in the 
wake of some industry’s failures. Initially, they diverged as to the solutions to apply because, at the 
EU level, the agencies remained unregulated entities until the end of the recent financial crisis. 
Finally, in the post-crisis regulatory debate all the problems concerning the rating industry, which 
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were to be tackled through specific legislative interventions were listed. Among these, a new one 
was put on the regulatory agenda: over-reliance on external credit ratings. Previous corporate 
scandals in which the CRAs played a role did not give regulators any signal of the existence of 
over-reliance. The 2007-2009 crisis’ related events raised for the first time the awareness of the 
phenomenon and its negative implications. Consequently, over-reliance on external credit ratings 
must be identified and discussed only in the context of the recent global financial crisis. 
 
II.6.4 The sources of over-reliance: rating-based regulation versus the structure finance sector  
 
II.6.4.1 Rating-based regulation 
Having clarified that the over-reliance on external credit ratings is a phenomenon regulators and 
policymakers started taking into consideration in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, it is 
now to be verified whether the rating based regulation is the only context which can increase the 
risk of over-reliance, or whether other areas or situations should also be taken into consideration.  
 Firstly, the FSB brought to attention the risk of over-reliance deriving from the hardwiring 
of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks. In this case, credit rating references can 
discourage investors and market participants from undertaking their own due diligence and credit 
risk assessment. In practice, legislation that requires the investment grade rating provided by the 
CRAs, coupled with the fact that no other credit risk assessment tools are referred to as alternatives 
to credit ratings, may be misleading for investors and market participants. Legislative reference to 
investment grade ratings may be interpreted by investors and market participants as ‘a seal of 
approval’ of credit quality on the part of regulators.258 In other words, the FSB warned against the 
risk that investors and market participants may believe that the use of credit ratings by regulators 
can give them an imprimatur as guarantees of creditworthiness. As a result, investors and market 
participants would rely on credit ratings as the exclusive benchmark to assess credit risk and would 
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not perform their own due diligence and credit risk assessment in addition to the credit quality 
analysis provided by the CRAs. In this context, over-reliance would find its source in the credit 
rating references incorporated in legislation and regulatory frameworks; and would materialise 
through a negligent behaviour by investors and market participants.  
 
II.6.4.2 The structured finance sector 
However, over-reliance is not exclusively traced back to the hardwiring of credit ratings into 
legislation and regulatory frameworks. In the FSB report it is stated that over-reliance on credit 
ratings was particularly acute in the structured finance sector during the years leading up to the 
recent financial crisis.259 With regard to the structured finance sector, it is commonly acknowledged 
that investors misunderstood the specificities and limits of the structured finance ratings. In essence, 
they wrongly assumed that the ratings assigned to structured products such as RMBSs and CDOs 
covered market risk and liquidity risk in addition to credit risk.260 To understand these limits and 
why the structured finance sector is deemed of posing a serious risk of over-reliance, it is necessary 
to consider how the structured finance process works, the characteristics of the structured finance 
rating and the investors’ approach in analysing the risks inherent to these products during the pre-
crisis period.  
 To begin with, the mechanisms underlining a structured finance operation and the 
importance of the role played by the CRAs can be understood by dividing the transaction into three 
fundamental stages: 1) pooling of assets; 2) tranching of liabilities; and 3) transfer of the credit risk 
of the collateral asset pool from the originator to a stand-alone entity denominated special purpose 
vehicle (SPV).261 Pooling involves the collection and assemblage of credit-sensitive assets in a 
portfolio. These assets are usually diversified: cash instruments such as residential mortgages, credit 
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card receivables, loans, bonds and synthetic exposures such as credit default swaps (CDS). The 
portfolio of assets is then sold to the SPV which will finance the purchase by issuing claims backed 
by the cash flows deriving from the assets.262 The SPV’s balance sheet must be separated from the 
originator’s balance sheet because the de-linking of credit risk from the originator to the SPV is 
only effective through a ‘true sale’ between two different entities, namely the originator and the 
SPV. As said, the SPV issue claims for financing the purchase of the portfolio. Where the SPV 
issued claims that are not prioritised or simply claims to the payoff of the underlying portfolio, the 
structure would be defined as a pass-through securitisation.263 On the other hand, if the claims were 
prioritised according to different classes of risk, then the operation would be regarded as one of 
structured finance. Therefore, the creation of a range of securities with different cash flow risks, 
known as tranches, is regarded as the feature which distinguishes a structured finance operation 
from a pass-through securitisation.264 The tranching process creates seniority ordering among the 
different tranches of securities divided into senior, mezzanine and equity. Senior tranches are 
structured in such a way as to be immune from default losses which shall be finally absorbed by the 
riskier tranches, namely, the mezzanine and equity.265  
 The process is complex and is characterised by the interplay of different participants other 
than the originator and the SPV. CRAs play a significant role within a structured finance operation. 
A structured finance rating does not have any different meaning than the rating applied to 
traditional debt instruments such as corporate or sovereign bonds: a structured finance rating is an 
opinion on the probability that the cash flow from the underlying pool of assets can service the 
claims associated to a particular tranche.266 The CRAs’ analysis, like in corporate and sovereign 
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bonds, is concerned exclusively with the credit risk and does not cover any other risk such as 
market or liquidity risk. Meaning and objective are the same. However, several studies highlight a 
peculiarity of structured finance ratings which distinguish them from traditional ratings, that is to 
say, the ‘ex ante’ nature of structured finance rating.267 Basically, in the structured finance process 
arrangers usually pre-structure the deals by referring to the CRAs’ models and then interact with 
CRAs in order to increase the size of the tranches with the highest ratings or reduce the cost/quality 
of assets used to reach a high rating tranche or lessen the level of credit protection required for a 
certain tranche.268 This is referred to as the ex ante or targeted nature of the structured finance 
ratings as opposed to traditional bond ratings where pre-rating feedback to issuers and targeted 
ratings have a minor role. There is, hence, a conceptual difference between structured and 
traditional credit ratings.  
 Furthermore, a difference in performance is highlighted by some empirical studies. On the 
one hand, structured finance ratings seem to have more stability than corporate bond ratings during 
economic upturns but, on the other hand, they have a higher risk of severe downgrade than 
corporate bond ratings during economic downturns. 269  Specifically, the pooling and tranching 
techniques mitigate exposure to idiosyncratic risks of each individual asset. Consequently, it is 
accepted that the average credit performance of the underlying pool of assets is less volatile and 
more predictable in times of economic upturns than the individual assets. However, the benefits of 
diversification are lost when, because of economic pressures that influence the credit quality of 
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many assets, correlated defaults in the asset pools occur with strong cliff effects to the rating of 
structured products.270  
 All the actors involved in the structured process, in particular, originators, CRAs and 
investors need to understand the default risk embodied in the collateral pool as well as the other 
risks that are unrelated to defaults in the underlying collateral pool but which affect the 
creditworthiness of the tranches arising from the transaction structure.271  
  
II.6.4.2.1 Over-reliance on the structured finance ratings 
In the years leading up to the recent financial crisis, the increasing innovation in the structured 
finance market increased the complexity and sophistication of structured products. As a result, 
investors were unable to fully gauge the mechanics and risks associated to these products and they 
ultimately relied on the credit ratings provided by the CRAs. The triple A ratings assigned to these 
products became their first and unique ‘port of call’ for their investment decisions. However, their 
approach to the credit ratings was flawed. Not only were they unable to understand the 
characteristics of the structured finance ratings vis-à-vis the credit ratings assigned to other debt 
instruments, but they also misinterpreted the limits of the structured finance ratings. As mentioned, 
they believed that these could cover market and liquidity risk in addition to credit risk. The 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (now ESMA) summarised their risk analysis 
approach as follows: ‘it’s [the structured product] AAA rated so it’s safe, valuable and liquid’.272  
 This raises the question of how this misleading approach could happen. According to the 
International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), this may find an explanation in 
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the investors’ ignorance on the type of products they were buying, on their risk characteristics and 
the specificities of the rating assigned to them, as well as to laxness in undertaking own risk 
analysis on the products: ‘this happened either because they were lax or ignorant’.273  
  
II.6.5 Closing the gap: defining over-reliance on external credit ratings 
These two adjectives, ‘lax or ignorant’, are the basis for drawing a comparison between the 
phenomenon of over-reliance in the context of the rating-based regulation and in the context of the 
structured finance sector. Taking position from their literal meaning, while the former refers to a 
lack of care, attention or control, the latter denotes a lack of knowledge, understanding or 
information about something. Putting these meanings into the context of over-reliance, it can be 
shown that laxness is more pertaining to over-reliance arising from the rating-based regulation, 
whereas ignorance characterises the over-reliance in the structured finance sector. In other words, 
the reasons behind the risk of over-reliance arising from the structured finance sector are different 
than the ones behind the over-reliance deriving from the rating-based regulation. This would bring 
to attention two types of over-reliance according to whether we refer to the rating-based regulation 
or to the structured finance sector.  
 In the legislative context, over-reliance is ascribed to the investors’ negligence in respect of 
undertaking own due diligence and credit risk assessment. This is due to a misperception of the role 
assigned by regulators to credit ratings into legislation. Generally speaking, the ‘seal of approval’ 
interpretation does not necessarily imply ignorance on the characteristics and limits of the products 
and, above all, of the credit ratings. Market participants who invest in highly rated products under 
legislative requirements may be aware of the limits of credit ratings; especially, if they invest in 
corporate debt instruments whose risk characteristics may be gauged more easily than a complex, 
highly sophisticated, structured product. In an over-reliance perspective, they would not say, ‘it’s 
AAA rated so it’s safe, valuable and liquid’. Rather, they might say, ‘it’s AAA rated and this is 
                                                          
273
 IOSCO, ‘The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Markets-Final Report’ (2008). 
109 
 
required by regulators; hence, I am safe and sound and nothing else is needed’. Eventually, this 
reasoning does not necessarily overestimate the limits of credit ratings; it leads them to neglect their 
own due diligence and credit risk assessment which should be additional or complementary to the 
risk analysis provided by the CRAs. In essence, they are not incentivised to undertake their own 
credit risk assessment, even though they may have the capacity and possibility.  
 By contrast, in the structured finance sector, if they do not have a clear understanding of the 
products and of the specificities of their credit ratings, they will not have the capacity or the 
possibility of conducting their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. A lack of 
understanding of the products an investor would like to buy, means not knowing its features and 
risk characteristics; in turn, not knowing the financial product to be purchased implies ignorance. 
This ignorance may finally lead to a mischaracterisation of the limits of the credit ratings as it 
happened before the outbreak of the recent financial turmoil. Clearly, in the structured finance 
sector, these problems stem from the lack of necessary information whether on the characteristics of 
the structured products or on the specificities of the credit ratings assigned to them. Importantly, 
increasing the level of the investors’ understanding of the characteristics of the structured finance 
ratings through more disclosure from the part of CRAs is part of the current regulatory strategies to 
reduce over-reliance in the structured finance sector in the EU274and the US.275 This goes hand-in-
hand with more disclosure on the characteristics of the structured finance products by the issuers. 
Indeed, the higher the level of sophistication of the structured finance products, the higher the risk 
that the purchasers will not have a clear understanding of them. This, in turn, will increase their 
ignorance and the risk that they may perceive a triple A as a guarantee of good investments. In this 
context, their over-reliance on credit ratings seems to be the natural result of their lack of necessary 
information. Therefore, a lack of their own due diligence and credit risk assessment is not a matter 
of negligence, but a matter of impossibility because of a lack of information.  
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 In light of this discussion, a line of demarcation can be finally drawn between two types of 
overreliance: the first stems from the use of credit ratings by the public sector; and the second 
relates to the structured finance sector. In the first area, over-reliance is the investors’ and market 
participants’ misunderstanding of the role of credit ratings in financial regulation which finally 
leads them to be negligent in conducting their own credit risk assessment. In the second area, over-
reliance originates from the lack of necessary information on the products and their ratings. This 
makes them unable to undertake their own due diligence and credit risk assessment and may lead 
them to rely exclusively on credit ratings for the assessment of credit risk. Clearly, in this context 
credit ratings are not the ‘seal of approval’ of creditworthiness by regulators, but the ‘seal of 
creditworthiness’ by CRAs.  
 Having distinguished two areas which carry the risk of over-reliance, it is possible to 
summarise the result of the present analysis into a definition of over-reliance and, thus, close the 
definitional gap in the FSB report. Over-reliance on external credit ratings is a behavioural 
phenomenon which may originate from two contexts, that is, the rating-based regulation and the 
structured finance context. Within the hardwiring of credit ratings in financial legislation, over-
reliance is the misperception of the roles of credit ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks. 
This misperception results in the investors’ and market participants’ negligence in conducting their 
own due diligence and credit risk assessment. In the structured finance sector, over-reliance is the 
mischaracterisation of the nature and limits of the credit ratings. This depends on the impossibility 
of conducting one’s own due diligence and credit risk assessment due to a lack of necessary 
information on the products and their ratings. Different regulatory approaches to tackle the 
phenomenon corroborate the existence of the two types of over-reliance.   
 
II.7 REGULATORY APPROACHES AT THE NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND 
REGIONAL LEVELS TO ADDRESS OVER-RELIANCE ON CREDIT RATINGS 
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II.7.1 Delimiting the scope of the analysis 
As discussed, the 2007-2009 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis highlighted the 
systemic relevance of credit rating downgrades. In particular, cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours 
associated to downgrades can threaten the financial stability at the global level. These, in turn, are 
exacerbated by over-reliance on external credit ratings by investors and market participants. As 
elaborated, over-reliance is a behavioural phenomenon according to which external credit ratings 
are referred to by investors and market participants as the exclusive benchmark for assessing 
creditworthiness. Within the post-crisis debate on the CRAs, the risk of over-reliance came under 
the regulatory spotlight. The FSB introduced the phenomenon and gave warning about its effects. In 
particular, because of over-reliance investors and market participants are not incentivised to 
undertake their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. In the previous paragraphs, the hard-
wiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks, as well as the structured finance 
sector have been earmarked as over-reliance risky areas. Different approaches have been elaborated 
to reduce the risk of over-reliance according to whether the risk originates from the former or latter 
sector. This research deals with the risk of over-reliance deriving from the rating-based regulation 
and the consequent approaches to mitigate the phenomenon. In this context, recommendations were 
first elaborated at the international level. Not only did the FSB spot the phenomenon, but it also 
encouraged authorities to check the role they assigned to credit ratings in regulations and 
supervisory rules. The FSB underlined that credit rating references should not facilitate undue 
reliance on credit ratings and should be consistent with the aim of having investors perform an 
autonomous judgement of risks and proper due diligence. 276  The authorities’ task was hence 
concerned with reviewing whether investment grade rating requirements in regulations and 
supervisory policies could be perceived by investors and market participants as an official 
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recognition of creditworthiness; and, for this reason, act as a disincentive to perform additional due 
diligence and credit risk assessment.277  
 Significantly, the tie between the public sector and the credit rating was no longer as strong 
as it was before the recent financial crisis. The risk of over-reliance and the suggestions brought 
forward by the FSB to reduce it marked the beginning of a new relationship between regulators and 
credit ratings. Accordingly, it is now to be assessed how the competent authorities at the national, 
international and regional levels acted on the FSB’s advice. In this respect, the analysis will take 
position from the approaches elaborated by the US regulators, the FSB and the EU Institutions. 
These are the only three macro areas in which it is possible to take stock of the progress to reduce 
the risk of over-reliance from the moment the FSB warned against it. 
 
II.7.2 US level: Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act: Reliance versus over-reliance 
To start with the US, in line with the FSB inputs, the SEC launched its consultations. Consistency 
with the FSB advice can be seen through the examination of the Releases issued between 2008 and 
2009. These were concerned with verifying whether in the SEC’s rules and forms the requirement 
to use credit ratings provided by NRSROs could place an official seal of approval on credit ratings 
that were detrimental to the investors’ independent due diligence and credit risk analysis.   
Through Release No 34-58070 of 2008 the SEC sought views from the users of credit 
ratings as to the opportunity to eliminate credit rating references from its rules and replace them 
with alternative tools for measuring credit risk.278 Some significant aspects can be discussed in 
relation to this approach. Firstly, and in accordance with the FSB guideline, the SEC proposed a 
review which was only finalised to identify those credit rating references which could induce 
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uncritical reliance on external credit ratings.279 This means that the review had to identify and select 
specific credit rating references. Secondly, the SEC went beyond the FSB recommendation. The 
FSB did not suggest any replacement of credit ratings with alternatives. Consequently, as it will be 
discussed below, the SEC translated the FSB recommendation into an approach aimed at replacing 
the credit ratings with valid alternatives. As will be shown below, this aspect would have influenced 
the successive strategies on over-reliance.280 Finally, the SEC asked the users of credit ratings to 
provide their view on the approach it brought forward. Even though this approach sounds like a 
downsize of the role of credit ratings into financial legislation, it can be said that the SEC still 
showed consideration for the utility of credit ratings into its regulations. In fact, at the time in which 
Release No 34-58070 was issued, CRARA was the only piece of legislation for the regulation of the 
rating industry. CRARA regulated only selected aspects of the rating industry acknowledging the 
importance of credit ratings in financial markets.281 Accordingly, any consultation launched by the 
SEC to change its rating regulation also had to refer to the purpose of CRARA to protect investors 
and improve the operations of the rating industry.282 For these reasons, in relation to over-reliance, 
the SEC could select between ‘good and bad’ credit rating references in its regulations.283 As the 
review and possible removal was only concerned with specific credit rating references, it can be 
said that credit ratings were still a component of the authority’s regulatory programme. Those 
references not carrying any risk of over-reliance had to be maintained. Among other things, this was 
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also consistent with the FSB recommendation to be aware of the important role of credit ratings in 
investment and risk management frameworks. In this sense, the FSB urged careful consideration of 
the implications of any possible changes to regulations and supervisory rules.284  
 Nonetheless, it must be emphasised that it remains untested whether the SEC was able to 
identify the credit rating references which can cause ‘undue reliance’ on external credit ratings by 
investors and market participants. It is unquestionable that the SEC was initially consistent with the 
FSB guidelines concerning the problem of over-reliance; but finally there are not results permitting 
evaluation of which credit rating references the SEC identified and selected as over-reliance risky. 
This impossibility finds an explanation in another significant change in the relationship between the 
public sector and the credit ratings. This change has been marked through the introduction of the 
Dodd Frank Act which President Barack Obama signed in 2010. The Dodd Frank Act deals with 
almost every part of the US financial system and regulates the rating industry through several 
provisions as well.285 Among the provisions incorporated into the Dodd Frank Act, Section 939A 
confirms the view that the outcomes of the initial investigation that the SEC conducted with regard 
to the danger of over-reliance have remained ineffective. Titled ‘Review of Reliance on Ratings’, 
Section 939A resulted from a bipartisan agreement between the Republican and Democratic 
Senators in the US Congress.286  According to Section 939A, all the US Federal agencies are 
required to review the references to credit ratings in their legislation and then remove these 
references to substitute them with alternative standards of creditworthiness.287 The contents of this 
provision are quite revolutionary in the sense that they seem to put an end to the relationship 
between the US regulators and the credit ratings. In fact, Section 939A states that the current rating 
references have to be eliminated and this means that the tie between the public sector and the credit 
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ratings must be broken. As will be discussed in greater detail, the overall approach sounds like a 
prohibition to include credit ratings in future regulations. In light of this, it can be argued that the 
initial SEC’s investigative path which aimed at selecting only those credit rating references which 
could create over-reliance has been interrupted by Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act. In the 
Releases issued consequently to Section 939A, the SEC acknowledged that it had to deal with a 
new approach. In essence, it was no longer the case to select between ‘good and bad’ references and 
eliminate the ‘bad’ references, now credit rating references have to be eliminated and alternatives 
have to be elaborated.288  
 Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act represents a significant U-turn in comparison to the 
aims of the previous proposed review of the credit rating references. Also, it appears not to be in 
line with the FSB recommendations either. These were specifically related to over-reliance, while 
Section 939A deals with reliance on credit ratings. At this stage, it may be argued that the US 
regulators initially had the intention to tackle over-reliance and they ultimately ended up dealing 
with reliance. Indeed, all the releases issued in relation to Section 939A no longer mention the risk 
of the ‘seal of approval’. Rather, they are mainly concerned with implementing the letter of the 
section, in particular, with regard to the search of an alternative to credit ratings which is 
mandatory.289  
 The context of Section 939A raises the question of whether over-reliance is still a matter of 
concern for the US regulators and whether an approach to deal with it can be identified at the US 
level. To answer this question, the analysis has to be necessarily circumscribed to Section 939A of 
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the Dodd Frank Act. In fact, this rule deals with the source of over-reliance, that is, the hardwiring 
of credit ratings into legislation. It is therefore to be collocated within a debate on the use of the 
credit ratings by the public sector which the FSB has initiated in the wake of the recent crisis. With 
this in mind, it is to be verified whether this rule has any relation to the phenomenon which may 
derive from the hardwiring of ratings into legislation, namely over-reliance on external credit 
ratings, or it is exclusively concerned with the use of credit ratings by the public sector. To this end, 
it is desirable to clarify the meaning and purpose of Section 939A.  
 In the ‘Oversight of the Credit Rating Agencies Post Dodd Frank’ 2011 report it is stated as 
follows:  
[…] there was broad agreement that investors, because of the government’s explicit 
requirement of ratings, had become basically over-reliant on the rating agencies and 
failed to do their due diligence. And so by having the government require these 
ratings, investors believed that ratings had a stamp of approval from the Federal 
Government. In order to help decrease the dependence on a few organisations to 
have such an outsized influence in our financial system a bipartisan proposal 
[Section 939A] was added to the Dodd Frank Bill that required regulators to cease 
their reliance on credit ratings and instead adopt their own standard of credit 
worthiness.290  
 
This statement is the rationale behind Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act. By reflecting over it, 
the definition of over-reliance stemming from the hardwiring, provided in the previous paragraph, 
can be identified. In other words, the statement refers to the misperception of the role of credit 
ratings in legislation by investors, which leads them to be negligent in their own credit risk 
assessment and rely solely on credit ratings. This is over-reliance on credit ratings and the approach 
to eliminate the related risk results in the bipartisan proposal which has been ultimately set out in 
Section 939A.  
 From the regulators’ statement it can be understood that Section 939A deals with over-
reliance by tackling the governmental reliance on external credit ratings. It is no longer the case to 
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select between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ credit rating references as initially suggested by the FSB. The 
misperception of these references as a stamp of approval and the consequent investors’ negligence 
stems from the governmental use of credit ratings and that is the primary area of intervention. 
Section 939A is entitled ‘reliance’ and not ‘over-reliance’ because it deals with the source of the 
latter. Consequently, over-reliance is still relevant at the US level and its reduction is based on the 
approach set out in Section 939A. This rule should not be regarded as explicitly referring to over-
reliance. It explicitly refers to its source and, thus, it represents the approach which is supposed to 
reduce the risk of over-reliance in the private sector by eliminating the public sector’s reliance on 
credit ratings.  
 From the initial recommendations issued by the FSB with regard to the risk of over-reliance 
deriving from the embedment of credit ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks, Section 
939A marked a significant change. There was an initial consistency with the FSB advice to select 
only those credit rating references which could cause uncritical reliance by investors and market 
participants. Then, the issuance of Section 939A evolved the initial approach into one exclusively 
based on ending governmental reliance on credit ratings by the public sector and de-emphasising 
the role of credit ratings in legislation. This approach is also regarded as suitable to tackle the risk 
of over-reliance in the private sector. Consequently, over-reliance can be implicitly deduced from 
the approach which explicitly refers to its source, namely: regulatory reliance on credit ratings.  
 
II.7.3 The FSB principles for reducing reliance on credit ratings: searching for over-reliance 
Interesting developments can be discussed at the international level as well. To this end, the 
analysis is concerned with the approach that the FSB issued almost contextually to Section 939A of 
the Dodd Frank Act. In October 2010, the FSB issued a body of guidelines entitled, ‘Principles for 
Reducing Reliance on Credit Ratings’.291 Before discussing the approach resulting from this set of 
principles, some preliminary considerations are in order. Firstly, a comparison can be made with 
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Section 939A. The FSB Principles and the US rule were issued quite close together and, thus, some 
common features can be highlighted. Like Section 939A, the FSB Principles appear to refer 
exclusively to the regulatory reliance on external credit ratings. In essence, regulatory reliance 
should be the main problem to be tackled and in relation to which the set of principles has been 
elaborated. In fact, the set is entitled ‘principles for reducing reliance on credit ratings’ and not 
‘principles for reducing over-reliance on credit ratings’. In light of this, it is to be wondered which 
relevance over-reliance can have within the international body which, at first, introduced this 
behavioural phenomenon and recommended interventions with regard to the hardwiring of credit 
ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks. In other words, the investigation to be conducted 
is not dissimilar to the one concerning Section 939A.  
 In the previous paragraph it has been verified that the approach set out in Section 939A 
implicitly refers to over-reliance to the extent that it is supposed to reduce this by de-emphasising 
the regulatory reliance on external credit ratings. Now, in the context of the FSB principles for 
reducing reliance on credit ratings, it is to be assessed whether there is explicit or implicit reference 
to over-reliance. In this respect, it is desirable to analyse the purpose and contents of the set of 
principles.  
 
II.7.3.1 Rationale and purpose of the FSB set of principles 
In the explanatory notes to the set of principles, the FSB refers to the need to reduce the cliff-edge 
effects associated to downgrades and the potential for herd-behaviours. As explained above, the 
hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks increases this possibility. 
Specifically, according to the language used by the FSB, the hardwiring of credit ratings in 
legislation is the source of mechanistic and parallel reliance on credit ratings.292 Essentially, it is the 
source of what has so far been identified as over-reliance or market over-reliance (MOR).293 It must 
be noted that the FSB does not detail or provide any definition of mechanistic and parallel reliance. 
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Another definitional gap is therefore to be addressed. To briefly anticipate what this research will 
remark upon in the next parts, the absence of definitions is a concrete problem with which also the 
European competent supervisory authorities had to deal with at the end of 2013, while 
implementing the normative approaches set out in the EU regulation of the CRAs to reduce over-
reliance on the credit ratings. Indeed, their problem was concerned with the elaboration of a 
common definition of ‘mechanistic and parallel’ reliance since the European institutions endorsed 
the expression from the FSB but did not clarify its meaning.294 At this stage of development of the 
present research, a general definition can be set out and then re-discussed in connection with the 
analysis of the status of implementation of the anti-over-reliance strategies in the next parts.  
 The meaning of this expression can be understood by referring to some of the situations 
highlighted in the previous paragraphs. As seen, asset managers are required to hold in their 
portfolio investment grade instruments. In the event of downgrades of these instruments, if they rely 
exclusively on the rating news and, consequently, a dramatic sale of debt instruments takes place, 
this can be regarded as a mechanistic reliance on credit ratings. In addition, if other investors and 
market participants will be doing the same simply because they are biased by the previous 
investors’ conduct, their behaviour can be regarded as parallel. Both mechanistic and parallel 
reliance clearly refers to cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours. These phenomena are exacerbated 
when credit ratings are taken at face value with no complementary, independent analysis. This 
reasoning goes back again to the phenomenon of over-reliance on external credit ratings, according 
to which credit ratings become the primary and exclusive benchmarks to assess creditworthiness.  
 
II.7.3.2 The FSB two-pronged approach: contents and reference to over-reliance 
To cease or reduce this potential, it is necessary to intervene at the source, that is to say, rating-
based regulation. In turn, this implies stopping regulators from including credit ratings in financial 
regulations. This is the rationale behind FSB Principle I. According to FSB Principle I, standard 
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setters, regulators and policymakers are required to review references to credit ratings in their 
standards and regulations and, where appropriate, replace them with alternative standards of 
creditworthiness.295 FSB Principle I is set up as the first level of the approach elaborated by the 
FSB. Basically, the overall approach is a strategy to be put into practice through two intertwined 
levels. The first level is incorporated in FSB Principle I and the second in FSB Principle II.296  
 The second principle requires investors and market participants to undertake their own credit 
risk assessment and due diligence and not to rely solely or mechanistically on credit ratings.297 The 
intertwine between the two levels of the FSB approach can be seen in the fact that the second level 
can be implemented consequently to the development of the first level: once credit rating references 
are removed and replaced by alternative standards of creditworthiness, investors and market 
participants will be more independent from credit ratings and will prioritise their own due diligence 
and credit assessment.298  
 The contents of the two FSB Principles have a relation with over-reliance on external credit 
ratings. Over-reliance stemming from the embedment of credit ratings into regulations may 
discourage market participants from doing their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. In 
this respect, the first level of the FSB approach intervenes at the source of over-reliance, while the 
second level deals with those who risk over-relying because of the rating-based regulation. Based 
on this, it can be claimed that FSB Principle II is the specific provision on over-reliance. Indeed, 
over-reliance stems from the hardwiring but it is finally materialised through the conduct of 
investors and market participants. Therefore, another rule encouraging an independent, more 
autonomous, credit risk analysis must be laid down in addition to the one prescribing the deletion of 
the credit rating references; and this is FSB Principle II.  
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 Compared to Section 939A, the set of principles introduces an essential element, namely the 
encouragement to undertake independent credit risk analysis. However, the endorsement of the set 
of principles by the FSB jurisdictions during the G20 Seoul Summit of 2010 has made FSB 
Principle II a guideline that the US regulators have to take into consideration while implementing 
Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act.299 Based on the contents of the two-pronged approach, the 
strategy seems to be clear: not only should over-reliance be tackled by eliminating the credit rating 
references, but also through the establishment of stronger internal risk assessment practices so as to 
reduce the firms’ dependence on external credit ratings. Such an approach requires the users of 
credit ratings to have the capability to conduct their own credit risk analysis. This, in turn, can only 
be facilitated by having appropriate internal resources with adequate expertise to assess the credit 
risk that firms are exposed to, disclosure of information as to the approaches and processes applied 
to the assessment of credit risk, and a thorough check of the adequacy of firms’ internal credit 
assessment processes by supervisors and regulators.  
 There is a clear incentive to develop internal credit risk assessment capacity and thus to 
encourage more use of IRB systems. For these reasons the FSB regards the set of principles as the 
catalyst of a significant change in existing credit risk measurement practices more based on external 
credit risk assessment than on internal.300 The two-pronged approach involves all the principal 
actors and users of external credit ratings in the financial markets, from large, sophisticated, 
financial institutions, including central banks to smaller, less sophisticated financial firms as well as 
investment managers who have mandates to invest in highly rated financial products. Specifically, 
central banks are encouraged to avoid mechanistic use of CRA ratings by performing their own 
judgement on the financial instruments they accept in market operations, both as collateral and as 
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outright purchases.301  Banks must have the capability to conduct their own assessment of the 
creditworthiness of assets and should satisfy supervisors of that capability.302 Similarly, investment 
managers and institutional investors are required not to refer to CRA ratings as a substitute for an 
independent credit judgement. 303  In private sector margin agreements, market participants and 
central counterparties are cautioned against the ‘use of changes in CRA ratings as automatic triggers 
for large, discrete, collateral calls in margin agreements on derivatives and securities financing 
transactions’.304  What is more, the FSB document asks issuers of securities to disclose credit-
relevant information in order to help investors make independent investment decisions.305 Finally, 
the FSB expects standard setters and regulators to coordinate their efforts to reduce reliance and 
share experiences taking into consideration factors such as characteristics of products, market 
participants and jurisdictions so as to ensure the implementation of the principles within a 
reasonable timeframe.  
 Since the initial FSB recommendations, at the international level an approach to reduce 
over-reliance seems to have been finally included in the set of principles set out by the FSB. 
Nonetheless, it may be argued that this conclusion is only based on the interpretation of the content 
of the two-pronged approach. In fact, like Section 939A, the set of principles refers to the reduction 
of reliance and does not have any explicit reference to over-reliance. Whereas, in the analysis of 
Section 939A evidence was found of the relevance of over-reliance through the statements of 
regulators, in the case of the FSB Principles, the investigation is not concluded. It is necessary to go 
beyond the interpretation of the two-pronged approach. To give concreteness to the assertion that 
the FSB Principle II refers to over-reliance and, thus, the phenomenon is addressed, first, through 
the elimination of the hardwiring and, then, through the consequent encouragement of independent 
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credit risk analysis, it is desirable to look at the implementation of these principles among the FSB 
jurisdictions. 
 
II.7.4 The European CRA Regulation III: confirming over-reliance 
At the beginning of this chapter, it has been explained that the private sector relies on credit ratings 
because they are valid sources of information which help reduce information asymmetries and 
lower the cost of transaction.306 The public sector relies on credit ratings as well. As discussed, the 
legislative requirements to invest in highly rated debt instruments finds its reason in the need to 
avoid investors and market participants to engage in investments which can be excessively risky.307 
Seen from this angle, reliance on external credit ratings has a good connotation. However, cliff-
edge effects and herd behaviours associated to rating downgrades give reliance a negative 
connotation. Both cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours are exacerbated by over-reliance on credit 
ratings. 308  In this context, the hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation is regarded as the 
incentive to over-rely on credit ratings and the source of related problems. Accordingly, regulators 
started revisiting their approach to credit ratings. The current debate aims at reducing regulatory 
reliance to curb the impact of cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours and mitigate the potential of 
over-reliance. To this end, regulators are required to revisit their credit rating references, delete 
them and replace them with alternative standards of creditworthiness. As detailed, this is the 
rationale behind Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act and Principle I of the FSB guidelines to 
reduce reliance on credit ratings. As explained in the previous paragraphs, such an approach reflects 
the evolution of the initial debate on over-reliance finally developed through Section 939A at the 
US level and the set of FSB principles at the international level. Since in this context over-reliance 
is no longer explicitly mentioned, an investigation has been conducted on the extent to which over-
reliance is relevant within the two approaches. In essence, the argument was discussed that reducing 
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reliance is a one-size-fits-all approach which includes over-reliance as well. In practice, the review 
and elimination of the credit rating references is an intervention at the source of over-reliance. After 
this, the risk of over-reliance will be further reduced by giving investors and market participants the 
opportunity to perform a credit assessment which does not exclusively rely on external credit 
ratings. As to the US, this hypothesis found confirmation in the regulatory debate concerning the 
efforts to implement Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act. While at the international level, FSB 
Principle II encourages investors and market participants to undertake their own due diligence and 
credit assessment once FSB Principle I has been translated into practice. Over-reliance is reflected 
in the second level of the FSB approach. However, FSB Principle II does not explicitly refer to 
over-reliance nor is it entitled ‘over-reliance’. Consequently, at the international level the assertion 
still remains abstract. Concreteness is to be found by investigating how the FSB Principles have so 
far been translated into rules by the FSB jurisdictions.  
 The FSB has declared that the US and EU are the only systems which seem to have 
undertaken more efforts in the reduction of regulatory reliance.309 As seen, the US issued Section 
939A before the FSB Principles. The implementation of this rule as well as the FSB Principles after 
their endorsement will be discussed in the next chapter. What is needed in the present context is the 
identification of a rule which explicitly refers to over-reliance through the translation of the FSB 
two-pronged approach. The investigation is therefore concerned with the progress made at the EU 
level to implement the FSB Principles.  
 By looking at the three pieces of the European legislation of CRAs it can be noticed that the 
European regulators took into consideration the problem of over-reliance as initially encouraged by 
the FSB. CRA Regulation I did not include any specific provision on over-reliance, only a reference 
under Recital No 10 in which it is stated that investors should not excessively rely on credit ratings 
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and should instead perform their own credit assessment and due diligence.310 However, as it is 
known, CRA Regulation I was the stepping stone towards the current broader regulation 
encompassing all the issues which were left out: sovereign rating methodologies, CRAs’ civil 
liability and disclosure requirements with regard to the rating of structured finance products.311 
Over-reliance on external credit ratings was included as well. 312  It can be observed that the 
consultations and preparatory works leading to the draft of CRA Regulation III reflect a full 
endorsement of the Principles that the FSB issued meanwhile. In particular, from the impact 
assessment study of the third piece of CRA regulation, it can be seen that the aim to pursue a 
strategy conforming to the set of principles was on focus.313 Finally, the transposition of the FSB 
two-pronged approach can be noticed in Articles 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) of CRA Regulation III. Both 
Articles 5(b) and 5(c) implement FSB Principle I. Article 5(b) of CRA Regulation III requires the 
European supervisory authorities not to refer to credit ratings in their guidelines, recommendations 
and draft technical standards where these references carry the potential to trigger sole or 
mechanistic reliance on credit ratings by authorities and market participants. Furthermore, the rule 
requests the concerned authorities to review and remove, where appropriate, all such references to 
credit ratings in their existing guidelines, recommendations, and draft technical standards.314 This 
rule mirrors the contents of FSB Principle I even though, as it will be discussed below, a slight 
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difference can be identified in the fact that Article 5(b) does not provide any requirement to 
complement this elimination with the elaboration of new alternatives or standards of 
creditworthiness. Article 5(c) tasks the Commission with monitoring whether credit rating 
references in Union law can trigger undue reliance on credit ratings. As the Article specifies further, 
the purpose is to delete such references by 2020 once appropriate alternatives are found.315Article 
5(c) is in line with the first level of the FSB approach and also seems to resemble the contents of 
Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act.  
 The contents of these rules represent the transposition of the first level of the two-pronged 
approach into the European legislation of CRAs. On the other hand, the transposition of the second 
level of the approach can be identified in Article 5(a). This rule is entitled ‘Over-reliance on credit 
ratings by financial institutions’ and requires financial institutions to make their own credit 
assessment and not solely and mechanistically rely on credit ratings.316 This rule represents the 
explicit approach on over-reliance which draws on the FSB Principle II. In other words, Article 5(a) 
of CRA Regulation III gives concreteness to the assertion according to which FSB Principle II, 
though implicitly, refers to and has to be regarded as the approach set out at the international level 
to tackle over-reliance through the reduction of regulatory reliance on credit ratings. Furthermore, 
Article 5(a) and its denomination confirms that the reduction of regulatory reliance on credit ratings 
is the one-size-fits-all strategy which is also supposed to reduce the potential for over-reliance and 
the possibility of cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours. To complete the picture, reference can also 
be made out of the context of the European legislation of CRAs. Directive 2013/14/EU, issued in 
May 2013, has amended the European directives on the activities and supervision of institutions for 
occupational retirement provision (IORP Directive), on the regulation of undertakings for collective 
investment in transferable securities (UCITS Directive) and on alternative investment fund 
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managers (AIFM Directive).317 Amendments were applied with respect to over-reliance on credit 
ratings and, again, they reflect the FSB Principle II to the extent that in order to improve the quality 
of investment made by IORPs, UCITS and AIFMs, Directive 2013/14/EU states that it is not 
desirable to rely solely and mechanistically on credit ratings or use them as the only parameter 
when assessing the risk involved in the investment made by IORPs, UCITS and AIFMs.318  
 All things considered, it can now be said that the regulatory debate on over-reliance initiated 
by the FSB evolved into approaches elaborated at the national, international and regional level. In 
this context, both the US and the EU have issued their own rules which address the risk of over-
reliance by way of dealing with the regulatory use of credit ratings coupled with the encouragement 
to investors and market participants to perform more autonomous credit quality analysis. 
 
II.8 CONCLUSION 
Over-reliance on external credit ratings is a phenomenon which has the effect of discouraging 
investors and market participants from doing their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. In 
this part of the thesis the contours of the phenomenon has been sketched by first trying to identify it 
within the negative aspects associated to credit ratings. This has entailed a preliminary analysis of 
reliance on credit ratings. Reliance was construed in accordance with the positive aspects 
commonly associated with the use of credit ratings, such as reduction of information asymmetries 
and transaction costs. As explained, these are the reasons why the private sector makes wide use of 
credit ratings. Within this positive connotation, the meaning of reliance on credit ratings has been 
specified, namely the trust that investors and market participants put on the value of the services 
provided by CRAs through their credit ratings. As it has been illustrated, this trust is not only 
circumscribed to the private sector but involves the public sector as well. Even though there are 
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some significant differences among legal systems as to the amount of credit rating references in the 
regulations and legislative frameworks, it has been shown why the credit ratings are an important 
part of regulatory strategies. Indeed, these aim to protect investors from undertaking excessive risk. 
The line of demarcation between investment and speculative grade that credit ratings represent 
through their alphabetical symbols is therefore an efficient tool that regulators use to cap the 
amount of risk investors can take. All of these aspects have been incorporated into one word, 
namely the ‘good’ aspects of credit ratings and, thus in the context of the investigative path towards 
over-reliance, reliance on credit ratings has been interpreted as the ‘good’ aspect of credit ratings.  
 This has been the platform to question which negative aspects can derive from the use of 
credit ratings in the private and public sector in addition to the ‘good’. The shift from the ‘good’ to 
the ‘bad’ aspects of credit ratings has been the further investigative step which has permitted the 
identification of over-reliance in the context of the cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours associated 
to credit ratings, which were particularly acute in the period of the recent financial turmoil. The 
context of the crisis showed how the investors’ reactions to rating changes caused a rethinking of 
the role of credit ratings, in particular, in regulations. Regulators started to use words such as 
hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks as well as over-reliance by 
investors and market participants. With these preconditions the central topic of this research could 
start being discussed.  
It has been argued that the phenomenon of over-reliance was only introduced by the 
regulators and policymakers but no definition has ever been provided. In an attempt to close this 
gap, this part of the thesis has first investigated whether there were traces of over-reliance before 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis and then assessed whether incentives to over-rely can only derive 
from the hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation or whether other sectors can be regarded as 
over-reliance risky. In this respect, the following answers have been provided: over-reliance on 
external credit ratings was for the first time introduced in the regulatory debate at the national, 
international and regional levels which followed the recent crisis and global recession; the 
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hardwiring of credit ratings is not the only area which provides incentives to over-rely, the 
structured finance sector is critical as well. By distinguishing these two sectors, the analysis closed 
the definitional gap through two definitions of over-reliance according to whether reference is made 
to the regulatory or structured finance sector. Within the hardwiring of credit ratings in financial 
legislation, over-reliance is the misperception of the role of credit ratings in legislation and 
regulatory frameworks. This misperception results in the investors’ and market participants’ 
negligence in conducting their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. In the structured 
finance sector, over-reliance is the mischaracterisation of the nature and limits of the credit ratings. 
This depends on the impossibility of conducting one’s own due diligence and credit risk assessment 
due to the lack of necessary information on the products and their ratings.  
 This thesis is concerned with the approaches elaborated to reduce the risk of over-reliance 
stemming from the embedment of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks. As to 
this, the investigation took chart of the evolution of the debate finalised to the elaboration of a 
regulatory approach. The investigation led to the conclusion that the approach to tackle over-
reliance on external credit ratings is based, first, on the reduction of credit rating references in 
legislation and, secondly, on the parallel enhancement of investors’ and market participants’ 
capabilities to conduct their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. Such a conclusion builds 
upon the evolutionary stages of the debate on over-reliance at the national, international and 
regional levels.  
 In the US, the word ‘over-reliance’ disappeared in the aftermath of the issue of Section 
939A of the Dodd Frank Act which deals with reliance on credit ratings and requires the US 
agencies to review, remove and substitute with valid alternatives credit rating references in their 
respective legislation. This has raised the question of whether over-reliance was still relevant in the 
US debate and whether the spirit and letter of Section 939A could be interpreted as referring to 
over-reliance through reliance. An analysis of the results of the US debate discussing the 
implementation of Section 939A confirmed this assertion. Within this debate, Section 939A was 
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also interpreted as referring to the enhancement of independent credit risk analysis to avoid giving 
exclusivity to credit ratings. It was noticed that this matches the definition of over-reliance that this 
work had previously elaborated. Hence, there is an implicit reference to over-reliance under Section 
939A. In other words, the risk of over-reliance can be reduced by encouraging more independent 
credit risk analysis. However, this approach means first to intervene at the source of over-reliance, 
that is, through the reduction of credit rating references. Similarities with the US results have been 
found at the international level through the analysis of the FSB principles for reducing reliance on 
credit ratings. Again, the word ‘over-reliance’ disappeared in the approach elaborated by the body 
which introduced the phenomenon, but it is referred to in the principle of enhancing investors’ 
credit risk assessment capabilities, though this is not entitled ‘over-reliance’ nor does it mention 
over-reliance either. This implicit reference to over-reliance needed explicit confirmation. This has 
been finally found at the EU level through the title of the rules of CRA Regulation III which 
respectively deal with reliance and over-reliance.  
 Therefore, based on the results of the investigation conducted in this first part, over-reliance 
stemming from the hardwiring of credit ratings in regulations results in a negligent behaviour by 
investors and market participants who neglect any complementary, independent credit risk 
assessment. The approaches elaborated at the international, national and regional levels aim at 
tackling this problem by encouraging independent credit risk analysis by intervening at its source, 
namely, through the repeal of credit rating references in legislation. 
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CHAPTER III 
REGULATORY APPROACHES AGAINST OVER-RELIANCE: IN 
SEARCH OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 
III.1 INTRODUCTION 
More than five years have passed since the beginning of the regulatory debate on over-reliance and 
the issuance of the FSB set of principles. Normative approaches have been set out as well, primarily 
in the US and the EU. As illustrated in the previous chapter, these approaches mandate the 
competent authorities to start a review of the credit rating references in their legislation, 
recommendations and guidelines. At this stage, it is desirable to take stock of the current status of 
enactment of the reforms at the national, international and regional levels. In essence, it is necessary 
to chart the pace of the implementation of the normative approaches; that is, the substantial progress 
towards the translation of the rules against over-reliance. In fact, the review of the credit rating 
references is simply the first step of a broader process which also entails the removal of them and 
the subsequent enhancement of the investors’ and market participants’ capabilities to conduct a 
credit risk analysis independent from the credit ratings. In the middle of these two passages, there is 
also the crucial aspect relating to the elaboration of suitable alternatives to the external credit 
ratings.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyse and critically assess the results achieved in the 
translation of such a strategy. The analysis requires concentration mainly on the US and EU levels 
because they are the only two legal systems which have set out normative approaches, and where an 
implementation process can be concretely verified. As to the review of the credit rating references, 
it must not be forgotten that the US and the EU approaches are different in that while the former 
pursues an identification of all the credit rating references within the US federal agencies’ 
legislation, the latter aims to identify and select only those credit rating references which carry the 
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risk of mechanistic and parallel reliance. Consequently, different results are likely to be discussed. 
In this context, the set of principles elaborated by the FSB will be referred to as the basic two-level 
strategy upon which the implementation progress can be tested among the FSB jurisdictions, in 
particular in the US and the EU. 
 In any case, despite some differences, what the US and the EU have in common in their 
rules is the search of valid alternatives to the credit ratings. Undeniably, the overall progress of the 
strategy is conditioned by this aspect. Indeed, the search and set up of appropriate alternatives to the 
credit ratings is vital for the subsequent removal stage to be applied under both Section 939A and 
CRA Regulation III. Importantly, where there are significant difficulties in finding valid alternatives 
to the credit ratings, this may mean that the strategy is slowing down in its progress or, to say the 
worst, that it is doomed to fail. On the other hand, possible amendments imply identifying which 
type of alternatives have been incorporated into the changed rules, how they work, how investors 
and market participants will use them, and whether the credit ratings can still play a role in the 
legislation. Consequently, it is necessary to have an in-depth investigation into the crucial aspect of 
the alternatives; while, with regard to the credit ratings, it will be desirable to assess the extent to 
which the possible amendments mark the end of the ratings’ hegemony in legislation and, thus, the 
final rules may be regarded as effective in tackling the risk of over-reliance.  
 Such an investigation will be essential to move on to the analysis of the progress in the 
implementation of the second level of the strategy, relating to the enhancement of the investors’ 
independent credit risk analysis. As discussed, the regulatory strategy is intertwined and the 
development of one level may influence the development of the other. Consequently, in relation to 
the second level it is to verify the extent to which investors and market participants are effectively 
capable of conducting a credit risk analysis not heavily influenced by the credit ratings. This raises 
the question of whether both sophisticated and less sophisticated investors can be independent from 
the credit ratings and the degree to which those market participants who cannot afford independent 
credit risk analysis may still rely on credit ratings or be helped by the possible new alternatives.  
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 Accordingly, the analysis which will be pursued in this chapter is structured as follows. 
After a preliminary interpretation of the US and EU approaches with a comparison between them, 
the first level of the strategy, in its review and removal stages, will be the focus. In this regard, by 
identifying the changes and the final rules elaborated by the US and EU competent authorities, the 
status of the reforms will be illustrated and critically reviewed in relation to the aim of eliminating 
or mitigating the risk of over-reliance. After that, the analysis will check the progress made in the 
translation of the second level of the approach. In more detail, by way of referring to some data 
provided by the FSB it will be possible to have a grasp of the progress, advantages or shortcomings 
in the translation of the second level. Taking stock of the implementation of both levels of the 
strategy will provide us with a clear picture of the workability of the rules, and will permit us to 
discuss further improvements, if needed. Finally, some preliminary conclusions will be drawn in the 
light of the results which this investigation will bring forward. 
 
III.2 THE OVER-RELIANCE RULES AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 
 
III.2.1 Normative approaches in focus 
Reducing the amount of credit rating references in legislation and regulatory frameworks, as well as 
encouraging investors and market participants to undertake more independent credit risk analysis is 
the approach to be implemented to eliminate the risk of over-reliance on external credit ratings. This 
framework has been identified in the FSB set of principles for reducing reliance on credit ratings, in 
Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act, and in Article 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) of the EU CRA Regulation 
III. The US and EU are the two legal systems which have translated this strategy into a normative 
framework. In other words, in the wake of the post-crisis regulatory debate on the CRAs and on 
over-reliance on the credit ratings, only the US and the EU have set out specific rules which require 
intervention on the legislation incorporating credit rating references, and aim at enhancing market 
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participants’ own credit risk assessment capabilities.319 Evidently, the US and the EU are the two 
areas in which it is possible to analyse the level of the progress made in the translation of the rules 
concerning over-reliance on external credit ratings. Accordingly, an evaluation of the steps that they 
have taken so far, permits us to assess whether the strategy to reduce over-reliance is workable. 
Preliminarily, it is desirable to have an understanding of the US and EU rules by discussing them in 
comparison.  
 As already mentioned, when the FSB Principles were issued in 2010, Section 939A of the 
Dodd Frank Act had already been finalised, while at the EU level consultations on the necessary 
amendments to be applied to CRA Regulation I were still in place and could not be set out in the 
new CRA Regulation III before June 2013. 320  Chronologically, the US approach is the first, 
followed by the FSB guidelines; while the EU rules are the most recent. Nonetheless, with the view 
to comparing the US and EU rules, the FSB principles can be used as the platform to identify 
similarities and differences between them. In fact, the FSB framework is a set of soft-law, non-
binding principles. Since both the US and EU rules have endorsed these guidelines, the FSB two-
pronged approach can be taken as the basis to test the US and EU level of implementation of their 
respective rules on over-reliance. In practice, through a comparison of the US and EU rules it is 
possible to verify their full or partial alignment with the FSB general strategy. Furthermore, this 
will clarify whether the implementation process may be regarded as a coordinated effort between 
the two FSB jurisdictions or an independent path.  
 As illustrated in the previous chapter, FSB Principle I requires standard setters and 
authorities to review references to credit ratings in standards, laws and regulations. Putting this task 
into the US and EU perspective, Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act entrusts each US Federal 
agency with this review, while Article 5(b) of CRA Regulation III gives the same task to the 
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European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). Both the 
US and the EU approaches converge as to the assignment to regulators of the task of revisiting 
credit rating references. Competent authorities will have to review the references to credit ratings in 
their own regulations, guidance, recommendations and draft technical standards. 
 Also, FSB Principle I states that standard setters and regulators, wherever possible, should 
remove credit rating references or replace them with alternative standards of creditworthiness. In 
this respect, significant differences can be underlined between the US and EU approaches. To begin 
with the European rules, Article 5(b) of CRA Regulation III specifies that the aim of the review that 
the European financial authorities have to conduct on their own guidelines, recommendations or 
technical standards is the identification of those credit rating references which have the potential to 
trigger sole or mechanistic reliance on external credit ratings by investors and market participants. 
Similarly, under Article 5(c) the Commission has to identify the same credit rating references by 
2020. Altogether, these rules have a clear meaning: the elimination of the credit rating references 
consequent to the review is subject to a condition, that is, only the references which can trigger sole 
and mechanistic reliance must be eliminated.321 The elimination is only possible with these specific 
credit rating references. Indeed, Article 5(b) uses the words, ‘where appropriate’ which has the 
same meaning as, ‘wherever possible’ used under FSB Principle I. Both expressions indicate that 
the elimination is a possibility and not a mandatory process once the review of the credit rating 
references has been completed. Consequently, not only do specific credit rating references have to 
be identified and selected, but also their elimination is subordinated to the development of 
appropriate alternatives to the credit ratings. There are therefore two conditions upon which the EU 
approach is based: 1) the review aims at selecting specific credit rating references; and 2) 
elimination is subordinated to the elaboration of valid alternatives. This second condition has been 
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transposed into Article 5(c) as well, under which credit rating references in Union law are to be 
eliminated, ‘provided that appropriate alternatives to credit risk assessment have been identified and 
implemented’. This is aligned with paragraph 1 of FSB Principle I which further specifies that 
credit rating references should be removed or replaced only once possible alternative provisions in 
laws and regulations have been developed and can be implemented.322 Hence, standards setters and 
authorities are encouraged to develop alternative definitions of creditworthiness. Based on this, it 
can be said that the European approach has fully endorsed and transposed into the CRA Regulation 
III the FSB two-pronged approach.323  
 As opposed to the EU rules, the US approach has significant differences. The review does 
not aim to select specific credit rating references. Section 939A is undoubtedly clear on this aspect. 
Regulators are required to identify which piece of their own legislation contains references to credit 
ratings. After completing the review, they will have to remove the identified credit rating references 
and substitute them with alternative standards of creditworthiness. Agencies have to jointly 
cooperate to develop a common standard of creditworthiness. Significantly, this approach pursues 
the total elimination of the credit ratings from regulations and legislative frameworks. 324  The 
elimination of the credit rating references is not subordinated to the elaboration of alternatives to 
credit ratings. The elimination is not a possibility but the main purpose of the review, so as to 
replace the credit ratings with new standards of creditworthiness. Undoubtedly, the US approach 
sounds harsher than the EU approach. In a nutshell, while the US approach is based on review, 
removal, and replacement of credit ratings with new standards of creditworthiness, the EU approach 
can be summarised as follows: review, possible alternatives and, thus, possible credit ratings 
deletion. The EU strategy is built upon the FSB two-pronged approach which still acknowledges the 
importance of the credit ratings in the financial markets and, for this reason, not all the credit rating 
                                                          
322
 See FSB Principle I para 1. 
323
 Commission Impact Assessment (n 178). 
324
 Kevin F Barnard & Alan W Avery, ‘Basel III v Dodd-Frank: What does it Mean for US Banks?’ (2011) 
Who’s Who Legal Blog <http://whoswholegal.com/news/features/article/28829/basel-iii-v-dodd-frank-does-
mean-us-banks/ > accessed 8 March 2014. 
137 
 
references are to be eliminated.325 Unlike the EU rules, the US approach cannot be regarded as the 
full endorsement of the FSB strategy. Section 939A came into force before the issuance of the FSB 
Principles and, as mentioned above, is the result of a process which began with the assessment of 
over-reliance and ultimately resulted in a rule which aims at ending the use of credit ratings into 
regulations. This has been finally underlined by the FSB in the 2013 interim report:  
 
[T]he United States (US) has moved the furthest in removing references to CRA 
ratings from law or regulation. This initiative has been the consequence of section 
939A of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires federal regulatory agencies to remove 
from their regulations any references to, or requirements of reliance on, credit ratings 
in assessments of creditworthiness and to substitute in those regulations other 
standards of creditworthiness that the agencies determine to be appropriate. Indeed, 
this legislation goes further and sets a more absolute standard than the Principles, as 
it requires the complete removal and replacement of CRA ratings as may be 
determined appropriate.  
  
However, it must be stressed that the US are among the FSB jurisdictions which endorsed the FSB 
strategy. This must be interpreted as an acknowledgement of the need to take all the necessary 
regulatory efforts to reduce the risk of over-reliance, not as the intention to elaborate an approach 
which could entirely reflect the FSB Principles. This could not be possible since the US already had 
its own legislative approach. The dichotomy between elimination and possible elimination of the 
credit rating references is the major difference between the US and the EU approaches. It can be 
seen from this comparison that these approaches are not aligned. Firstly, differences in the time of 
issuance of the rules lead to the conclusion that the US and EU rules are not the result of a 
coordinated regulatory dialogue. Secondly, the way regulators have to deal with credit rating 
references in legislation and regulatory frameworks makes evident that the reduction of over-
reliance will be achieved differently. Essentially, if the general principle is that over-reliance has to 
be reduced by eliminating credit rating references and by enhancing market participants’ credit risk 
analysis capacities, this will be achieved by the US and the EU through different strategies. In the 
US, the market participants’ independent credit risk analysis will be encouraged once all the credit 
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rating references will be eliminated and replaced by alternative standards of creditworthiness; in the 
EU, and in the other FSB jurisdictions which fully endorsed the FSB principles, the same aim will 
be pursued after the selection, elimination, and replacement of those credit rating references which 
may induce mechanistic and parallel reliance.   
 
III.2.2 Implementation process in focus 
 
III.2.2.1 Discussing credit rating alternatives  
Over-reliance on external credit ratings is supposed to be reduced through a two-truck approach 
providing for the elimination of credit rating references and contextual improvement of investors’ 
and market participants’ independent credit risk analysis. The two levels of the strategy are 
intertwined so that they are supposed to be implemented in parallel.326 This means that the degree of 
development of one level will affect the development of the other. Consequently, to have a better 
understanding of the workability of this strategy, in particular of the progress made at the US and 
EU level to implement their respective rules, it is necessary to discuss the two levels separately.  
 Starting with the first one, its success lies on the elaboration of appropriate, valid 
alternatives to external credit ratings. In fact, both the FSB principles and the EU rules clarify that 
the removal is possible only once valid substitutes are found. The same can be said for the US 
approach under Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act, though a different language is applied. As 
mentioned above, the formulation of this provision sounds like an imperative for the US agencies, 
in the sense that the removal must be the natural consequence of the review. However, even in this 
case the elaboration of valid standards of creditworthiness to be used in substitution of the NRSRO 
credit ratings will play a decisive role in the success of the US approach. Therefore, even though the 
US strategy is based on review, removal and replacement of the credit rating references with 
alternative standards of creditworthiness, the last passage will be decisive in that without 
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alternatives to credit ratings the implementation process cannot be completed. Importantly, the 
search for alternatives must be regarded as the milestone for stopping regulatory reliance on credit 
ratings and, thus, reducing the potential of over-reliance by investors and market participants.  
 Before assessing the workability of the strategy through an analysis of the status of the 
reforms at the national, international and regional levels, it must be observed that the search for 
alternatives to credit ratings is not a new issue within the regulatory debate on CRAs. Even before 
those corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom which put the CRAs under the regulatory 
spotlight, some academics debated the possibility of substituting credit rating references with 
market based indicators. In particular, in the context of his regulatory license doctrine, not only did 
Frank Partnoy argue that credit ratings do not have any informational value, but he also proposed 
substituting the rating-based legislation with a credit spread-based regulatory regime.327 In his view, 
the credit spreads are the valid alternatives to credit ratings in that they are more accurate and give 
more informational value. Besides, they are determined by the markets and not by private entities. 
This would contribute to reduce the danger of conflict of interest which is inherent in the CRAs’ 
issuers-pay-model and which is exacerbated by the widespread use of the credit ratings in 
legislation. Significantly, the author proposes replacing the rating-based regulation with a credit-
spread regulation and urges regulators to experiment with the incorporation of credit spreads into 
some portions of rating-based regulations. Even though Partnoy’s proposal did not find any support 
and the regulators kept their reliance on the credit ratings, his views were farsighted since they 
anticipated the issues that the post-crisis debate on over-reliance dealt with. In fact, in the aftermath 
of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the debate on valid alternatives to credit ratings gained 
momentum. Further studies discussing the viability of credit default swap spread (CDS) as 
substitutes for credit ratings and their utility as market-based tools for regulatory and private 
purposes were brought forward.328 Other scholars proposed, inter alia, indicators based on non-
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market-based measures, for instance, indicators based on accounting data.329 In this context, a dual 
rating approach under which regulatory requirements could take into consideration both external 
credit ratings and internal ratings was also proposed.330  
 Finally, another possibility which was brought to attention was concerned with the outsource 
of credit assessment to non-CRAs. This proposal was based on the case of the US National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) which, being worried about the reliability of 
ratings, hired an independent third party to model potential losses on regulated insurance 
companies’ RMBS portfolios. The approach was then extended to regulated entities’ CMBS 
portfolios.331  
 Nonetheless, all the mentioned proposals remained on paper because none of them were 
immune from criticism. For instance, it was argued that market based indicators such as CDS and 
credit spreads would require some judgemental overlay in that they encompass a variety of factors 
and hence the impact of credit would be difficult to assess when observing price movements.332 
Furthermore, such indicators would tend to be pro-cyclical and the risk would be to substitute credit 
ratings with credit risk assessment tools which may have the same shortcomings, in particular 
during economic downturn periods.333  Also, the outsource of non-CRA third parties remained 
circumscribed within the NAIC and did not pave the way for anything new. In this debate, however, 
it cannot be left unnoticed that the FSB two-pronged approach, as well as the contents of the EU 
and US rules on reliance and over-reliance, have marked a no turning back point. Finding 
alternatives to external credit ratings is now required by rules of law and there must be compliance 
with such a requirement.  
 
III.2.2.2 Implementation progress among the FSB jurisdictions  
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Nonetheless, the debate is still ongoing in search of appropriate replacements to credit ratings to 
enact the first level of the strategy. In this respect, the FSB underlined that progress has been the 
greatest in the identification and removal of hard-wired references to CRAs ratings in domestic laws 
and regulations.334 In reality, by way of analysing the data provided by the FSB it can be argued that 
progress is not as great as the FSB claims. Significantly, it is to be clarified what meaning the word 
‘progress’ carries in this context. The FSB emphasised that almost all FSB jurisdictions have 
undertaken a stock-tacking review of credit rating references in their legislation. This is in line with 
the FSB Principle I which encourages a review by standard setters and regulators finalised to 
remove and replace with valid alternatives those credit rating references which can determine undue 
reliance. However, a stocktaking exercise should not be regarded as a definitive progress in the 
implementation of the FSB strategy, rather as the first step. Indeed, as results in the FSB interim 
report, not all the FSB jurisdictions have yet completed the review. Setting aside the EU Member 
States which will follow the implementation of the EU action plan embodied in the CRA 
Regulation III, as well as in the UCITS and AIMFD Directives,335 other FSB jurisdictions either 
have not started the review process yet or have concluded that it is not necessary to apply any 
removal.336 Consequently, the discussion has to take into consideration only those jurisdictions in 
which the stocktaking exercise has been completed. In this regard, it can be observed that the 
majority of the FSB jurisdictions felt it opportune not to remove any credit rating reference at the 
conclusion of their stocktaking exercise.  
 For example, taking into account some Latin American countries and their banking 
regulations, it can be concluded that banking activity in Argentina is not heavily dependent on 
credit ratings. Recently issued rules avoid credit rating references, while other credit rating 
references in regulation will not be removed because they are regarded as marginal and with no 
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impact.337  A similar view has been expressed by the Brazilian authorities, which stressed the 
marginal role that external credit ratings play in banking regulation. In particular, the authorities 
underlined that external credit ratings ‘are only supplementary sources of information in the process 
of internal credit assessment for provisioning purposes’. Given this secondary role, the Brazilian 
authorities decided not to remove their credit rating references.338 With regard to Asian countries, 
the use of external credit ratings as complementary sources of information has also been underlined 
by the Japanese authorities involved in the review exercise. Significantly, most Japanese banks have 
internal rating systems and refer to CRA ratings as complementary tools to measure credit risk. 
Consequently, laws and regulations had very limited references to credit ratings.339 Likewise in 
Europe, the Swiss authorities did not apply any removal. Objectively, such a removal could not be 
envisaged in that most of the sectors which came under the authorities’ scrutiny did not have any 
reference to the external credit ratings. For instance, no references were found with regard to 
pension funds, central counterparties (CCPs), insurance and collective investment schemes (CIS). 
As to the banking sector, some references were found in accordance with the SA of the Basel 
framework. As to central bank operations, some references were found in internal guidelines for 
reserve management and collateral policy. However, the Swiss authorities stressed that credit 
ratings are not the exclusive credit risk assessment tool and hence these references should not be 
regarded as carrying the risk of mechanistic reliance.340  
 Absence of exclusivity of the credit ratings has also been underlined by the UK competent 
institutional authorities. For example, the Bank of England (BoE), in relation to monetary policies 
and reserve management purposes underlined that the credit ratings are not referred to as exclusive 
factors but as one factor for determining eligible collateral and investments. Furthermore, 
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counterparty eligibility and limits are determined by referring to a range of information which 
includes the credit ratings as one minor factor. Equally, for CCPs the credit ratings assigned by the 
CRAs are regarded as one parameter in collateral eligibility and investment policy; furthermore, the 
UK Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) requires its regulated banks to set up internal 
methodologies so that they can assess the credit risk of exposures to individual obligors, securities, 
securitisation positions or credit risk at the portfolio level. Such methodologies do not blindly rely 
on external credit ratings.341 Importantly, all these authorities depicted a very limited use of external 
credit ratings in financial legislation. Moreover, such a use is deemed not to pose any risk.  
 Similarly, the harmless nature of credit rating references is the reason why the Australian 
authorities decided not to remove any credit rating references from their legislation. At the end of 
their review the authorities felt that their current framework was robust and credit rating references 
did not pose systemic or market risks. Hence, it was concluded that there was no sound prudential 
basis for removing references to CRAs’ ratings in prudential standards. Furthermore, the Australian 
authorities underlined that CRA ratings are an integral part of the Basel framework with which the 
authorities want to remain compliant.342 This is an aspect which has been brought forward by the 
South African authorities as well. They justified their denial to remove credit rating references on 
the ground that credit ratings ‘form an integral part of the internationally agreed frameworks, 
standards, and requirements, issued by standard-setting bodies such as the Basel Committee’.343  
 These data stimulate further reflection. As seen, the concerned FSB jurisdictions had reasons 
not to apply any removal. The removal is not compulsory. It is subordinated to the identification of 
those credit rating references which can induce mechanistic and parallel reliance on credit ratings. 
However, it can be noticed that the reasons why most of the FSB jurisdictions did not apply any 
removals are not exclusively justified on the grounds that their credit rating references do not cause 
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mechanistic and parallel reliance. Some jurisdictions have also specified either the marginal role of 
credit ratings in their legislation or the limited number of credit rating references. These credit 
rating references were considered not to pose any threat and were finally kept. Maintaining the 
credit ratings means that it is not necessary to move on to the next stages of the approach, in 
particular, to the search for alternatives. Importantly, these results run counter to the expectations of 
the FSB which envisaged the optimal progress such as the one in which credit rating references 
could possibly be removed and substituted by valid alternatives. In fact, the FSB has argued that the 
choice of some jurisdictions to leave credit rating references in their regulations may result in an 
underestimation of the danger of over-reliance by market participants in their jurisdiction.344 In this 
context, only the US and the EU are singled out as the two FSB jurisdictions whose current reforms 
followed the review and removal strategy in accordance with some specific deadlines. Having 
provided this picture, the analysis can now be circumscribed to the US and the EU so as to take 
stock of the evolution of their reforms. 
 
III.3 THE STATUS OF THE US REFORMS UNDER SECTION 939A OF THE DODD FRANK 
ACT 
 
III.3.1 The early debate on Section 939A 
 
III.3.1.1 Difficulties and expectations 
In the US, progress in the implementation of Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act can be verified 
by analysing the amendments applied to their own legislation by the following agencies: the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA), the Department of Labour (DOL), the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and the SEC. As 
mentioned above, one of the most salient aspects of Section 939A is the search for valid 
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alternatives, or standards of creditworthiness as a replacement for the external credit ratings. 
According to a literal interpretation of Section 939A, external credit ratings should disappear from 
legislation and a new credit risk assessment tool should be inserted in place of them. This was 
actually the way Section 939A was interpreted by scholars and commentators once it was 
finalised.345 The search for alternatives to credit ratings was regarded, and still is, as the most 
challenging feature of the approach, so that more than one doubt has been expressed on the concrete 
possibility of finding a valid substitute to credit ratings. Coffee, for instance, cast doubts on the US 
regulators’ capacity to provide an adequate definition of creditworthiness,346 while Suttle argued 
that the search for alternatives sounds like a vicious circle in that, in his view, valid replacements 
cannot be found because they do not exist. In this respect, it is worth reporting his statement: ‘if a 
valid alternative to credit ratings exists I would be very impressed since I do not have clear idea of 
what it is......what was put into (section 939A) is a classic case of saying we aspire to do this but we 
have no idea of how to go about it’.347 Significantly, Suttle’s statement underlines how the success 
of the approach depends on finding valid alternatives to credit ratings. His declaration is quite 
conclusive as to the success of the implementation of Section 939A. As already stressed, if valid 
alternatives to credit ratings are not agreed the approach to reduce over-reliance will be likely to 
fail.   
Nonetheless, Section 939A was initially conceived as a rule which should have paved the 
way to a new, universally accepted standard of creditworthiness in substitution for the external 
credit ratings. This can be confirmed by analysing the regulatory debate which followed the 
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issuance of Section 939A. In that context, five key characteristics of a good creditworthiness 
standard, as an alternative to external credit ratings, were discussed. Firstly, it was emphasised that 
the standard should have been reliably risk sensitive. This means that it should have effectively 
measured the credit risk of different types of debt instruments. Hence, it should have been applied 
in a consistent and transparent way across different types of financial instruments.348 Furthermore, 
such a standard should have been capable of auto adjusting on a timely basis in accordance with 
changes in the credit risk profile of instruments and auto adapting to cover new financial market 
practices.349 Finally, the standard should have been easy to understand and simple to implement so 
as to avoid excessive regulatory burden for financial institutions, in particular, small banks and 
firms. Importantly, the debate underlined that external credit ratings have these characteristics.350 
Consequently, this raises the question of whether the regulators had in mind a standard which could 
be a duplication of the credit ratings, but with another name, or something different. It may be 
submitted that regulators were initially searching for something having the same quality of the 
credit ratings but not the same shortcomings. Ultimately, this was the solution they hoped to find. 
However, such a standard appears to be a utopian vision. It is based on an abstract idea of a perfect 
standard which is highly debatable because of its subjectivity. In other words, who or what can 
assert with absolute certainty that a potentially new elaborated standard can be better than credit 
ratings?  
 As mentioned in the previous paragraph, all the proposals brought forward remained on 
paper because they were not favourably received and did not have sufficient strength to lead to the 
substitution of the credit ratings in legislation. Hence, Suttle’s statement is emblematic of all the 
difficulties that the implementation of Section 939A could have encountered.  
III.3.1.2 Doubts and reservations 
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In any case, another essential aspect must be taken into consideration. In the event that a new 
standard of creditworthiness which has the abovementioned requirements is proposed, this could 
only be regarded as the first step. The success of any hypothetical standard as an alternative to 
credit ratings also depends on the acceptance by those investors and market participants who have 
always used credit ratings either because they found them useful or because the legislation requires 
them to do so. In the context of the approach aiming at replacing credit ratings, their opinion is of 
paramount importance. Some reflections can be drawn by taking into consideration the views they 
expressed once Section 939A was finalised into the Dodd Frank Act.  
 In the aftermath of the entry into force of Section 939A, the OCC, the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) issued collectively the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule 
Making Regarding Alternatives to the Use of Credit Ratings in the Risk-Based Capital Guidelines 
of the Federal Bank Agencies (ANPR).351 Given the prominent use of external credit ratings in the 
banking sector, these agencies moved first in the attempt to comply with Section 939A and sought 
consultation by the users of credit ratings on potential alternatives. In this context, all those which 
provided comments to the agencies expressed concerns on the requirements of Section 939A of the 
Dodd Frank Act. In practice, they stressed that the formulation of the rule sounded like a prohibition 
to refer to external credit ratings not only in legislation but also for the users of credit ratings. For 
these reasons, almost all the commentators asked for the repeal or amendment of Section 939A.  
 For example, the American Bankers Association (ABA) emphasised the international use 
and broad acceptance across the markets of credit ratings. Abandoning completely the use of credit 
ratings in the capital rules adopted by the US regulators could have significant negative implications 
for the adoption of the internationally agreed Basel III standards and lead to competitive distortions 
across the international banking industries. For these reasons, ABA refers to the provisions of 
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section 939A as ill-advised and overreacting. 352  Similarly, the American Securitization Forum 
(ASF) argued that overreliance can be tackled by improving the regulation of the use of credit 
ratings and the supervision of CRAs, rather than ‘prohibiting’ the use of the credit ratings. ASF 
warns that removing credit ratings from the risk-based capital rules could have a significant impact 
on liquidity in the ABS markets which rely upon the ability of investors to make real-time decisions 
at the point of initial offering or subsequent secondary market purchase. Hence, eliminating credit 
ratings from these rules may jeopardise the ability of a large number of banking organisations to 
participate in the asset backed securities (ABS) markets, substantially reducing market liquidity.353 
The Security Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) brought to attention the 
importance of credit ratings in the capital markets’ determination of the creditworthiness of an 
issuer in measuring regulatory capital since they are transparent, easily comparable and easily 
available. Accordingly, potential new standards of creditworthiness must be additional or 
complementary to the credit ratings and should not be conceived as the subterfuge to prohibit credit 
ratings.354 Scepticism was also expressed individually within the bodies which issued the ANPR. It 
is worth reporting some significant lines of the testimony released by John Walsh as Acting 
Comptroller of the Currency:  
 
[…] the prohibition against references to ratings in regulations under section 939A 
goes further than is reasonably necessary to respond to these issues. Rather than 
disregard credit ratings, it may be more appropriate to assess their strengths and 
weaknesses and to supplement ratings with additional analysis in appropriate cases. 
We suggest that section 939A be amended to direct regulators to require that ratings-
based determinations be confirmed by additional risk analysis in circumstances 
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where ratings are likely to present an incomplete picture of the risks presented to an 
institution, or where those risks are heightened due to concentrations in particular 
asset classes.355  
  
It can be seen from this context that the purpose of the regulators was to consult on the possibility 
of finding one alternative which could be universally accepted and, hence, replace the credit ratings 
in legislation. However, this intention raised reservations from the users of credit ratings. Among 
other things, the choice of one alternative appeared to be flawed to the extent that the risk of over-
reliance could shift from the credit ratings to another measure of credit risk. Such a concern was 
expressed by Moody’s during the above-mentioned period of consultations. Moody’s warned 
regulators not to neglect the importance of ratings for financial markets. In particular, concerns 
were expressed with regard to deregulating in such a way as to diminish the importance of ratings, 
perhaps through the elaboration of alternative measures that may trigger mechanistic responses as 
much as downgrades.356 The same concern has been recently expressed by the FSB in its last 
interim report. The FSB warned about the risk of facilitating undue reliance through a new 
alternative in the event that an adequate impact assessment is not conducted.357  
 As it emerged from the initial comments, the spirit and letter of Section 939A did not 
encounter any favour. This, however, could not invert the course of the reforms to be pursued under 
Section 939A. On the one hand, the users’ concerns are worth being mentioned to verify how much 
weight they had in the final reforms set out by the US agencies. On the other hand, the users’ 
concerns and reservations highlighted above were raised back in 2010, immediately after the 
issuance of Section 939A. Now, at the time of writing, almost five years have passed. This can be a 
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sufficient time to assess the progress and the status of implementation of the rule in question by the 
US agencies. 
 
III.3.2 The US Federal agencies’ reform process 
 
III.3.2.1 CFTC 
 
By making a comparison between the amendments that the US agencies have applied since the 
issue of Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act, an evolution in the elaboration of alternatives to 
external credit ratings can be discussed. Specifically, it will be seen how the solutions brought 
forward by one agency have influenced the work of the other agencies in terms of development of 
their own standards of creditworthiness. To have a grasp of this evolution, it is necessary to give a 
chronological order to the work of the US agencies. To this end, the review that the CFTC358 
undertook under the letter of Section 939A is the first to be analysed.359  
 CFTC regulations apply to future commission merchants (FCMs), derivatives clearing 
organizations (DCOs) and commodity pool operators (CPOs).360 For the purpose of Section 939A, 
two groups of CFTC regulations are of relevance: 1) those regulations in which credit ratings are 
used to limit Commission registrants’ investments or deposits of customer funds; and 2) those 
regulations which require disclosing a credit rating to describe the characteristics of an investment, 
namely, Regulation 1.49 and Regulation 4.24.361 While the former Regulation sets out qualifications 
with regard to the types of depositories where FCMs and DCOs might place customers’ funds, the 
latter refers to the use of credit ratings in the context of the disclosure of an investment’s 
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characteristics. Both the regulations in question could be regarded as rating-based regulations. 
Before the CFTC review, Regulation 1.49 regarded a foreign depository as acceptable where it had 
in excess of $1 billion of regulatory capital or issue commercial paper, or a long debt instrument, 
rated in one of the two highest rating categories by at least one NRSRO.362 Following the letter and 
spirit of Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act, the second alternative referring to the credit ratings 
should have been removed and replaced with another standard for the measurement of 
creditworthiness. Indeed, the CFTC initially proposed the elimination of such reference and sought 
consultation on whether it could be sufficient relying exclusively on a minimum capital requirement 
of $1 billion in regulatory capital, or whether another standard or measure of solvency and 
creditworthiness, different than external credit ratings, could be used as an appropriate, additional 
test of a bank’s safety.363 With regard to Regulation 4.24, the credit rating reference to be removed 
was identified in the requirement for CPOs to disclose the characteristics of the commodity and 
other interests that the pool will trade, including, where applicable, their investment rating.364 In this 
regard, the CFTC proposed to replace the reference to credit ratings with the phrase 
‘creditworthiness’. In this respect, the new rule reads as follows:  
 
[…] the pool operator must disclose the following: 1) the types of commodity 
interests and other interests which the pool will trade, including: (i) the approximate 
percentage of the pool’s assets that will be used to trade commodity interests, 
securities and other types of interests, categorized by type of commodity or market 
sector, type of security (debt, equity preferred equity), whether traded or listed on a 
regulated exchange market, maturity ranges and creditworthiness, as applicable.365 
  
In the context of the amendments applied to Regulation 1.49 and Regulation 4.24, the CFTC 
undertook other reviews which ended up with the removal of credit rating references in Regulation 
30.7 and Regulation 1.25. The former is concerned with the treatment of foreign futures or foreign 
options secured amount and was aligned with the reliance on the $1 billion of regulatory capital 
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requirement under Regulation 1.49.366 The latter provides rules for investing customer funds and 
applies to DCOs and FCMs as well. Basically, this regulation sets out the list of instruments DCOs 
and FCMs are permitted to invest the customers’ money in. Among the listed requirements 
according to which investment are permissible, there is also the provision of the highest rating 
assigned by NRSROs to the financial instruments. In addition, the investment must be ‘readily 
marketable’ and promptly liquidated.367 In line with previous proposals and in accordance with 
Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act, the CFTC proposed to eliminate the requirement relating to 
the assignment of top credit ratings. These proposals were ultimately incorporated into the final 
rules.368  
 In the first place, it can be noticed that the CFTC’s only applied a removal of the credit 
rating reference. As mentioned above, the approach under Section 939A can be defined within the 
following stages: review, removal and alternatives. However, the CFTC’s work can only be 
assessed within the first two stages, that is, review and removal. It can be defined as a restyling of 
the two regulations through which credit rating references disappear, but no specific alternatives for 
them have been set out. Also, the CFTC’s approach maintains the possibility of relying on credit 
ratings. In practice, credit rating references are deleted from the CFTC’s regulations but they 
survive in use. In fact, the CFTC acknowledges that CPOs will not be prohibited from relying on 
credit ratings. Rather, credit ratings can be used as one of the factors to be taken into consideration 
in making an investment decision.369  
 
III.3.2.2 OCC 
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The second review to be analysed in chronological order is the final rule issued by the OCC370 in 
June 2012 which began to be effective as of January 2013. The amendments applied by the OCC 
pertain to 12 CFR Parts 1, 5, 16, 28 and 160.371 Such rules refer to the requirements that national 
banks and Federal savings have to follow to determine whether or not a security is investment 
grade. The investment grade status is the condition upon which the purchase of a security is 
permissible. Prior to the amendments, securities could be regarded as investment grade where they 
were rated in one of the top four investment grade rating scales by two or one NRSROs. Should the 
security be unrated, the investment grade status could be determined by the national bank or Federal 
savings association by regarding the debt instrument as having the same credit quality of a security 
rated investment grade by NRSROs.372 In this context the centrality of the role of the credit ratings 
provided by NRSROs is evident. Not only were the credit ratings the sole determinant of the 
investment grade status, but they were also the reference parameter to which the national banks or 
Federal savings could base their investment grade determination.  
 Such a primacy of the credit ratings is the area of intervention of the OCC to comply with 
the Dodd Frank Act. Pursuant to the amendments set out in the OCC Final rule, a new definition of 
investment grade security is provided. Such is the security when its issuer has an adequate capacity 
to meet financial commitments under the security for the projected life of the asset exposure.373 The 
language of the final rule raises first the question of who is entitled to determine whether the issuer 
has an adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments since the rules no longer rely on 
NRSRO credit ratings. In this regard, the task is on national banks and Federal savings which are 
now required to undertake proper due diligence.374 In substance, the definition of investment grade 
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is consequent to an analytical process in which it must be determined: 1) that the risk of default by 
the obligor is low; and 2) that full and timely repayment of principal and interest is expected. It can 
be observed that this approach mirrors the FSB framework in its two-pronged approach. In 
synthesis, the removal of the credit rating reference has the aim to enhance the internal risk 
assessment capacity and, thus, reduce the potential of over-reliance on external credit ratings. Being 
the task of determining the investment grade status on the national banks and federal savings, it is to 
be wondered which factors they can take into consideration for their determination. The OCC 
specified that a number of factors can be taken into account, including credit ratings provided by 
NRSROs.375  
 The OCC’s approach marks an evolution vis-à-vis the CFTC’s approach. As illustrated, the 
CFTC’s review only led to a restyling of the legislation with no alternatives to credit ratings. 
Whereas, the OCC substituted the credit rating references with a new definition of investment grade 
and gave national banks and Federal savings the responsibility to determine such a status. The 
CFTC approach resulted in the simple deletion of credit rating references without the substitution 
with any alternative. The OCC based its standard on a new definition of investment grade to be 
determined by the concerned financial institutions. To this end, reference could be made to a variety 
of factors other than external credit ratings. However, the OCC did not provide any specific 
indication on possible factors to be chosen as alternatives to the NRSRO credit ratings. Possible 
alternatives were generically indicated. These included the firms’ own internal systems or analytics 
provided by third parties when conducting due diligence and determining whether a particular 
security may be permissible and considered an appropriate investment.376 
 
III.3.2.3 NCUA 
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The NCUA approach has provided something more specific.377 Significantly, further evolution in 
the elaboration of the standard of creditworthiness can be discussed in relation to the NCUA review, 
which is the third in chronological order. The NCUA conducted its review and found references to 
NRSRO credit ratings in parts 703, 704, 709 and 742 of the NCUA regulations.378 Part 703 provides 
an interpretation of those sections of the Federal Credit Union Act specifying those securities, 
deposits and other obligations in which a Federal credit union (FCU) is permitted or prohibited to 
invest.379  On the other hand, part 704 provides a list of definitions of terms referring to the 
investment activities of corporate credit unions, 380  while part 709 disciplines the involuntary 
liquidation of FCUs and the adjudication of creditor claims involving federally insured credit 
unions (FICUs).381 Finally, part 742 provides an exemption from certain regulatory restrictions for 
credit unions that have showed sustained superior performance.382 All these parts have credit rating 
references which must be subjected to the removal under Section 939A. For instance, under parts 
703 and 704 some securities rated in the highest category by NRSROs meet the requirement of 
being permissible.383 Under part 709 a definition of securitisation which includes a reference to 
NRSROs is provided,384  while pursuant to part 742 a credit union can be exempted from the 
prohibition of purchasing a commercial mortgage related security provided that, among other 
requirements, the security is rated in one of the two highest rating categories by at least one 
NRSRO.385  
 The NCUA approach is based on the evaluation of the capacity of issuers to repay their debt. 
Consequently, a distinction is made between an issuer’s ‘adequate capacity’ to meet its financial 
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obligations for the projected life of the security even under adverse economic conditions; and an 
issuer’s ‘strong capacity’ to meet all financial commitments under the security for its projected life 
even under adverse economic conditions.386 In the first place, it can be noticed that the NCUA 
replaces references to credit ratings through two standards which are respectively applied to parts 
703, 704 and 742 of the NCUA regulations. While the first standard is labelled as ‘investment 
grade’, the second is referred to as ‘minimum amount of credit risk’.387  The creditworthiness 
standard which applies to corporate credit union under part 704 and in relation to the exemption 
provided under part 742, is the minimal amount of credit risk, while investment grade is provided as 
a creditworthiness standard for the investments permitted under part 703. Having ‘adequate 
capacity’ to meet financial commitment is different than having ‘strong capacity’. The former 
implies more risk than the latter which finally implies a minimum amount of credit risk. In other 
words, both represent the likelihood of repayment but the second one is stronger than the first one. 
This means that the assessment of the two standards, in particular, the first one, requires more 
analysis and monitoring than the second one. This task will be on the corporate credit unions.388  
 In this respect, the evolution of the NCUA approach, compared to the OCC, is marked by 
the specification of a series of factors which the unions can take into consideration for regarding a 
security as investment grade or as having a minimum amount of credit risk. The list is wide: credit 
spreads; securities-related research; internal or external credit risk assessment; default statistics; 
inclusion on an index; priority and enhancement; price, yield, and/or volume; and asset class-
specific factors.389 Even though NRSRO credit ratings are not explicitly mentioned, there is an 
indirect reference to them as an external credit risk assessment. With the exception of the CFTC, all 
the approaches illustrated so far are concerned with establishing new definitions of creditworthiness 
which are based on repayment capacity and risk of default. The elaborated standards permit to take 
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into consideration a variety of factors for the creditworthiness determination. Also, the standards 
aim at promoting more autonomy in creditworthiness analysis by the involved financial institutions.  
 
III.3.2.4 FHFA 
It can be observed that the work undertaken by the OCC and NCUA had become the platform upon 
which the other agencies have or are currently developing their own standards to comply with 
Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act. At the time of writing, the FHFA390 has issued its proposal 
for removing credit rating references and substitute them with opportune alternative standards of 
creditworthiness in its regulations.391 In this respect the source is the Federal Home Loan Bank Act 
(Bank Act) which regulates the operation of twelve, wholesale cooperative banks whose members 
are entitled to purchase the capital stock of a bank and obtain access to secured loans. Under the 
Bank Act, these banks are government-sponsored enterprises which can borrow funds at spreads 
over the rates on US Treasury securities of comparable maturity lower than most other entities.392 
Some provisions of the Bank Act make reference to external credit ratings to the extent that they 
prohibit the cooperative banks to invest in securities rated below investment grade by NRSROs at 
the time the investment is made.393 Furthermore, other provisions allow the banks to invest in debt 
instruments issued by state, local, or tribal government units or agencies, having the second highest 
credit rating from NRSROs.394 These are the references identified through the review conducted by 
the FHFA.  
 Under the current proposal brought forward by the agency, these credit rating references 
could be substituted through a new standard, namely ‘investment quality’. Such a standard would 
replace references to ‘investment grade’ certified by NRSROs and ‘second highest credit rating 
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from an NRSRO’. The investment quality status is the result of a determination made by a bank. In 
essence, under the FHFA’s proposal, banks may be required to assess that there is adequate 
financial support for any debt instrument or obligation so that the repayment of principal and 
interest is guaranteed and, hence, there is only minimal risk that such payment would not be 
serviced because of adverse events during the life of the instrument. Like in the NCUA approach, 
this assessment can be made by taking into consideration a wide variety of factors: internal or 
external credit risk assessments, including scenario analysis; security or asset-class related research; 
credit analysis of cash flow and debt service projections; credit spreads; loss distributions, default 
rates, and other statistics; relevant market data, for example, bid-ask spreads, most recent sales 
price, and historical price volatility, trading volume, implied market rating, and size, depth and 
concentration level of the market for the investment; local and regional economic conditions; legal 
or other contractual implications to credit and repayment risk; underwriting, performance measures 
and triggers; and other financial instrument covenants and considerations.395  Significantly, the 
credit ratings are no longer the exclusive benchmarks to be referred to, but they are still a factor to 
be taken into consideration. The FHFA argues that the proposed standard will enhance the banks’ 
internal credit risk assessment and management practices.396 As mentioned, the final rule has not 
been set out yet. At this stage, it can be confirmed that the FHFA proposal builds upon the NCUA 
final rule, in the sense that it tries to encourage more internal analysis by the concerned financial 
institutions and specifies the same factors which the institutions may take into consideration for 
their judgement.  
 
III.3.2.5 US Banking Agencies 
The establishment of a new definition of creditworthiness based on repayment capacity and risk of 
default is the paradigm which has been finally applied by the US Banking agencies. This results in 
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the final rule that the OCC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board) have 
adopted to revise their risk based and leverage capital requirements for banking organisations. The 
final rule implements a revised definition of regulatory capital, a new common equity tier 1 
minimum capital requirement, a higher minimum tier 1 capital requirement and, for banking 
minimum organisations subject to the advanced approaches risk-based capital rules, a 
supplementary leverage ratio that incorporates a broader set of exposures in the denominator.397 In 
the context of the final rule, changes are also applied to comply with Section 939A of the Dodd 
Frank Act. In particular, these changes are concerned with some definitions in the advanced 
approaches rules referring to external credit ratings.  
 The final rule has elaborated a new standard of creditworthiness based on a definition of 
investment grade which does not rely exclusively on external credit ratings. To this end, investment 
grade is a status that the entity to which the banking organisation is exposed through a loan or 
security is required to have. Under the final rule, such a status belongs to those entities which are 
deemed to have an adequate capacity to meet financial commitments for the projected life of the 
asset or exposure. The entities’ capacity to meet financial commitments is regarded as adequate if 
their risk of default is low and the full and timely repayment of principal and interest is expected.398 
This standard of creditworthiness has also been applied by the FDIC while revising its risk-based 
and leverage capital requirement for FDIC supervised institutions. The FDIC has acknowledged 
that its final rule is identical to the joint final rule issued by the OCC and the Board. Consequently, 
the FDIC has referred to the investment grade status defined by these agencies to comply with 
Section 939A.399  
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III.3.2.6 SEC 
Lastly, the SEC is involved in the review process directed through Section 939A. The standards 
elaborated currently are concerned with some rules incorporated in the Investment Company Act. In 
chronological order, the first relevant change has been applied to section 6(a)(5) of the Investment 
Company Act. 400  Prior to the recent amendments, under this section business and industrial 
development companies (BIDCOs) could only purchase securities rated investment grade by 
NRSROs. The investment grade certification provided by NRSROs would allow BIDCOs to benefit 
from some exceptions set out in other rules of the Investment Company Act.401 Consequently, the 
review entails the removal of such reliance. To this end, the standard elaborated is based on the 
qualification of securities having moderate credit risk and sufficient liquidity. Therefore, BIDCOs 
can benefit from the exceptions by purchasing securities which the board of directors or members of 
the BIDCOs determine to be a) subject to no greater than moderate risk and b) sufficiently liquid so 
that the security can be sold within a reasonably short period of time. This determination is made at 
the time of purchase and the board of directors or members of the BIDCOs are allowed to refer to 
credit quality reports prepared by outside sources, including NRSROs which are regarded as 
credible and reliable for the indicated purpose.402 Minimum credit risk and sufficient liquidity is the 
creditworthiness standard which replaces the investment grade status based exclusively on the credit 
ratings provided by NRSROs.  
 This status is then applied by the SEC to rule 10f-3 of the Investment Company Act. Rule 
10f-3 has a definition of eligible municipal securities in relation to securities which can be 
purchased during an affiliated underwriting under certain conditions. Investment grade provided by 
NRSROs were the certifications that municipal securities had sought to be considered eligible.403 As 
aforementioned, the SEC applied the same creditworthiness standard to both the rules, based on a 
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degree of liquidity so that the security can be sold within a reasonably short period of time and 
subject to a minimal or low amount of credit risk.404  
 Within the review and amendments applied by the SEC, new standards can be illustrated 
also in relation to rule 5b-3 and the historical Net Capital Rule. Under Rule 5b-3, for certain 
diversification and broker-dealer counterparty limit purposes under the investment Company Act, 
funds may refer to the acquisition of a repurchase agreement as an acquisition of securities 
collateralising the repurchase agreement if the obligation of the seller to repurchase the securities 
from the fund is fully collateralised. Before the amendments a repurchase agreement was regarded 
as fully collateralised where, among others, the collateral for the repurchase agreement consisted 
entirely of cash items, government securities, securities that at the time the repurchase agreement 
was entered into were rated in the highest rating category by NRSROs or unrated securities whose 
quality was comparable to securities that are rated in the highest rating category by NRSROs.405 
This determination was the task of the fund’s board of directors or its delegate. In relation to this 
rule, the standard of creditworthiness alternative to the external credit ratings is again a 
determination aimed at assessing a sufficient degree of liquidity permitting the debt instrument to be 
sold at a reasonable time and on the capacity of the issuer to meet its financial obligation on the 
securities collateralising the repurchase agreement. In this respect, the wording of the SEC refers to 
an issuer’s ‘exceptionally strong capacity to meet its financial commitments’. In this context, it is 
specified that the board can reach the credit quality and liquidity determination through an analysis 
which can take into consideration third-party assessments, including an NRSRO rating.406 In this 
respect, the final rule did not provide any specific indication as to the factors to be taken into 
account. The SEC generically underlined that the board can base its analysis on ratings, reports, 
opinions and so on. However, it stressed that it is the board’s duty to determine the basis for using 
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third-party assessment. In particular, if these are NRSRO credit ratings they do not have to blindly 
rely on the use of such ratings without evaluating the quality by themselves of each NRSRO’s 
assessment.407  
 Finally, as to the Net Capital Rule removals are relating to those provisions of rule 15c3-1 
establishing lower haircuts for higher rated commercial paper, non-convertible debt and preferred 
stock.408 According to the new standard of creditworthiness elaborated as an alternative to external 
credit ratings, and to allow broker dealers to apply these lower haircuts, the broker dealers are 
required to elaborate policies and procedures designed to assess the credit risk applicable to the 
position. 409  Such an analysis must lead to the determination that the investment has only a 
‘minimum amount of credit risk’. Minimal credit risk can be determined by broker dealers by using 
a variety of factors. In this context the SEC listed the factors which can be considered: credit 
spreads, securities-related research, internal or external credit risk assessments, default statistics, 
inclusion on an index, priorities and enhancements, price yield and/or volume and asset class-
specific factors. It cannot be left unnoticed that external credit ratings, though they are no longer 
exclusive credit risk assessment tools, did not disappear and can still be referred to.410  
 
III.3.2.7 DOL 
The SEC’s standards of creditworthiness are also the paradigm upon which the DOL is currently 
elaborating its own reforms. 411  Reference is to be made to the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), which includes provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code), the 
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Federal labour laws and other Federal laws.412 The prohibited transaction rules of the Code fall 
under the jurisdiction of the DOL. In this respect, the DOL has set out a number of generic or 
‘class’ prohibited transaction exemptions (PTEs), many of which apply to party-in-interest 
transactions involving securities. The DOL has regarded some of its class exemptions as regulations 
which fall under the scope of Section 939A.413 To this end, the proposed review is addressing PTE 
75-1, PTE 80-83, PTE 81-8, PTE 95-60, PTE 97-41 and PTE 2006-16. All the listed regulations are 
concerned with the purchase or sale of securities by employees or fiduciaries on behalf of 
employees and provide relief from the restrictions that the ERISA apply to the purchase or sale. 
Among the conditions to be met to be granted exemptions, the regulations refer to investment grade 
credit ratings provided by NRSROs.  
 By way of referring to the standard of creditworthiness elaborated by the SEC in relation to 
rules 10f-3, 2a-7 and 5b-3 of the Investment Company Act, the DOL is proposing to replace the 
credit rating references in its PTEs in the same way. Therefore, ‘minimal or low amount of credit 
risk’ as well as ‘highest or exceptionally strong capacity’ to meet obligations are the parameters the 
DOL is likely to apply to its regulations. Again, the approach is based on eliminating the primacy of 
credit ratings in regulations. This does not mean prohibiting credit ratings since the DOL, in the 
same way as the other agencies, intends to refer to them as one among the factors to be taken into 
account for the assessment of creditworthiness.414 
 
III.3.3 The US reforms: A critical review in relation to the risk of over-reliance 
 
III.3.3.1 Evaluating the work of the agencies 
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Having illustrated the current status of implementation of Section 939A through the works of the 
concerned agencies, it is now possible to discuss the agencies’ work in relation to the purpose of 
reducing over-reliance on external credit ratings. Before the illustrated amendments, NRSRO credit 
ratings were the main parameters for measuring creditworthiness. In light of the changes, credit 
ratings are now among several factors to be taken into consideration. This principle characterises all 
the proposed and final rules that the US agencies have issued so far. All the agencies’ approaches 
mark the end of the primacy of the external credit ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks. 
This aspect stimulates numerous reflections.  
 In relation to the spirit and letter of Section 939A, the new role of credit ratings, no longer as 
the exclusive tool but one among several factors to be considered for determining the standard of 
creditworthiness elaborated by each agency, might mean that Section 939A does not prohibit credit 
ratings as initially construed. Indeed, by analysing the consultations launched by each agency, it can 
be observed that this fear has always been present and remarked upon by the users of credit ratings. 
The agencies themselves had to finally underline that this is not the purpose of the Dodd Frank Act, 
in particular, Section 939A.415 Significantly, this opens an interesting scenario on the construction 
of the rule in question; that is, the review work undertaken by the agencies finally clarified that the 
credit ratings are not prohibited. Nonetheless, rather than being the authentic interpretation of 
Section 939A, this may also be discussed from different angles, namely in relation to the 
impossibility of finding proper, universally accepted, alternatives to credit ratings. In fact, the 
CFTC, the OCC and the NCUA underlined that they did not receive any indication from the users 
of credit ratings in this respect. Their main concern was only in relation to the prospect of being 
prevented from using the credit ratings through the implementation of Section 939A. 416 
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Consequently, it may be argued that the agencies’ approaches denote two significant aspects. On the 
one hand, the impossibility of overcoming the difficulties in finding an adequate, unique 
replacement to credit ratings in accordance with what was the initial meaning and purpose of 
Section 939A; on the other hand, and consequent to this, there is the compromise with the users of 
credit ratings. The concerns they expressed turned out to be a strong defence of the credit ratings 
against a possible prohibition.  
 Hypothetically, if a universally accepted alternative to the credit ratings had been found and 
tested, it may be sensible to think that the credit ratings might not have been indicated among other 
factors to be taken into account for credit quality assessments. However, not only has ‘the’ 
alternative ever been found but also the unanimous opposition by the users of the credit ratings 
played a decisive role in making the proposed and final rules. At this stage, it can be asserted that 
Section 939A initially pursued the elimination of the credit ratings from legislation and regulatory 
frameworks. Then, the final result of this strategy through the work of the mandated agencies 
denotes a diversion from this aim. Rating-based regulation is a word which still fits in the new 
context. Whereas previously the regulation was ‘exclusively’ based on the credit ratings, now it is 
‘also’ based on the credit ratings. This is sufficient to say that the credit ratings remained and hence 
they are still part of the legislation. The proposed or final rules set out by the US agencies reflect a 
middle-of-the-road solution in an attempt to comply with the letter of Section 939A, satisfy the 
users of the credit ratings, and find other credit risk assessment tools to be indicated together with 
the credit ratings with the view to eliminating their exclusivity in legislation, but not their presence.  
 This can find confirmation through the work that the agencies have completed so far. For 
example, taking position from the CFTC’s and NCUA’s explanations of their respective 
amendments, some interesting elements can be found in support of the assertion that the agencies’ 
work was challenged by the utopian aim to find a unique, accepted alternative to the credit ratings, 
and by the influence that the users of the credit ratings exercised in favour of them. To begin with 
the CFTC, this agency explained the removal on the grounds that it noted the poor past performance 
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of the credit ratings in gauging the safety of certain types of investments. Accordingly, their 
reference in the Commission’s regulations is no longer essential to assess the creditworthiness of 
some investments. However, the CFTC’s final rule also stated that FCM or DCO may refer to 
external credit ratings as one of many factors to make an investment decision.417 There is a clear 
contradiction. If credit ratings are no longer useful or necessary due to their past performance, why 
would FCM or DCO still be entitled to refer to such useless or unnecessary credit risk assessment 
tools? This contradiction could have been avoided where an alternative credit risk assessment tool 
had been discussed, but, as mentioned above the CFTC did not receive any external comment or 
proposal. The NCUA received some proposals in this respect. In its final rule it specified that one 
commentator suggested including the credit spreads as an alternative standard for measuring 
creditworthiness. It is worth reporting the NCUA’s view on this proposal:  
 
[T]he NCUA Board does not support this approach because credit spreads are a 
function of open markets and they reflect investor interest for reasons that include, 
but are not limited to, credit risk. Market credit spreads for various asset classes 
experience variability depending on current supply and demand for the product, 
actual market interest rates, and a variety of other factors. While the NCUA Board 
declines to establish specific allowable credit spreads, it notes that FCUs and 
corporates may use credit spread information as a factor in assessing changes in 
creditworthiness.418 
  
This statement can be evaluated from two different angles. Firstly, it confirms what has been 
discussed in the previous paragraph, that is, the fact that none of the alternatives which were 
proposed before and after the debate on over-reliance encountered any favour. Probably a unique, 
universally accepted standard of creditworthiness to replace the credit ratings will never be found. 
This assertion has a probabilistic meaning in that, as it will be discussed below, the Commission is 
supposed to undertake the same work of the US agencies in relation to the credit rating references in 
EU law and complete this by 2020. As seen, the work implies finding appropriate alternatives and, 
hence, there is still room for assessment. However, the work of the US agencies has made it clear 
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that the task is highly ambitious and challenging. Secondly, the NCUA statement indicates how the 
regulators themselves have reservations as to the inclusion of one standard in place of another. It 
appears that none of the agencies took any responsibility in deciding or proposing a specific 
creditworthiness standard which should have replaced the credit ratings. This explains why Section 
939A set up a plan that is too challenging.  
 To put it more simply, while a review and removal of credit ratings is possible, it is not 
possible to get rid of the credit ratings completely. This also justifies the choice of setting out a list 
of alternatives to be freely selected by the market participants. In substance, the NCUA statement 
relating to the inclusion of the credit spreads mirrors what all the agencies have pursued or have 
been aiming to pursue as to the credit ratings in their current or next final rules. As to the credit 
spreads, the NCUA said that they will not include them as an exclusive standard of creditworthiness 
but the market participants are free to refer to them if they find them useful for their credit risk 
assessment analysis. This is not different from the way through which all the agencies finally dealt 
with the credit ratings: they cannot refer to them as exclusive benchmarks but the ratings can be 
selected among other tools and used by the market participants. Their primacy in the US legislation 
has been reduced, but they have not been totally eliminated.  
 
III.3.3.2 Effectiveness as to the risk of over-reliance 
Given this overall picture, it is to be wondered which consequences can derive in relation to the 
purpose of reducing the risk of over-reliance. The agencies’ approaches may not serve this purpose 
adequately. To sum up, credit ratings are indicated among other risk assessment tools which, 
initially, were discussed as possible replacements to them. Their pros and cons, however, raised 
doubts as to their suitability to become a valid alternative to credit ratings. In practice, within the 
debate aiming at searching for alternatives, the credit ratings were able to maintain their position 
because of the opposition by users to any change which hinted at their abandonment. Hence, the 
final solution which is reflected in the agencies’ approaches can be highlighted as follows: 1) credit 
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rating references are deleted and this complies with Section 939A; 2) credit ratings may be referred 
to among other credit risk assessment tools and this eliminates any users’ fear of being banned from 
using credit ratings.  
 Nonetheless, where regulators indicate credit ratings among several factors to be taken into 
consideration, it may be natural that users will choose what they have always referred to so far and, 
thus, they will continue to rely on them. This will not reduce the risk of over-reliance either. The 
danger of over-reliance may be even stronger in those agencies’ approaches, such as CFTC and 
OCC, in which the principle of using credit ratings among other factors is simply stated without any 
specification of the alternative factors.  
 Having said so, the standard of creditworthiness that the agencies elaborated after deleting 
the credit rating references raise significant doubts as well. Standards like ‘adequate’, ‘strong’ or an 
‘exceptionally strong’ capacity to meet commitments could be regarded as the narrative description 
of the rating scales applied by the CRAs. In more detail, a triple A or A+ indicate such capacities 
and, thus, they match the investment grade status specified by the rules.419 Consequently, it may be 
argued that the standards of creditworthiness elaborated by the agencies are the translation of the 
meaning of the investment grade rating scales. Therefore, given that the task of determining the 
investment grade status is on the financial institutions, it appears obvious that the rating symbolism 
and its meaning may be the first port of call and risks becoming the exclusive one, even though the 
new rules state that credit ratings should not be given exclusivity. Moreover, the responsibility on 
the financial institutions to qualify a security as investment grade raises the issue of how to consider 
this determination. It is acknowledged that credit ratings are forward looking opinions subject to 
                                                          
419
 See S&P, ‘Standard and Poor’s Ratings Definitions’ (2014): ’AAA: An obligation rated 'AAA' has the 
highest rating assigned by Standard & Poor's. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the 
obligation is extremely strong; AA: An obligation rated 'AA' differs from the highest-rated obligations only 
to a small degree. The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is very strong; 
A: An obligation rated 'A' is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of changes in circumstances 
and economic conditions than obligations in higher-rated categories. However, the obligor's capacity to meet 
its financial commitment on the obligation is still strong’. 
169 
 
changes over time.420 Hence, the question is whether the investment grade determination from the 
part of the financial institutions should be regarded as an opinion like credit ratings or something 
different. This issue seems not to have been given due consideration within the approaches 
elaborated by the agencies. In addition, the approaches seem to have missed the essentiality of the 
monitoring of the investment grade status once the determination is finalised. As illustrated in the 
first part of this thesis, CRAs provide adequate monitoring services through the outlook and watch-
list procedures. In the agencies’ approaches there is no indication on the proper actions to be taken 
in the event that the investment grade status should change. Once again, it is reasonable to think that 
if the financial institutions referred to NRSRO credit ratings for their creditworthiness 
determination, possible downgrades applied by the CRAs might have a bias on them and perhaps 
result in cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours. Given these considerations, the following 
conclusion on the implementation of Section 939A through the agencies’ proposed and final rules 
can be reached. The agencies’ approaches mark the end of the primacy of the credit ratings in the 
US financial legislation but they have maintained incentives which may, in practice, result in the 
primacy of credit ratings as credit risk measurement tools. At this stage of implementation of the 
reforms, it may be argued that the chosen amendments may not be effective in the reduction of the 
risk of over-reliance. On the contrary, the risk remains alive even if other credit risk assessment 
tools are indicated along with the credit ratings. 
 
III.4 THE STATUS OF THE EU REFORMS UNDER THE CRA III REGULATION 
 
III.4.1 The work of the ESAs 
The EU is regarded by the FSB as the second system in which progress in the implementation of the 
two-pronged approach can be discussed. As seen, the European regulatory approaches were finally 
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incorporated into three Articles within CRA Regulation III. These rules represent the normative 
translation of the approach set out at the international level to tackle over-reliance on external credit 
ratings by way of reducing the amount of credit rating references into legislation and regulatory 
frameworks and then encouraging more independent credit risk analysis by investors and market 
participants.421  With regard to the review of the credit rating references, Article 5(b) of CRA 
Regulation III mandates the ESAs to conduct a stocktaking review of the credit rating references in 
their guidelines and recommendations. The ESAs completed their review by the end of 2013 and 
hence a critical assessment of the outcomes can be made.422   
The first observations concern the purpose of their review. According to the letter of Article 
5(b) the review has to identify those credit rating references which can trigger mechanistic reliance 
on credit ratings. Significantly, during the consultation period leading to the completion of CRA 
Regulation III, the European Central Bank (ECB) warned about the degree of subjectivity 
surrounding the concept of mechanistic reliance. 423  This was due to a lack of definition of 
mechanistic reliance on external credit ratings. In the previous chapter a definitional gap with 
regard to the phenomenon of over-reliance was highlighted. Consequently, two different definitions 
of the phenomenon have been provided according to whether over-reliance stems from the 
hardwiring of ratings into legislation or from the structured finance sector. It can be said that the 
lack of a definition is a lacuna which has characterised the regulatory debate on over-reliance so far. 
Among other things, it has been pointed out that the FSB itself did not provide any definition of 
mechanistic reliance. This gap has been closed by way of associating mechanistic reliance to cliff-
edge effects and herd behaviours.  
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 In their recent stocktaking review the ESAs underlined that the Commission gave them 
mandate to identify references which can induce mechanistic reliance on external credit ratings 
without providing any definition of mechanistic reliance.424 Clearly, the ESAs’ review could not 
take place without a preliminary clarification of what mechanistic reliance is. In fact, unlike the US 
regulators under the auspices of Section 939A, the ESAs were required to conduct a selective 
review. Consequently, their preliminary task was to set out a definition of mechanistic reliance so as 
to be facilitated in the identification of the credit rating references which can carry such a risk. 
According to the final draft of the consultation paper on the enactment of Article 5(b) of CRA 
Regulation III issued in 2014, the definition of mechanistic reliance reads as follows: ‘it is 
considered that there is sole or mechanistic reliance on credit ratings (or credit rating outlooks) 
when an action or omission is the consequence of any type of rule based on credit ratings (or credit 
rating outlooks) without any discretion’. The ESAs clarified that such a definition can be traced 
back to the preparatory works which finally led the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
Council of Europe (hereinafter: the European Institutions) to finalise the last piece of European 
legislation of CRAs.425 In practice, this definition is the result of the understanding reached by the 
European Institutions during the negotiation of CRA Regulation III. However, such an 
understanding has never been translated into a specific definition. The definition of mechanistic 
reliance provided by the ESAs can be considered the summarisation of the broader definition of 
over-reliance deriving from regulation that this thesis attempted to sketch in its second chapter. In 
their definition the ESAs emphasise the negligent conduct of investors and market participants in 
performing their own due diligence and credit assessment when they give exclusive relevance to 
credit ratings as credit risk assessment tools. Such a conduct can exacerbate cliff-edge effects and 
parallel behaviours from the part of other investors and market participants. While the ‘action’ 
indicated in the definition refers indeed to these phenomena, the ‘omission’ is to be referred to the 
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lack of any credit risk assessment complementary to the analysis provided by the CRAs. This gives 
the credit ratings the exclusivity and primacy as a means for the assessment of credit risk.  
 Even though there is not explicit reference to the misperception of credit ratings as an 
official seal of approval of creditworthiness, the ESAs’ definition is, in any case, in relation to a 
negligent conduct by investors and market participants which connotes the type of over-reliance 
stemming from the hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks. Finally, 
the ESAs underline the source of the problems at stake, that is, they are facilitated by regulations 
based on external credit ratings.426 This definition constitutes the paradigm upon which the ESAs 
were supposed to perform and complete their review by the end of 2013. In practice, through their 
definition of mechanistic reliance their work could have easily selected specific credit rating 
references. This, in turn, could have guaranteed compliance with the letter of Article 5(b) and with 
the rationale behind FSB Principle I. The following discussion is based on the results of their 
review and selection.  
 Being commonly agreed that the banking regulation boasts the most pervasive use of credit 
ratings, the analysis can start with the review conducted by the EBA as to its guidelines and 
recommendations. Then, following the order given by the Joint Forum as to the use of credit ratings 
in LRSPs, the discussion can concentrate on the review conducted by the ESMA in relation to its 
guidelines on money market funds (MMF) and short term money market funds (SMMF). Finally, 
the result of the EIOPA’s review concludes the discussion on the European progress in the 
translation of the first level of the approach. 
 
III.4.1.1 The EBA’s mandate 
 
III.4.1.1.1 Area of intervention 
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The EBA’s review can be assessed in relation to its Revised Guidelines on the Recognition of 
External Credit Assessment Institutions issued in 2010. The guidelines were intended to provide 
consistency across jurisdictions on the ECAI recognition for the determination of capital 
requirements under the SA and in relation to the securitisation ratings-based approach.427 Within 
these guidelines, those concerning the mapping to external ratings in the SA and the mapping for 
securitisation exposures came under the EBA spotlight with regard to the risk of mechanistic 
reliance as it has been defined above. To have a better understanding of this, some preliminary 
explanations are in order.  
 As already mentioned, under the Basel II capital adequacy framework, banking institutions 
are allowed to use the SA and, thus, rely on external credit ratings to calculate capital requirement 
for credit risk. At the EU level, the Basel II framework and its SA were subsequently transposed 
into the CRD legislation comprising Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC. The SA was 
maintained in the new Basel III framework as well as in the current CRD IV legislation comprising 
Regulation EU No 575/2013 (CRR) and Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD).428 Taking position from the 
first source, that is, the Basel II framework, Annex 2 identifies the mapping process as the 
correspondence between the credit risk assessment to risk weights determined by an eligible ECAI 
under the SA, and the credit quality steps (CQS). In greater detail, what this means is that once a 
rating agency is eligible to be recognised as an ECAI its credit assessments are mapped by 
supervisors to the CQS defined by the Basel II framework. As is known, the framework also 
calculates the risk weight to be applied to each exposure. The banking supervisory authorities are 
responsible for the mapping process and, as specified in Annex 2, they have ‘to consider a variety 
of qualitative and quantitative factors to differentiate between the relative degrees of risk expressed 
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by each assessment, including, inter alia, the pool of issuers that each agency covers, the range of 
ratings that an agency assigns, each rating’s meaning, and each agency’s definition of default’.429 In 
relation to Annex 2 of the Basel II framework, Articles 82(1) of CRD III specifies that the 
competent authorities shall determine, in an objective and consistent manner, with which of the 
CQSs set out in Directive 2006/48/EC the credit assessment provided by ECAI are to be 
associated.430  
 The 2010 EBA guidelines were issued in the context of such rules and principles with the 
view to laying down a common approach to mapping and hence ensuring consistency across the EU 
to reduce the risk of regulatory arbitrage.431 With regard to the use of external credit ratings and 
their mapping under the SA, the EBA underlined that CQS may change consequently to rating 
downgrades. In turn, this will determine an increase in the capital requirements. The EBA identifies 
this situation as an example of mechanistic reliance because institutions cannot rely on risk 
assessment tools alternative to credit ratings.432 Similar conclusions were drawn in relation to the 
mapping process for securitisation exposures. Therefore, the EBA was able to identify what can be 
the source of mechanistic reliance on external credit ratings and should be accordingly repealed 
under Article 5(b) of CRA Regulation III.433  
 
III.4.1.1.2 Analysing the EBA’s approach 
However, what causes debate is not the identified guidelines but how the EBA decided to react. In 
other words, the EBA’s justification for why it feels it is not opportune to apply any amendment. To 
begin with, there are technical reasons. These can be traced back to forthcoming implementing 
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technical standards (ITS) specifying the mapping of ECAIs to credit quality steps which the EBA 
have the task to draft under the CRR. The ITS will amend automatically the guidelines. 
Consequently, any amendment before the issuance of the ITS would not make sense.434 Secondly, 
the EBA questions its authority to apply the amendments requested by the letter of Article 5(b). 
Interestingly, the EBA argues that the risk of over-reliance stems primarily from the SA rather than 
exclusively from its guidelines. Then, this risk continues through the implementing legislation, 
namely the CRD III and IV. In this context, it is the task of the Basel Committee Task Force on the 
SA to find appropriate alternatives for the mapping to external credit ratings in the approach and for 
securitisation exposure. This would allow a change in the implementing legislation and possibly 
new guidelines in accordance.435  
 Significantly, policy reasons seem to prevent the EBA from complying with Article 5(b). 
Furthermore, the EBA underlines that any amendments to its guidelines cannot have any effect on 
the implementing legislation, namely the CRR. In practice, guidelines and recommendations issued 
by the ESAs cannot repeal any legislation and, thus, the EBA feels that it is not opportune to take 
any steps. These are the legal reasons which prevent the EBA from complying with Article 5(b). 
Based on this, it can be observed that, at least for the EBA, the mandate set out in Article 5(b) has 
remained on paper or not completely fulfilled. The message from the part of the EBA appears to be 
clear: the forthcoming ITS will take into consideration the risk of over-reliance. However, what is 
indicated as essential is the elaboration of alternatives to external credit ratings. In this respect, the 
problem is not only the objective difficulty in finding accepted alternatives but also the willingness 
from the part of the Basel arena to discuss the opportunity of finding alternatives as substitutes to 
the credit ratings.  
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 Indeed, the new Basel III framework, despite the Committee’s intention to pursue strategies 
to reduce reliance on the external credit ratings, still considers them fundamental. For instance, with 
regard to the credit rating references under the Basel Committee liquidity standards, the Basel 
Committee declared that using market based indicators in replacement of the credit ratings will not 
be possible. The credit ratings are needed and, above all, there are currently no plans to completely 
remove them.436  As to market risk, the second consultation paper relating to the trading book 
revised the SA for the calculation of capital charges for interest rate risk and risks relating to 
securitisation positions held in the trading book. The approach currently relies on assessments based 
on the credit ratings provided by CRAs.437  
 Finally, the Basel Committee has recently published a second Consultative Document 
setting out revised proposals regarding the Basel securitisation framework. In short, these proposals 
introduce a revised set of approaches for determining regulatory capital requirements relating to 
securitisation exposures held in the banking book.438 The revised framework, among others,439 aims 
at reducing mechanistic reliance on external credit ratings in line with the FSB principles and the 
G20 leaders call on the Committee to tackle the adverse incentives deriving from the use of the 
credit ratings in the regulatory capital framework.440 Under the securitisation framework set out in 
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Basel II, banks should hold regulatory capital against all their securitisation exposures. To 
determine the regulatory capital requirements for securitisation exposures within the banking book 
the banks may use either the SA or the IRB approach. The proposed new framework is based on a 
simplified hierarchy of approaches, at the top of which stands the Internal Rating Based Approach 
(IRBA), followed by the External Ratings Based Approach (EXRBA), the SA and finally the 
application of a 1250% risk weight. Importantly, when it is not possible to use the IRBA it is 
necessary to move down to the next available one.441 As can be seen, the external credit ratings still 
retain their relevance, though the IRB is at the top of the hierarchy. In fact, the EXRBA can be used 
in jurisdictions where the use of external credit ratings is permitted and where tranches have an 
external credit rating or where credit ratings can be inferred. Then, following the hierarchy, the SA 
will be referred to when the first two are not available. However, in this respect the framework 
specifies that the resulting capital requirements under the SA are meant to be broadly aligned with 
those obtained under the EXRBA and will be slightly higher than those obtained under the IRB 
approach.442 
 This is a work which is yet to be finalised by the Basel Committee. As is known, the Basel 
frameworks are not legally binding, rather they aim to form the basis for national rulemaking. In 
any case, the work of the committee has its relevance with respect to the implementation of the FSB 
two-pronged approach and the EU rules addressing over-reliance. In particular, the timing of its 
work seems to be determinant as to the progress of the FSB’s jurisdictions review and reduction of 
credit rating references in the banking sector. Most of them have declared that they intend to 
progress in accordance with the FSB set of principles only after (and within eighteen months) the 
Basel Committee will have completed its work on the above illustrated frameworks. Putting this 
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picture into the EBA perspective, it is clear that its room for manoeuvre seems to be very limited. 
Its justifications with regard to the opportunity of not applying any changes to its guidelines have a 
logic in relation to the fact that any change should come first from the source upon which the 
European legislation on capital requirements is based, that is, the Basel framework. This would 
permit the EBA to issue new guidelines or implementing technical standards for the finalisation of 
new bodies of rules that the EU competent institution would elaborate in accordance with the Basel 
soft-law rules. Ultimately, the EBA risks being stalled as long as signals do not come from the part 
of the Basel Committee. This will also make Article 5(b) useless in relation to the risk of over-
reliance in the banking sector.  
 
III.4.1.2 The ESMA’s mandate 
 
III.4.1.2.1 Area of intervention 
The ESMA performed its review in relation to the 2010 CESR’s guidelines providing a definition of 
money market funds. 443  When they were issued, the guidelines aimed at ensuring investors’ 
protection through a harmonised definition of money market fund. The guidelines drew a line 
between short-term money market funds (STMMFs) and money market funds (MMFs). While 
STMMFs are allowed to invest in securities with a residual maturity of less than, or equal to, 397 
days and have a portfolio-weighted average maturity that does not exceed 60 days, MMFs are not 
subjected to the same maturity restriction provided that their portfolio-weighted average maturity 
does not exceed 6 months. To put it more simply, STMMFs have a very short weighted average 
maturity and weighted average life vis-à-vis money market funds which have a longer weighted 
average maturity and weighted average life. Another significant difference upon which the ESMA 
based the distinction between STMMFs and MMFs is concerned with the possibility for MMFs of 
holding sovereign issuance, meant as a money market instrument ‘issued or guaranteed by a central, 
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regional, or local authority or central bank of a Member State, the ECB, the EU or the European 
Investment Bank (EIB)’.444 With regard to over-reliance, Boxes 2 and 3 of the ESMA’s guidelines, 
relating respectively to STMMFs and MMFs came under scrutiny.  
 
III.4.1.2.2 Analysing the ESMA’s approach 
According to ESMA, references to external credit ratings in Boxes 2 and 3 can create undue 
reliance by asset managers. In point 3 of box 2 it is stated that STMMFs have to invest in debt 
instruments which are of a high quality. The determination of ‘high quality’ is the task of the 
management company and, to this end, the guidelines specify that a wide range of factors can be 
taken into account, among them: (a) the credit quality of the instrument; (b) the type of asset class 
represented by the instrument; (c) the operational and counterparty risk when it is a structured 
finance transaction; and (d) the liquidity profile.445 Based on these factors, attention is to be devoted 
to the credit quality of the debt instrument. In this respect, paragraph 4 of the guideline associates 
the credit quality requirement to the highest credit rating category awarded by recognised CRAs. 
Such a requirement operates in the event of credit rating provided by CRAs, otherwise an 
equivalent quality for an unrated instrument will be determined through the management company’s 
internal rating process.446 As to MMF, paragraph 2 of Box 3 states that MMFs may hold sovereign 
issuance provided that it is of investment grade quality. 
Paragraph 4 of Box 2 and paragraph 2 of Box 3 of the ESMA guidelines have been the 
object of the review. It is worth reporting the text of the proposed changes: 
[F]or the purposes of point 3a), [the STTMF must] ensure that the management 
company performs its own documented assessment of the credit quality of money 
market instruments that allows it to consider a money market instrument as high 
quality. Where one or more credit rating agencies registered and supervised by 
ESMA have provided a rating of the instrument, the management company’s internal 
assessment should have regard to, inter alia, those credit ratings. While there should 
be no mechanistic reliance on such external ratings, a downgrade below the two 
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highest short-term credit ratings by any agency registered and supervised by ESMA 
that has rated the instrument should lead the manager to undertake a new assessment 
of the credit quality of the money market instrument to ensure it continues to be of 
high quality (Paragraph 4 of Box 2). 
 
[a MMF] May, as an exception to the requirement of point 4 of Box 2, hold 
sovereign issuance of a lower internally-assigned credit quality based on the MMF 
manager’s own documented assessment of credit quality. Where one or more credit 
rating agencies registered and supervised by ESMA have provided a rating of the 
instrument, the management company’s internal assessment should have regard to, 
inter alia, those credit ratings. While there should not be mechanistic reliance on such 
external ratings, a downgrade below investment grade or any other equivalent rating 
grade by any agency registered and supervised by ESMA that has rated the 
instrument should lead the manager to undertake a new assessment of the credit 
quality of the money market instrument to ensure it continues to be of appropriate 
quality (Paragraph 2 of Box 3). 
  
The changes applied by the ESMA stimulate the following reflections. The paragraphs were 
re-worded in such a way as not to give exclusivity to the external credit ratings to the detriment of 
other factors that the management company should consider for the determination of credit quality. 
Such an amendment would have made sense if there had not been any warnings in the guidelines as 
to the necessity to avoid giving primacy to external credit ratings for the determination of the credit 
quality. In reality, these warnings were already present in the explanatory notes included in the 
2010 ESMA’s guidelines: ‘in carrying out its diligence, the management company should not place 
undue weight on the credit rating of the instrument’.447 Also, the explanatory text encouraged to 
control the credit quality of the money market instruments on regular basis and not only at the time 
of the purchase. Significantly, in the event of rating downgrades corrective actions should have 
been taken into consideration by the management company in the best interests of the clients.448 
  
These explanatory notes were already mitigating the potential risk of over-reliance which, 
according to the ESMA’s 2014 review, would stem from paragraph 4 of Box 2 and paragraph 2 of 
Box 3. Based on this, it may be argued that there was no need for intervention on this guideline. 
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This context raises the question of whether the 2010 CESR’s guidelines on European money market 
funds could really carry the risk of over-reliance as claimed by the ESMA. The answer could be 
positive in the absence of mitigating warnings, but given that the warnings were already set out in 
the guidelines, the answer is negative. For these reasons, the applied amendments appear to be 
superfluous.  
 Nonetheless, a noteworthy feature of the proposed amendments may be seen in the 
amendment according to which the credit ratings can still be a point of reference for the 
determination of credit quality among other factors (‘inter alia’). This encourages us to consider 
external credit ratings as one and not as the exclusive tool for the assessment of creditworthiness. In 
any case, as some of the US implementing approaches have shown, it would be desirable for ESMA 
to provide a list of possible alternative factors. In fact, box 2 lists the factors to be considered for the 
determination of a debt instrument’s high quality with the specification that the list is not 
exhaustive. 449  Not giving an indication of possible alternatives for the assessment of 
creditworthiness but simply declaring that credit ratings can still be referred to ‘inter alia’ risks 
frustrating the purpose of reducing the primacy of external credit ratings as credit assessment tools. 
Therefore, such an amendment may appear to incentivise the use of credit ratings rather than reduce 
it. In other words, it appears that the ESMA’s worry is more concerned with showing that the credit 
ratings will not be lost rather than recalibrating the role of credit ratings as one among several 
factors to be considered for due diligence and credit risk assessment. In conclusion, it can be 
observed that while the EBA clarified the reasons why it felt it opportune not to apply any 
amendments in its guidelines, the ESMA reviewed and applied amendments to its guidelines 
according to the mandate of Article 5(b). However, its amendments appear, for the reasons 
explained, to be superfluous. 
 
III.4.2 The EU approach in future perspective 
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The EIOPA has concluded its own review with no identification of any recommendations and 
guidelines which contain credit rating references posing a risk of mechanistic reliance.450  This 
outcome stimulates further reflection in relation to the European approach against over-reliance. 
Remaining within the context of reducing regulatory reliance, analysis is to be concerned with 
Article 5(c) of CRA Regulation III. The contents are not dissimilar to those in Article 5(b) 
involving the ESAs. The only difference lies in the broadest term assigned to the Commission to 
conduct its review. The Commission will have to review and identify those credit ratings references 
in EU law which can cause undue reliance and, by January 2020, repeal them, provided that valid 
alternatives are found. The outcomes of the ESA’s review, in particular the ESMA’s and EIOPA’s 
review, raise some questions to be applied to the investigation that the Commission is expected to 
complete by the mentioned date. Accordingly, since it has been seen that the EIOPA did not find 
any credit rating references in its guidelines, while it has been argued that the ESMA guidelines do 
not carry, per se, any risk of over-reliance, it is desirable to discuss whether the review of the 
Commission under Article 5(c) can lead to the same results. In practice, the extent to which credit 
ratings are embedded into EU law is to be assessed and whether such references confer a primacy 
status to credit ratings in such a way as to be the exclusive benchmark and, thus, potentially 
discourage independent due diligence and credit risk assessment. To this end, this analysis will try 
to formulate a hypothesis on the outcome of the Commission’s forthcoming review. This will be 
based on the picture of the hardwiring of credit ratings into EU law. The context will be 
circumscribed to the EU financial legislation before the recent financial crisis, and to the 
consequent reforms which modified the legislation also with regard to over-reliance. This is the 
only context which permits us to understand the future developments of the current European 
approach against over-reliance.  
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III.4.2.1 Banking 
Starting with the banking sector it must be observed that the CRD, in its early framework, already 
provided some incentives for more internal risk analysis so as to counterbalance the use of external 
credit ratings. Firstly, the possibility of using the IRB approach was, per se, an incentive to perform 
more independent credit risk assessment since, as the Commission, stressed: ‘the CRD requires 
credit institutions to have their own sound credit granting criteria and credit decision processes in 
place. Basing rating decisions solely on external credit rating agency ratings does not fulfil this 
requirement under the EU banking legislation’.451 Secondly, it is worth noting that Annex VII, part 
4, item 18 of the early framework stated that: ‘if a credit institution uses external ratings as primary 
factors determining an internal rating assignment, the credit institution shall ensure that it considers 
other relevant information’.452  Therefore, external ratings could be used as primary factors for 
determining an internal rating but not as exclusive benchmarks. They had to be complemented with 
other information.  
 Considering that both the early and new CRD frameworks incorporated incentives for 
autonomous credit risk analysis, references to credit ratings do not seem to pose serious risks as to 
over-reliance. This may also be a logical conclusion for the Commission when it will review the 
credit ratings references in the banking sector to meet its deadline of 2020. In essence, due to the 
previous and current contents of the framework, the Commission may conclude that there are no 
references which may induce mechanistic and parallel reliance by the market participants.  
 
III.4.2.2 Insurance 
The early EU framework on the supervision of insurance and reinsurance undertakings did not 
contain any provision referring to the credit ratings.453 Recently, this regime has been amended 
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through the introduction of Directive 2009/138/EC (the so-called Solvency II framework directive), 
which introduces risk-oriented solvency requirements for insurance and reinsurance undertakings. 
Solvency II deals with credit risk, and capital requirements are calculated either through a standard 
formula or through the undertaking’s internal model subject to supervisory approval.454 There are 
no references to external credit ratings in the Solvency II framework. However, on 10 October 2014 
the Commission issued a Delegated Act containing implementing rules for Solvency II.455 In greater 
detail, Commission Delegated Regulation 2015/35 refers to the credit ratings provided by ECAI. 
Article 4 states that insurance and reinsurance undertakings may use external credit ratings for the 
calculation of the solvency capital requirements in accordance with the standard formula only 
where they have been issued by an ECAI or endorsed by an ECAI under CRA Regulation I. 
Nonetheless, Regulation 2015/35 takes into consideration the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings 
by specifying that they cannot be regarded as exclusive benchmarks for the purposes of calculating 
capital requirements.456 Consequently, the new regulation implementing the Solvency II framework 
is in line with the FSB principles and, in theory, should not pose any over-reliance threat.  
 
III.4.2.3 Pensions 
Similar conclusions apply to the pension sector. In the EU, pension funds are disciplined under the 
Institution for Occupational Retirement Provision Directive (IORP). 457  This directive does not 
contain any reference to credit ratings. Credit rating references might be identified in few Member 
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States’ laws implementing the IORP directive, but things may change due to the current trends 
towards the reduction of credit rating references.458 In any case, as already stressed by the EIOPA, 
this a sector in which legislation has never contained any credit rating references. Consequently, the 
Commission review will be basically in line with this de facto outcome.  
 
III.4.2.4 Investment funds 
In the EU the area of collective investment schemes covers four types of harmonised investment 
funds: Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS); Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers (AIFM); European Venture Capital Funds (EuVECA); and European 
Social Entrepreneurship funds (EuSEF). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the UCITS directive 
2009/65/EC and AIFM directive 2011/61/EU have been amended by directive 2013/14/EU in 
relation to the risk of over-reliance.459 However, with specific regard to UCITS, it can be noticed 
that even before the current legislation credit ratings were not the exclusive tools for assessing 
credit risk. In this respect, reference is to be made to Directive 2007/16/EC implementing Council 
Directive 85/611/ECC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to UCITS as regards the clarification of certain definitions.460 For instance, Article 6 listed 
the criteria to verify the eligibility of non-listed money market instruments issued by ‘an 
establishment which is subject to, and complies with, prudential rules considered by competent 
authorities to be as stringent as those laid down by community law’. In essence, this provision set 
out four, non-cumulative, criteria to be met by a money market instrument to be eligible for an 
investment by a UCITS. The third of these criteria requires the issuer of said instrument to be ‘at 
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least investment grade rating’.461 It is submitted that such a provision only identified an instrument 
as being ‘eligible’ for investment but not ‘suitable’ and therefore it was not to be regarded as 
encouraging excessive reliance on the detriment of one’s own risk analysis.462 Furthermore, Article 
10 referred to credit ratings to determine whether transferable securities or money market 
instruments embedded a derivative component. According to Article 10, one of the non-cumulative 
criteria to be used to verify whether the host security (money market instrument) embedded a 
derivative was whether the performance of the money market instrument was sensitive to changes 
in credit rating of the underlined index or asset.463 Like in Article 6, credit ratings were just one 
criterion. Asset managers were neither limited nor discouraged from conducting their own risk 
analysis.  
 Considering the recent amendments applied to the UCITS and AIFM directives, which 
include the principle to reduce over-reliance through the encouragement of independent credit risk 
analysis, the outcomes in this sector are not dissimilar to those relating to the CRD framework. 
There was already an ex ante, and there is an ex post, mitigation of the role of the credit ratings so 
that the Commission will be likely to conclude that there is no danger of mechanistic and parallel 
reliance deriving from these EU law frameworks. 
 
III.4.2.5 Investment firms 
With regard to investment firms, it is worth mentioning the debate as to the credit rating reference 
incorporated in Article 18 of Directive 2006/73/EC implementing directive 2004/39/EC (MIFID I). 
Article 18 requires qualifying money market funds (QMMF) to invest in high quality money market 
instruments ‘to achieve their primary investment objective to maintain the net asset value of the 
undertaking either constant at par (net of earnings) or at the value of the investors’ initial capital 
plus earnings’. Under this rule, high money market instruments are those which receive the highest 
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credit ratings by competent CRAs.464 An instrument not rated by any competent CRA shall not be 
regarded as a high quality one. This reference to credit ratings was controversial. It was argued that 
the requirement could potentially exclude all UCITS money market funds which did not rely on 
specific credit ratings in their investment process from the market of managing investment firms’ 
client money.465  Specifically, the risk was that a money market fund could be excluded from 
becoming a QMMF when it did not rely on competent CRAs but conducted its own risk analysis 
sufficient to demonstrate that the instrument had an acceptable level of risk.466 Significantly, the 
rule appeared to give an undue primacy to the credit ratings. Nonetheless, contrariety was expressed 
with regard to amend the credit rating reference on the ground that: ‘an independent credit rating 
protects investors by limiting the fund’s ability to chase higher yields through riskier securities 
based on the fund manager’s own subjective assessment’.467 Hence, the elimination of credit rating 
reference from Article 18 of the MIFID implementing directive would have hampered the 
possibility for money market fund investors to rely on a common standard for investment quality. 
Accordingly, it was suggested eliminating only the requirement to refer to ‘competent CRAs’, but 
finally there were not changes. However, it must be noticed that MIFID I will be repealed and 
recast by directive 2014/65/EU and Regulation 600/2014 (so-called MIFID II), which the 
Commission issued in July 2014. Both the directive and regulation do not contain references to 
credit ratings.468   
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III.4.2.6 Disclosure requirements for securities 
References to credit ratings are also included in the EU rules governing the publishing of a 
prospectus when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market. 
Annex V of Regulation 809/2004 implementing the Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC lists the 
information that the prospectus should include with regard to the securities to be offered or admitted 
to trading.469 To this end, Paragraph 7.5 of Annex V requires indicating ‘the credit ratings assigned 
to an issuer or its debt securities at the request or with the cooperation of the issuer in the rating 
process’. If the rating provider has previously published an explanation of the meaning of the 
ratings, this should also be included according to paragraph 7.5.470 These rules simply refer to 
instruments which received their solicited credit ratings. Nonetheless, there are no references 
imposing the use of external credit ratings as an eligibility condition for the security offering. Credit 
ratings are just mentioned among the information to be written in the prospectus. Accordingly, it is 
hard to think that such a reference will be identified as carrying the risk of mechanistic and parallel 
reliance. 
 
III.4.2.7 European Financial Stability Framework Agreement 
References to external credit ratings may also be found in the ‘European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) framework agreement of 7 June 2010 between the EFSF and the euro-area Member 
States’.471 For instance, point 2 of the EFSF is concerned with the conditions to be met to enter into 
financial assistance facility agreements, to be granted financial assistance, find instruments and 
issue guarantees. As to the issue of guarantees, point 2, paragraph 3 of the EFSF states that an 
unconditional and irrevocable guarantee shall be issued by each guarantor in respect of funding 
instruments issued or entered into under an EFSF programme. Also, guarantees may be requested 
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for other purposes which are relating to an issue of Funding Instruments and make possible an 
investment grade rating for Funding Instruments issued by EFSF.472 Point 4, paragraph 3 specifies 
the entities, credit institutions and financial operators the EFSF may appoint, negotiate and liaise 
with, for the structuring and negotiation of Funding Instruments on a stand-alone basis or under the 
EFSF Programme.473 To this end, EFSF is expected to liaise with CRAs by providing them with all 
the data and documentation needed to obtain requisite ratings. As of 2013, such a framework has 
been replaced by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which ultimately does not contain any 
reference or provisions placing reliance on external credit ratings.474 Once again, this is an area in 
which the removal and the replacement of the credit rating references with possible alternatives will 
not take place. 
 
III.4.2.8 State Aid 
Credit ratings are also points of reference for the Commission in several contexts. For example, 
pursuant to the ‘Communication from the Commission on the Revision of the Methods for Setting 
the Reference and Discount Rates’ and the ‘Commission Notice on the Application of Article 87 
and 88 of the EC Treaty to State Aid in the Form of Guarantees’, external credit ratings may be 
used to establish whether State guarantees or loans constitute State aid.475 For this purpose, point 
3.3 of the Communication refers to the rating classes provided by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch as the 
most frequently used by the banking sector. As it is explained clearly, however, ratings do not need 
to be obtained from those specific rating agencies and thus there is not an exclusive reliance on 
them.476 Importantly, the Communication acknowledges the value of the national rating systems or 
internal rating systems used by banks to reflect default rates and states that they have equal 
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acceptance.477 Undoubtedly, there are incentives not to place exclusive reliance on the external 
credit ratings. Furthermore, the EU Commission may use a bank’s credit rating as a measure of 
creditworthiness to assess whether state guarantees are appropriately priced in accordance with the 
Communication from the Commission on the Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in 
Relation to Financial Institutions in the Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis.478 
 References to external credit ratings may also be found in the ‘Commission Communication 
on Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions of 5 December 2008’. Credit ratings are used as tools 
for the assessment of a bank’s risk profile for recapitalisation purposes under State aid rules. Also in 
these contexts external credit ratings are not the unique indicators the Commission can rely on. 
Capital adequacy, the size of the recapitalisation, and the current credit default swap (CDS) spreads 
are, in fact, spelt out as further indicators for the evaluation of a bank’s risk profile in addition to 
credit ratings.479 This is an example of a level playing field between the credit ratings and other 
creditworthiness measurements so that the first are not an exclusive benchmark. Importantly, these 
provisions were antecedent to the finalisation of the current rules requiring the review to reduce the 
risk of over-reliance.  
 Similarly, according to the ‘Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of 
Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector of 25 February 2009’, banks are required to 
disclose, if available, the rating assigned to each basket of activities they hold, among others, 
structured products and securitised position. 480  Annex III of the Communication, however, 
encourages an independent analysis for the calculation of expected losses with regard to the 
impaired assets to be transferred to or guaranteed by a Member State. The results of such an 
assessment can be compared to the results deriving from the external credit ratings which are, 
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therefore, additional, complementary sources of information and not an exclusive determinant of 
credit quality assessment.481  
 
III.4.3 The EU approach: a critical review 
This investigation into the hardwiring of the credit ratings in the EU legislation and regulatory 
frameworks highlights a significant difference vis-à-vis the US review and consequent reforms. 
While in the second chapter the two systems were contrasted in terms of amount of credit rating 
references in their respective legislations, in this third chapter the analysis of the two systems 
through the lens of their respective reforms leads to the conclusion that in the EU, as opposed to the 
US, not only are credit ratings not that largely hardwired into the EU financial legislation, but also 
the EU legislation has never conferred any exclusive role to external credit ratings as the US 
regulators did in their legislation. As the above review showed, credit ratings are expressly 
indicated among other factors to be considered for risk assessment, and not as exclusive credit risk 
assessment tools. Putting this feature into the perspective of the work that the Commission should 
complete by 2020, it could be hypothesised that the outcomes may be no different than the EIOPA’s 
ones. The Commission may not be finding credit rating references which can induce mechanistic 
and parallel reliance on external credit ratings, especially where other factors for credit risk 
evaluation are mentioned in addition to credit ratings. Consequently, the other phases of the 
approach, namely deletion upon the condition of finding appropriate alternatives, might not be 
necessary either.  
 However, this should not make us think of the EU as a ‘protected area’ in which there is no 
risk of over-reliance on external credit ratings. The conducted analysis only leads to the conclusion 
that the risk appears not to be as high as it could be where credit ratings were given exclusivity as 
credit risk assessment tools in regulatory frameworks. In fact, the risk may be high in the legislation 
implementing EU law at the national levels. These may give primacy to credit ratings or not 
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incentivise investors and market participants to refer to them as sources of information 
complementary to independent analysis.  
 
 
III.5 MORE INDEPENDENT CREDIT RISK ANALYSIS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE   
 
III.5.1 The status of implementation 
Both the US and EU approaches have crystallised the requirement of independent credit risk 
analysis. Now, the possibilities of putting this principle into practice are to be discussed as well. 
 The FSB made it clear that the risk of over-reliance on external credit ratings must also be 
reduced through the enhancement of the market participants’ credit assessment capabilities, other 
than by revisiting the use of credit ratings in regulations. This is the second level of the FSB 
approach set out in Principle II, according to which banks, market participants and institutional 
investors have to make their own credit risk assessment instead of basing their investment decisions 
exclusively on credit ratings. Under the FSB Principle II, it is the task of regulators and 
policymakers to include this principle in the design of their regulations.482 At the EU level, this 
principle has been widely included in primary and secondary legislation. For instance, it has been 
crystallised in CRA Regulation III and in the Directives concerning UCITS and AIFM.483 Also, 
with regard to the banking sector, the CRD IV has incorporated numerous tools and requirements to 
reduce the risk of over-reliance. For example, competent authorities at the national level are 
required to encourage institutions to develop internal credit risk assessment capacity by increasing 
the use of IRB approaches for calculating capital requirements for credit risk. Moreover, competent 
authorities have to monitor that institutions do not refer exclusively to credit ratings for assessing 
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the creditworthiness of debt instruments and counterparties.484 As already mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the enactment of the second level of the FSB two-pronged approach depends on the 
development of the credit risk assessment capacity and monitoring by the supervisory competent 
authorities. With this in mind, the degree of implementation of this principle must now be analysed. 
By referring to some data produced by the FSB, it can be observed that the progress towards the 
enhancement of internal credit risk assessment capabilities has been significant with respect to 
central bank operations. Some central banks have already developed in-house credit risk groups, 
while others are in the process of developing their own credit risk assessment which should not 
incorporate external credit ratings.485 Also, other central banks declared that they will not take 
further measures to develop their own credit assessment capabilities because they do not see any 
mechanistic risk in their use of external credit ratings.486  
 Remaining in the banking sector, the BCBS has constantly issued guidelines and principles 
encouraging banks to have sound risk management capabilities and to rely on IRB for credit risk 
management. In this context, the FSB has noticed that some large banks already have in place their 
own IRB systems or, in some countries, they do not rely on external credit ratings at all.487 This is, 
for example, the case of Brazil. As the BCBS have shown in its Regulatory Consistency 
Assessment Programme (RCAP) in relation to the implementation of the Basel III framework, the 
Brazilian regulations do not link to external credit ratings risk weights for claims on sovereigns, 
public sector entities, banks, securities firms and corporations. Instead, they use fixed risk weights 
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or alternative simpler methodologies. 488  Likewise, for securitisation exposures the Brazilian 
regulations do not rely on external credit ratings.489  
 Other than the banking sector, the development of internal due diligence and credit risk 
assessment capabilities has also been seen in many larger pension funds and securities firms. In the 
case of securities firms, internal credit assessment has been adopted for the purpose of prudential 
requirements or for the purpose of making investment or lending decisions.490  
III.5.2 The second level of the approach: a critical review 
Apparently, this picture seems to be encouraging. In reality, as it can be understood, the 
development of internal credit risk assessment capabilities and the use of internal tools for credit 
risk evaluation are only circumscribed to large firms. These can have the means and adequate 
resources to set up their own credit risk assessment tools and, thus, they can be in line with the 
purpose of FSB Principle II in the reduction of over-reliance. On the other hand, this may be 
challenging for small, less sophisticated investors who do not have the economies of scale to 
undertake their own credit risk assessment. In fact, the FSB in its peer review final report regarded 
this as the drawback which undermines the pace of the translation of the second level of the 
approach in parallel with the first one.491 If not all of the financial firms are able to develop internal 
credit risk assessment capabilities, and probably keep on relying on the CRAs’ services, there will 
not be any progress in the reduction of the risk of over-reliance. Based on this, the picture has now a 
different connotation. The reduction of over-reliance through the encouragement of more 
independent credit risk analysis seems to be the privilege of large, more sophisticated investors vis-
à-vis smaller less sophisticated investors. Consequently, while the enactment of the first level of the 
approach is undermined by the difficulties in finding valid alternatives to credit ratings, the second 
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level may instead be jeopardised by cost-related problems which less sophisticated investors cannot 
or are not willing to undertake.  
 The scale of the problem can be understood by reflecting over this principle and its 
feasibility. As seen, progress in its implementation can be discussed mainly with regard to large 
financial institutions as opposed to small, less sophisticated, investors. However, this does not mean 
that all large, financial institutions are able to perform a credit risk analysis and due diligence 
through their own internal credit risk assessment tools. While less sophisticated investors may not 
have the means to set up what the FSB, the US and EU rules require to reduce over-reliance, more 
sophisticated market participants may not have an interest in deploying a huge amount of resources 
either.  
 Consequently, cost-related problems are not exclusively circumscribed to small financial 
institutions; they may be a general problem. For instance, where financial firms are required to 
strengthen their internal risk assessment by developing and using internal rating models, it is to be 
questioned the extent to which the compliance costs for firms with internal risk management are 
bearable. Such costs would include the possibility of accessing capital market information sources, 
an adequate framework of technologies to manage internal risks and, when needed, legal advice. 
According to the FSB, this should be a requirement for all financial firms, such as credit 
institutions, investment firms, insurance and reinsurance undertakings, asset managers and 
investment firms. However, taking position from the asset managers, it should not be forgotten that 
investment mandates are contractual agreements between private parties and, thus, requiring them 
to perform an independent risk assessment also implies the set up of adequate internal policies to 
reduce the risk that their assessment may be biased by conflict of interest with their clients.  
 In any case, the cost issues which have been generally highlighted for financial firms can be 
similarly applied to the specific FSB principle requiring banks to use internal rating models for the 
calculation of regulatory capital requirements. Again, the main drawback stems from compliance 
costs. Even though the costs associated should be evaluated in proportion to each individual firm, 
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the costs for the relevant financial sector may be considerable. In practice, since the FSB 
encourages the development of a variety of risk assessment models, this would be inevitably 
burdensome for the supervisory competent authorities. In this context, it should be questioned 
whether the regulatory agencies will be able to deploy a large number of supervisors to assess the 
suitability of a wide variety of risk models adopted or developed by the financial institutions. It 
must be recalled that when the IRB models were introduced in the Basel II framework, it was 
submitted that it would not be sensible for supervisors to assess a wide range of different types of 
credit risk models. This is the reason why banks, to be permitted to use internal models for 
regulatory purposes, had to adopt the Value-at-risk-style model. 492  In this respect, as Whelan 
underlines, where this precedent is followed, it is unlikely that the emancipation from the use of the 
agencies’ credit ratings will result in the variety of expected internal risk assessments;493 not to 
mention that even assessing the implementation of a common internal risk assessment model is not 
an easy task for supervisors either.494 Furthermore, even though the promotion of IRB approaches 
encouraged under the FSB set of principles as an alternative to the CRAs ratings is expected to 
reduce mechanistic reliance on them, the BCBS brought forward numerous issues concerning the 
reliability, comparability and transparency of IRB capital charges. 495  This raised significant 
concerns from the part of the FSB, which finally cautioned against the choice of models which may 
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be inadequate.496 As already mentioned, the problem in this context is that the risk of mechanistic 
reliance may simply shift from the credit ratings to another alternative.  
 Also, it cannot be neglected that the risk of pro-cyclicality of the IRB models vis-à-vis the 
use of external credit ratings is another issue hotly debated amongst economists.497 In short, some 
empirical studies have shown that pro-cyclicality issues have considerable relevance under the IRB 
models and how the choice of the rating philosophy can play a role in the increase of capital 
requirements during a period of economic downturns.498  These topics are only touched on the 
surface in the present research. Arguing which model is the best, less pro-cyclical, and to try to 
support such an assertion with data is out of the scope of this work. The present discussion had the 
aim to underline all the current difficulties concerning the implementation of the second level of the 
approach, and the issues which are at stake with regard to the encouragement of more IRB approach 
vis-à-vis the external credit ratings.  
 To summarise the main findings of the present analysis, the enhancement of the second level 
of the approach seems to be more plausible in the case of larger, sophisticated market participants. 
Evidently, there is a strict line of demarcation between firms which can afford the development and 
use of internal credit risk assessment processes and those institutions which cannot, and may 
consequently rely on the services provided by CRAs. The difference between large and small 
financial institutions was taken into consideration in the FSB guidelines as well. FSB Principle 
III.2.b recognises that smaller, less sophisticated banks may not have the resources to conduct 
internal credit assessment for all their investments. Nonetheless, it is stated that they should not 
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mechanistically rely on credit ratings and should publicly disclose their credit risk assessment 
approaches.499 In other words, while for large financial institutions the theoretical principle of not 
relying mechanistically on external credit ratings finds its practical application in the enhancement 
of IRB models, smaller institutions are simply told what they are not supposed to do, but not how.  
 Furthermore, these drawbacks were not only acknowledged at the international level. At the 
EU level, cost-related problems as to the enhancement of internal risk assessment models, as well as 
the difficulties for small financial institutions to set them up in order to be more independent from 
external credit ratings were clearly emphasised. In the consultations leading to the finalisation of 
CRA Regulation III, financial institutions and market participants were asked, for example, to 
provide their view on whether the use of the SA should be exclusively limited to small, less 
sophisticated investors due to the heavy costs relating to the set-up of internal models for small 
institutions.500  Also, in the CRA III impact assessment document, cost-related problems were 
regarded as the main disadvantages of the approach based on encouraging financial institutions to 
develop and use more IRB vis-à-vis external credit ratings. Finally, the Commission admitted that 
the approach could be burdensome for supervisors as well: ‘a system of internal ratings can prove 
beneficial for the macro-financial stability only if internal rating methodologies are carefully and 
accurately reviewed and approved by a competent authority. The need to validate internal rating 
methodologies would clearly create an additional burden for CRAs supervisors.’501 This makes it 
apparent the extent to which the enactment of the second level of the two-pronged approach can be 
challenging for supervisors as well since they are supposed to closely check the adequacy of firms’ 
own credit assessment processes.502  These are the main reasons why, at the present stage, the 
reduction of over-reliance through the enhancement of internal credit risk assessment capabilities is 
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not progressing as envisaged. This also explains why only a very small number of financial 
institutions have so far started improving their own internal risk assessment systems in accordance 
with the second level of the two-pronged approach. 
 
III.6 CONCLUSION 
Progress in the implementation of the two-pronged approach has not taken the pace which the FSB 
expected since the issue of the principles in 2010. This is due to numerous reasons. Preliminarily, it 
has been shown that the strategy is not a coordinated approach; and between the two legal systems 
which have progressed towards a normative approach, namely the US and the EU, only the latter 
reflects entirely the FSB strategy. The US, as an FSB jurisdiction, only endorsed the strategy in 
relation to the second level relating to the enhancement of the investors’ and market participants’ 
capability of conducting internal due diligence and credit risk assessment. In any case, coordination 
must be meant as an exchange of views and experiences in the context of an approach which 
implies redesigning the tie between the public sector and the credit risk assessment tools through 
the reduction of the credit ratings’ supremacy. The picture which has resulted from the review 
conducted by the FSB on the implementation of the two-pronged approach shows a patchwork of 
jurisdictions which deal with the implementation of the strategy by themselves and with no 
connections or exchange of experience with the others. Coordination would be desirable in that as 
Partnoy notes: ‘whenever you are talking about something that have systemic risk concerns you 
need to have global coordination, and this has not been happening, ideally the Dodd Frank 
treatment of CRAs would have been coordinated with Basel and the European approach but it was 
not’.503  
 The FSB did not expect this lack of coordination and, above all, the fact that most of the 
FSB jurisdictions decided not to remove the credit ratings references from their legislation. Indeed, 
these decisions were stigmatised by the FSB as dangerous. Consequently, one of the first results 
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which the analysis of the progress of the strategy brings to attention is a lack of uniformity in the 
implementation which diminishes the expectations of the FSB to have global and coordinated 
efforts towards the reduction of mechanistic and parallel reliance on the credit ratings. In this 
context, however, only the US and the EU can be discussed in terms of progress in the translation of 
the strategy in the aftermath of the respective rules that they set out. A significant aspect which 
emerged from the analysis of the current status of implementation of the respective approaches is 
that the final rules drafted by the US and EU competent authorities did not find the alternatives 
which, in line with the initial interpretation of the rules, should have replaced the credit ratings. 
Specifically, either it is generically stated that the credit ratings should not be the exclusive credit 
risk assessment tools and others must be taken into consideration, or provisional lists of other credit 
risk assessment instruments are provided along with the credit ratings. The result is that the primacy 
of the credit ratings is reduced in legislation, but there can be an incentive in practice to refer 
exclusively to the credit ratings. The credit ratings are still included in legislation in combination 
with other credit risk measurement tools. Importantly, their history and consolidated use in the 
private sector can still play a decisive role and give to them supremacy even if they are referred to 
in legislation as one factor among others for measuring credit risk. Therefore, the implementation of 
the approaches has maintained a de facto risk of giving preference to credit ratings. This, in turn, 
can escalate into over-reliance. This mainly characterises the US progress in which maintaining the 
credit ratings sounds like the compromise between the regulators and the main users of the credit 
ratings who strongly opposed any removal of the credit ratings in furtherance to the Dodd Frank 
Act.  
 As to the EU, it has been seen how in the banking sector the implementation of the strategy 
contrasts with the Basel framework which still relies on the credit ratings. Furthermore, the utility 
of the approach has been questioned in relation to the review that the Commission is expected to 
complete by 2020 under Article 5(c) of CRA Regulation III. As discussed, most of the EU financial 
legislation either do not incorporate credit rating references or the credit ratings are not indicated as 
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the exclusive credit risk assessment tools and, thus, the approach would be nothing new, and 
perhaps not needed to be applied with regard to EU law. These are the limits which have been 
identified as to the first level of the strategy.  
 The second level, on the other hand, has had only partial progress to the extent that only 
institutional, sophisticated investors can afford to deploy resources to develop adequate internal 
credit risk assessment systems. However, there is not progress with regard to small less 
sophisticated investors who do not have the economies of scale to conduct independent credit risk 
assessment. In this case the risk of giving primacy to credit ratings and the possibility of over-
relying remains concrete.  
 All things considered, it may be argued that the global implementation of the two-pronged 
approach may not further progress; the efforts so far analysed in the US and EU do not effectively 
mitigate the risk of over-reliance. Ideally, the credit ratings should have been entirely eliminated. 
However, this was not possible because nothing is as universally accepted as the credit ratings. In 
substance, while the public sector is open to attempting an elimination or reduction of them, the 
private sector is not open to being deprived of them. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEWING THE DEBATE ON OVER-RELIANCE AND ITS 
APPROACHES: IN SEARCH OF DIRECTION 
 
IV.1 INTRODUCTION 
The search for a clearer definition of over-reliance was the focal point to sketch the contours of the 
investigation which has been conducted in the second chapter of this research work. The aim was to 
provide an understanding of the phenomenon and its features in accordance with the line of 
demarcation drawn between two types of over-reliance: 1) over-reliance stemming from the 
hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks; and 2) over-reliance on 
credit ratings in the structured finance sector. Focussing on the issue of over-reliance deriving from 
the legislation, the evolution of the regulatory debate at the international, national and regional 
levels towards the opportune strategies to reduce the risk of undue reliance, has permitted us to 
move to the second part of the work in which the current status of implementation of the normative 
approaches has been discussed. ‘In search of effectiveness’ was the watchword which characterised 
the analysis in the third chapter. Its results are mixed, in the sense that the scenario is one of lights 
and shadows in that, even if the hegemony of the credit ratings in legislation is terminated, their 
presence may still be sufficient to keep the risk of over-reliance latent. At the global level, not all 
the FSB jurisdictions have followed the guidelines incorporated in the set of principles, others have 
not started yet. Consequently, the picture is of a strategy which slows down in its implementation, 
while the only two legal systems in which an implementation progress can be identified and 
discussed were finally unable to eliminate the credit ratings completely.  
 This is the context which introduces the fourth chapter of this thesis in which, among other 
things, a reflection on the future of the strategies can be made. Indeed, as emphasised from the very 
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beginning, the title of this thesis ends up with an interpretative question: ‘quo vadis?’504 This term 
should not be exclusively referred to the present chapter. It encapsulates the overall investigation 
into the phenomenon, its meaning, implications, as well as its regulatory approaches. Now, it will 
be incorporated into the structure of this part of the research in which a new analysis takes place on 
the grounds of the shortcomings that the previous chapter has brought to attention, and which 
undermine the development of the two-pronged approach in accordance with the pace that the 
regulators and policymakers expected from the very beginning. In essence, the context of the 
present analysis requires a new investigation into the debate of over-reliance with the view to 
showing that the approach is not only jeopardised by intrinsic limits but is, per se, the result of a 
debate which appears to be based on abstract, un-evidenced assumptions on the phenomenon of 
over-reliance. Furthermore, by taking an investigation into the risk of over-reliance deriving from 
the structured finance sector, it can be observed that the ensuing regulatory approaches make sense 
in that the debate was based on something concrete which was adequately evidenced. If we apply 
the evidence question to the type of over-reliance which has been analysed throughout this research, 
there will be more than a problem in reaching the same conclusion, that is, that the approaches 
make sense in that they are based on something which is known and has been proved. Obviously, 
investors and market participants are those who are in the best position to acknowledge that they 
over-rely or risk over-relying, since the phenomenon has been introduced as a problem of best 
practice from their part.505 Hence, if over-reliance is an investors’ and market participants’ failure, 
is it realistic to think that they will ever admit such a failure so that the regulatory intervention is 
justified? In this respect, it will be shown that in both areas of over-reliance they deny being biased 
by the credit ratings to the extent that they may finally neglect taking their own credit risk 
assessment and due diligence.  
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 Nonetheless, as to the structured finance sector, it will be highlighted how their denial can 
be overcome because of the crisis facts which, in turn, have received strong evidence. 
Consequently, it can be claimed that over-reliance does exist in the structured finance sector, and 
the elaborated approaches make sense. However, the argument of over-reliance deriving from the 
embedment of the credit ratings into legislation is not adequately supported. It will therefore be 
argued that the elaborated approach is founded on something nebulous. This can be identified as the 
first flaw of the debate, namely not having found any evidence of the phenomenon. This element 
stimulates a further question. Could the phenomenon of over-reliance, as it was introduced by the 
post-crisis debate, have been anticipated long before, and how? The debate is based on a problem of 
best practice by investors and market participants, but it is also essential to see whether the 
regulators have ever thought or were warned that their reliance on the credit ratings might have had 
unintended consequences. In fact, where the credit rating references are now deemed to be the 
source of over-reliance it is to be questioned whether and how this could have been avoided. To this 
end, it will be shown that even in the last century the regulators were warned as to the over-
emphasis that they gave to the credit ratings through their massive inclusion in regulations. Had 
those who voiced the problem been listened to, over-reliance would probably have been 
circumscribed to the structured finance sector within the post-crisis regulatory debate on the CRAs. 
Therefore, a lack of empirical evidence of the phenomenon with regard to the rating-based 
regulation and a lack of attention to some ex-ante warnings resulted in the current debate and its 
approaches with their own limits.  
 Quo vadis, then? This is the question around the future of the approach that this chapter will 
try to answer in the light of the results of the whole discussion. Accordingly, the chapter is 
structured as follows. The evidence of over-reliance relating to the rating-based regulation will be 
discussed vis-à-vis the evidence of the phenomenon stemming from the structured finance sector. 
Secondly, the responsibility of the regulators will be analysed not only from the perspective that 
they should have avoided relying too much on the credit ratings but also in relation to those who 
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warned against their risky reliance and were not listened to. Accordingly, a final reflection on 
possible new ways of development of the current strategy will conclude the chapter. 
  
IV.2 CREDIT RATING REFERENCES AND THE ‘OFFICIAL SEAL OF APPROVAL’: WHAT 
HAS BEEN MISSED? 
 
IV.2.1 CRAs’ market failures and regulatory interventions 
In the context of the regulatory debate which followed the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the operation 
of the CRAs was subjected to intense scrutiny and, as already mentioned, this resulted in new 
legislation, particularly in the US and in the EU. At the EU level, the regulation of CRAs was 
created for the first time in the aftermath of the crisis. Before, the European regulators had stated 
that regulatory intervention on the industry could have only been considered in the presence of 
concrete market failures.506 Significantly, all the post-crisis legislation can find its justification on 
the evidence that something did not work properly within the rating industry. Reports, 
investigations, and the analysis provided by scholars helped give evidence of failures and shape the 
contents of the rules incorporated in the legislation. These rules are based on the asserted etiological 
nexus between some events and the conduct of the CRAs. Some examples will clarify this point 
better.  
 As is known, the massive downgrades applied to such structured products as RMBSs and 
CDOs raised suspicions of CRAs’ failures in the evaluation of their creditworthiness. In the years 
leading up to the financial crisis these products were assigned investment grade ratings by the major 
CRAs. Then, at the outbreak of the crisis, their value fell dramatically when massive downgrades 
were applied.507  CRAs were accused of being aware of the high risk of default associated to 
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mortgaged related securities. Nonetheless, they ignored them so as not to compromise profitable 
business relationships with the originators of the products, in particular, major investment banks.508 
This made the CRAs’ business model, the issuers-pay-model, at the centre of criticisms due to its 
inherent risk of making CRAs’ interests more aligned with the issuers’ interests, rather than with the 
investors’ interests. Consequently, the CRAs were accused of being in conflict of interest with the 
issuers of the structured products they rated. In other words, the credit ratings were inflated in order 
to generate more deals and increase market share. The investigations which followed in the wake of 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis gave sufficient evidence of these facts. In particular, scholars and 
commentators corroborated the arguments against the CRAs’ failures.  
 For instance, by considering the potential of conflict of interest inherent in the issuers-pay-
model and the ‘generous’ credit ratings assigned to structured products Calomiris drew an important 
distinction between inflated and low-quality credit ratings. While the first are the purposeful over-
ratings on rated debts, the second are ratings based on flawed measures of underlined risk.509 To put 
it more simply, inflated ratings stem from possible conflict of interest between the issuers and the 
CRAs, while low quality ratings would result from poor credit rating methodologies. Both inflated 
and low quality credit ratings were then subjected to in-depth analysis in the post-crisis literature. 
For example, with regard to rating inflation, Frenkel showed how the structured finance sector is 
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more prone to rating inflation as opposed to the corporate bonds sector which has never experienced 
downgrades of the same scale as in the former. According to the author, an explanation is to be 
found in the structure of the market in which these two types of securities are issued and traded. The 
corporate bond market involves thousands of issuers who try to raise debt. However, structured 
finance markets may be regarded as niche markets due to the small number of specialised firms and 
large institutional investors acting as issuers. In Frenkel’s analysis this difference is crucial to 
understand and give evidence of the rating inflation that occurred with regard to RMBSs and CDOs 
in comparison with corporate plain bonds.510 According to his study, if a market is characterised by 
a large number of issuers, reputation concerns should work effectively as drivers for CRAs to issue 
reliable ratings to gain a solid reputation.511 A good reputation is considered rewarding in these 
markets since credible ratings reduce information asymmetries between investors and issuers, and 
create a surplus that CRAs can extract. By contrast, markets in which issuers are a small presence 
are more prone to rating inflation. In essence, in these markets issuers are better informed as to the 
credibility of the ratings because they boast vital information on the quality of the deal. Therefore, 
issuers would have more possibility to notice rating inflation and prize it with high fees unlike 
investors who may have awareness of a possible rating inflation once downgrades are applied. 
Consequently, CRAs may have incentives to provide generous ratings to create a double reputation, 
that is, the issuer would recognise that the rating agency released an untruthful credit rating, while 
investors would believe the opposite in the first place.512  
 Other studies flourished and tried to link rating inflation to the phenomenon of rating 
shopping which implies the request of non-binding credit ratings from more agencies and the hire of 
the agency which assigns the most favourable rating.513 In this respect, some authors have showed 
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that the occurrence of rating shopping can lead to inflation even when the ratings are truthful.514 In 
this respect, Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro show how a fair dissemination of information within an 
oligopolistic credit rating market can be compromised by strategic interactions between a rating 
agency and its client.515 According to their model, the debt issuer ‘shops around’ for the most 
favourable rating and, thus, the CRAs’ compensation is subordinated to the selection and 
publication of their ratings. In the event that the credit ratings are inflated, investors will ignore the 
reports issued by that agency in the future.516 In this respect, their model distinguishes between 
sophisticated and naive investors. Whereas the first are able to understand the agencies’ incentives 
for rating inflation but cannot tell, at the time the rating is published, whether or not this is truthful, 
the second simply take credit ratings at face value since they do not understand or consider the 
rationale behind the unfair interaction between the agencies and their clients.517  
 Furthermore, other studies have argued that the CRAs’ business model is an incentive to 
mislead the information that they receive and hence rate bad assets as investment grade;518 while 
other authors identify in the use of ratings for regulating financial institutions a source of potential 
rating inflation. According to Opp, Opp and Harris, these regulations have the effect of making 
investors willing to pay for a label of good rating and, consequently, the value of the information 
that the credit ratings convey is not a matter of concern for them. As a result, CRAs may be tempted 
to simply assign a good rating, rather than acquire costly information and conduct an objective 
credit rating process.519  
 Further studies were also conducted in relation to flawed models and methodologies 
underlining the ratings assigned to structured products. The post crisis literature and investigative 
reports gave evidence that CRAs tried to cope with the increasing volume of issuances by 
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developing new quantitative methods to capture the credit risk of highly sophisticated products. 
These methods included the elaboration of complex models to evaluate the quality of the underlying 
assets’ cash flow and the risk associated to the security.520 However, the methodologies and models 
that the CRAs applied were insufficient to track the worsening conditions in the underlying assets 
backing the RMBSs and CDOs.521 As to the methodologies applied to rate structured products, 
these were flawed because of the limited historical data available in the area of sub-prime 
mortgages. Such a drawback made it difficult to monitor the response of a pool of assets in relation 
to possible worsening in the economic scenarios. CRAs were accused of underestimating the 
correlations in the defaults that might happen in case of serious market downturns.522 Inaccurate 
ratings relating to RMBS and CDOs were partly the result of erroneous assumptions in CRAs’ 
models on correlative risk.523  
 As to the adequacy of the models applied, these proved to be useless because they based 
their predictions on the behaviour of RMBSs on historical data. These models lacked proper 
performance data to rate the subprime as well as the other mortgage products which were structured 
in the years preceding the financial crisis.524 In addition, the models did not take into consideration 
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events such as stagnancy or fall in the housing prices. CRAs did not have relevant data to be used in 
RMBSs and thus they were unprepared to predict defaults and losses when housing prices 
dramatically dropped.525 Finally, the fact that the CRAs, in particular Moody’s and S&P, did not 
own adequate loan performance data for their RMBSs’ models is also traced back to the companies’ 
reluctance to deploy resources to improve their models.526 All things considered, these models were 
useless in relation to the degree of sophistication of structured products and inadequate to reflect the 
credit risk inherent to them.527  
 These studies were the grounding for regulatory interventions since they gave evidence of 
numerous CRAs’ failures and made it opportune to intervene legislatively. Indeed, the rules which 
were issued at the US and EU level addressed, inter alia, the risk of rating inflation due to potential 
conflict of interests and the enhancement of the CRAs’ methodologies to rate structured products. 
Such rules are based on the proven nexus between some crisis events and the CRAs’ conducts. In 
other words, it was given sufficient evidence of CRAs’ conflict of interest and inadequate rating 
methodologies to justify legislative intervention. These events and related rules were then the basis 
for other bodies of rules concerning the CRAs’ civil liability regime and the supervisory 
framework. 528  Importantly, the regulations addressing these failures can be traced back to 
something which has been sufficiently demonstrated, no matter whether the rules which have been 
set out are appropriate or effective to solve the concerned problems. On the other hand, by way of 
applying this discussion to over-reliance, questions are raised as to whether any evidence was found 
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with regard to the assertion that rating based regulations and structured finance ratings discouraged 
investors and market participants to undertake their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. 
 
IV.2.2 Evidence of over-reliance in the structured finance sector 
IV.2.2.1 Delimiting the scope of the investigation 
This research is concerned with over-reliance stemming from the hardwiring of credit ratings into 
legislation and regulatory frameworks. To discuss the evidence of this phenomenon and find a 
justification of the approaches which have been critically analysed so far, it is desirable to conduct a 
broad investigation. This implies discussing the evidence of over-reliance by also considering the 
other area, namely the structured finance sector, which was deemed to be critical as to the risk of 
over-reliance. Regulatory intervention was significant in this sector as well. Numerous rules were 
set out with the view to curbing over-reliance on external credit ratings assigned to complex 
structured products. The rationale behind such rules should be the evidence that the investors and 
the market participants over-relied on the structured finance credit ratings at the expense of their 
own due diligence and credit risk assessment. Hence, the regulatory intervention should be based on 
specific facts and aim to eliminate or reduce the possibility that this can occur again. Finding 
evidence of over-reliance in the structured finance sector means verifying the extent to which 
investors and market participants are negatively influenced by the credit ratings. The same method 
of investigation can then be applied to over-reliance stemming from the hardwiring of the credit 
ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks.  
 To begin with, it is of relevance to have a preliminary illustration of the reforms which have 
been finalised so far to deal with the risk of over-reliance deriving from the structured finance 
sector. As will be shown, the EU boasts the major reforms through CRA Regulation I and III. As 
discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, in the structured finance sector over-reliance on 
external credit ratings may be determined by several factors, other than laxness in conducting due 
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diligence and credit risk assessment. In particular, over-reliance can be the consequence of a lack of 
an adequate understanding of the nature and limits of the structured credit ratings, so that these are 
mischaracterised by the market participants. Accordingly, the approaches elaborated on to reduce 
the risk of over-reliance in such a sector have been based on disclosure of more information with 
the view to improving and facilitating investors’ understanding of the structured products and the 
credit ratings assigned to them. By looking at the regulatory approaches in more detail, it can first 
be observed that they represent a collective effort in which the CRAs have taken part as well, by 
revisiting their structured finance rating methodologies and models. To understand the scale and 
importance of the reforms to reduce over-reliance in this sector, it is desirable to take stock of their 
evolution. In essence, from a legislative perspective, the development of these reforms can be 
analysed from the debate on the opportunity to add a new symbol to the credit ratings assigned to 
structured products to the current disclosure rules set out, in particular, at the EU level.  
 
IV.2.2.2 The additional symbol to the rating assigned to structured products 
At the international levels, the FSB, ESMA and IOSCO proposed to differentiate the credit rating 
for structured products from the rating of other rated instruments either through a new different 
rating scale or by attaching an additional symbol to the rating scale.529 The objective was to make 
investors aware of the characteristics of the products and help them perform more rigorous internal 
analysis on the instruments instead of relying only on the assessment provided by the CRAs. The 
proposal was hotly debated. In the USA, for instance, the SEC sought comments on two possible 
alternatives to tackle over-reliance on structured finance ratings. Firstly, it proposed requiring 
NRSROs, when rating structured products, to produce a report explaining the rating methodologies 
used for them, their differences from the methodologies applied to other instruments, and how the 
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risks relating to debt instruments issued by an asset pool, or as part of any securitisation process, 
differ from the risks inherent to other rated securities. Secondly, NRSROs were required to 
distinguish the rating of structured products through an appropriate symbol or identifier. 530 
Ultimately, the SEC opted for the first proposal, if only because of the strong opposition the other 
alternative received.531 On the other side of the Atlantic, the Commission asked for comments as to 
the possibility of requiring that all published ratings included health warnings informing of the 
specific risks associated with investments in specific assets; alternatively, as to the possibility of 
differentiating the structured credit rating by adding an additional symbol or identifier. Both ideas 
did not encounter any support, in particular the second one. 532  Despite strong opposition, the 
Commission opted for the additional symbol. As opposed to NRSROs, European registered CRAs 
are required to distinguish the credit rating assigned to structured products through an additional 
suffix.  
 Clearly, these are two different ways to solve the same problem, though the criticism was 
the same. In fact, some argued that the additional symbol could work as a stigma of ‘problem 
securities’ for structured products after the financial crisis events. For instance, SIFMA warned to 
distinguish between structured products which performed well and, thus, avoided the massive 
downgrade during the financial crisis and those which worked differently because they were toxic. 
As investors lost confidence in the structured finance market after the debacle, adding a modifier to 
their rating scale might work as a signal of ‘problem securities’ for all types of products 
indifferently. As a result, investors would shy away from structured products and the asset-backed 
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market would inevitably face liquidity problems.533 Others highlighted that the additional symbol 
could be burdensome for regulators and supervisors as they would be forced to adapt their 
regulatory and supervisory guidance to the new ratings framework. 534  The CRAs expressed 
comments along the same line. Some Japanese CRAs, R&I Japan and JCR Japan LtD (JCR) invited 
the Commission to follow the SEC approach and allow the CRAs to choose between the report and 
the different symbol. 535  Fitch and S&P expressed doubts as to the appropriateness of such a 
solution. They underlined that the additional symbol may simply categorise the securities as 
structured, without giving any other information.536 Moody’s views were not dissimilar. Moody’s 
gave its response to the Commission after launching a consultation with market participants. More 
than 200 submissions from institutions representing more than 9 trillion in fixed income assets 
under asset management were received by the agency.537 According to Moody’s, three quarters of 
the respondents opposed any change to the rating scale used for structured products since they 
would not benefit in terms of more information. A suffix attached to the structured finance rating 
would be merely a ‘cosmetic change’. 538  Among other things, Moody’s cautioned against 
introducing a different symbol for structured products because the definition of a ‘structured finance 
product’ was not completely clear yet. Basically, given the lack of a widely accepted definition of 
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the term structured finance, CRAs could have different views on the range of structured products to 
which apply the new rating symbol and this could generate confusion among investors.539  
 Finally, the Commission did not give in to the proposal to differentiate the structured finance 
rating and Article 10, paragraph 3 of CRA Regulation I imposes agencies, when rating structured 
products, to attach a symbol as a distinguisher of the structured finance rating from the rating used 
for other instruments. As a result, what distinguishes the ratings assigned to structured products 
from traditional corporate ratings is a suffix.  
 There are differences among some EU registered CRAs as to the meaning of the ‘structured 
finance’ (‘sf’) symbol. Both Fitch and S&P clarify that the symbol only indicates that the security is 
a structured finance instrument and does not imply any change to the meaning or definition of their 
credit ratings.540  The Canadian agency Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) uses the same 
specification but adds further details by specifying that the symbol does not change the risk of the 
particular structured finance instrument.541 The German agency Kroll Bond Rating Agency (KBRA) 
simply states that it appends an ‘sf’ indicator to ratings assigned to structured finance obligations 
and does not provide any other detail.542 Moody’s provides more details unlike the other registered 
competitors. Firstly, it defines the ratings applied to financial institutions, corporate instruments and 
public sector entities as ‘fundamental ratings’ to distinguish them from structured finance ratings. 
Secondly, it specifies that structured finance ratings can be recognised and differentiated from 
fundamental ratings through the symbol sf which accompanies the letter grade. Thirdly, it clarifies 
the purpose of the sf symbol, that is to say, ‘it should eliminate any presumptions that structured 
finance ratings and fundamental ratings, at the same letter grade level, will behave the same’. 
Fourthly, it explains the meaning of the suffix: ‘the (sf) indicator for structured finance security 
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ratings indicates that otherwise similarly rated structured finance and fundamental securities may 
have different risk characteristics’.543 Investors need to know what the suffix represents by all 
means. To this end, both Fitch and S&P clarify that the meaning of their ratings does not change 
despite the suffix. What the two agencies want to say is that structured credit ratings remain 
forward-looking opinions on creditworthiness which do not represent a recommendation to buy nor 
to sell debt instruments.  
 The benefit of this reform can be seen from several angles. The choice of the same suffix 
(sf) gives uniformity and eliminates any possibility that investors can be misled as it might be 
where CRAs applied different identifiers. In particular, this should eliminate the danger that 
structured credit ratings are understood by investors as covering market and liquidity risks in 
addition to credit risk, as happened in the years leading up to the crisis. Even though there are some 
differences among the agencies, EU registered CRAs took significant efforts to comply with Article 
10(3) and there was finally agreement as to the choice of the same modifier and the structured 
products to be referred to. On the whole, this reform can be regarded as adequate with regard to the 
aim to give investors awareness that the product they are buying is structured and has a level of 
sophistication which is higher than traditional ones. Moreover, the utility of this rule can be seen in 
the fact that it paved the way for introducing additional symbols for other rated instruments. For 
instance, Moody’s, S&P and Fitch attach the suffix ‘mmf’ to distinguish the rating provided for 
money market fund instruments. 544  Consequently, the agencies’ objection that the suffix may 
generate confusion among investors did not catch the point. Instead, the suffix is a valuable tool in 
that it gives awareness of the type of instrument which has been rated. In other words, it helps 
identify the rated instruments and not confuse it with others. Finally, the application of the symbol 
was circumscribed by all CRAs exclusively to the following products: asset-backed securities 
(ABS), residential mortgage-backed-securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed-securities 
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(CMBS), collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), insurance securitizations and asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP).545 This has contributed to make the line between what is and what is not 
a structured product less blurred.  
 
IV.2.2.3 More disclosure of structured finance credit ratings 
Nonetheless, the additional symbol per se was regarded as useful but not exhaustive with regard to 
over-reliance. Within the regulatory dialogue on CRAs which took place in the aftermath of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis at the national, regional and international levels there were numerous 
calls with regard to improving the disclosure on the rating methodologies applied to structured 
products.546 In general, Principle 3.5 of the 2008 revised version of the IOSCO Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (the IOSCO Code) states that the CRAs ‘should publish 
sufficient information about their procedure, methodologies and assumptions so that outside parties 
can understand how a rating was arrived at by the CRA’.547 With specific regard to structured 
products, the 2008 IOSCO Code requires the CRAs to provide investors with sufficient information 
about its loss and cash flow analysis so that they understand the basis of the CRAs ratings assigned 
to them and, thus, the risk of over-reliance may be reduced. CRAs should also disclose ‘the degree 
to which they analyse how sensitive a rating of a structured finance product is to changes in the 
CRAs underlining assumptions’.548  
 The implementation of these guidelines was particularly strong at the EU level. These 
principles constituted the benchmark on which the disclosure rules set out in the European CRA 
regulations were based. Article 8 of CRA Regulation I requires CRAs to disclose to the public the 
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methodologies, models and key rating assumptions that they use in their credit rating activities. 
Then Annex I, point II, Section D, mirrors the IOSCO Principle 3.5(a) which envisages disclosure 
of loss, cash-flow analysis and changes in the structured credit ratings. When rating structured 
products, the EU regulation imposes CRAs to accompany the disclosure of methodologies, models 
and key rating assumptions with guidance which explains assumptions, parameters, limits and 
uncertainties surrounding the models and rating methodologies used in such credit ratings, 
including simulation of stress scenarios undertaken by the agencies when establishing the ratings.549 
These rules were useful as well, since they prompted the agencies to revisit and improve their 
methodologies with the view to providing the users of credit ratings with adequate understanding 
and literacy as to the nature of the ratings assigned to structured products. For example, DBRS set 
out appropriate disclosure policies regarding the risks inherent to structured finance transactions. 
Rating procedures and methodologies for structured products were enhanced and proper 
mechanisms to keep them updated were elaborated as well.550 Fitch improved the transparency of 
rating assumptions through the publication of a series of additional ‘what if’ scenarios for major 
asset classes, elaborated appropriate electronic tools enabling better surveillance and cross-
transaction comparisons as to structured finance ratings, and enhanced the rating outlooks at the 
tranche level across structured finance transactions in certain markets. 551  Moody’s undertook 
several initiatives to enhance analytical methodologies with regard to the rating of structured 
products and to provide more clarity as to the characteristics of structured finance ratings.552 In a 
similar fashion, S&P adopted measures to improve the methodologies and surveillance processes 
with regard to structured products. 553  In addition to internal measures, all the major CRAs 
elaborated programs to contribute to the better understanding of their structured finance ratings and 
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therefore improve market education. Moreover, CRAs’ websites can be easily accessed to have 
information on these specific credit ratings. To this end, explanatory guidance is provided and can 
be downloaded as well.  
 At the EU level, however, efforts are still ongoing through the new rules of CRA Regulation 
III. In this context, it is worth mentioning Article 8(a) which aims at enhancing the investors’ 
independence in their investment decisions by requiring the issuer, the originator, and the sponsor 
of a structured finance instrument to disclose information on the credit quality and performance of 
the individual underlying assets of the instrument, the structure of the securitisation transaction, the 
cash flows and any collateral supporting a securitisation exposure, as well as any information that it 
is necessary to conduct comprehensive and well informed stress tests on the cash flows and 
collateral values supporting the underlying exposure.554 This is the overview of the reforms to 
reduce the risk of over-reliance on structured credit ratings. Major efforts have been observed at the 
EU level, in which the new rules of the CRA Regulation III are still under implementation, while 
the CRA Regulation I rules have had significant practical results since their incorporation. The 
picture is one of useful reforms. However, it is to be wondered the extent to which these reforms are 
backed up with adequate evidence of the investors’ over-reliance on credit ratings in the structured 
finance sector. 
 
IV.2.2.4 In search of evidence 
As the reforms have been illustrated above, it is now necessary to find a justification of them 
through an investigation aimed at giving evidence of the risk of over-reliance on credit ratings in the 
sector in question and, above all, of the fact that investors and market participants had unduly relied 
on the structured credit ratings during the pre-crisis period. To this end, it is worth contrasting the 
results of two studies on the ratings of structured products and the way investors perceived them. 
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Even though they addressed the same topic, these studies were conducted at different times; before 
and after the 2007-2009 financial crisis.  
 It can be observed that, prior to the outbreak of the financial turmoil, external credit ratings 
were not the exclusive indicators on which investors could base their decisions to purchase 
structured products.555 It is, in fact, pointed out in the pre-crisis survey that investors had a proper 
use of external credit ratings to complement their own analysis. Specifically, investors relied on the 
agencies’ pre-sale reports in the primary market as valuable sources providing preliminary 
information with regard to the features, strength, and weakness of the structure. Furthermore, they 
relied on the models CRAs used to stress-test the assigned ratings with more conservative 
assumptions. Such models were complementary to the investors’ own assessment and were 
regarded as valuable information to understand whether more credit enhancement was necessary for 
the structure. Credit ratings, as this survey revealed, were considered not the exclusive but just a 
second or third independent opinion whose influence was not decisive for the investment decision, 
given the development or the possibility, for some investors, to exploit in-house credit assessment 
techniques for all the components of the structure relating to the products they might have 
purchased.556  
 The pre-crisis survey highlighted the investors’ possibility and capability to conduct their 
own credit risk analysis on structured products. Speaking of over-reliance, the risk might have been 
on those small investors unable to develop their own credit risk assessment models. Hence, it can be 
submitted that if investors are able to understand the specificities and risks carried by structured 
products, they will also have awareness of the fact that these risks are different than those inherent 
in traditional debt instruments. At least, this is what the survey claimed: ‘investors seemed to be 
fully aware that structure finance poses different and more complex risks than ordinary credit 
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investments’.557 In more detail, mark-to-market investors, investing in mezzanine finance, are seen 
as having the necessary capabilities to do their own due diligence, while those investing in senior 
tranches may tend to rely more on the credit quality analysis provided by the CRAs.558 However, 
this is not a serious problem, the survey noted. The growing level of sophistication and knowledge 
by the community as to the nature and risk of financial products limits the investors’ risk of over-
reliance on credit ratings. For the majority of investors, the ratings assigned to structured products 
are accordingly ‘one check in a broader due diligence and risk management process’.559 The survey 
explained the relationship between investors and credit ratings not in terms of over-reliance but as 
reliance due to the inclusion of credit ratings into investment mandates or internal risk and capital 
management system, and to the ‘value creation’ by credit ratings in the structuring of opinions and 
third-party assessment, information provision, deal surveillance and market development in the 
structured finance context.560  
 Clearly, the pre-crisis survey portrayed a scenario that is not negative; in which investors 
rely on ratings as complementary sources of information to their own due diligence. Based on the 
scenario provided by the survey, we should conclude that investors and market participants would 
not over-rely. They would have a proper understanding of the risks inherent to structured products 
and the capability to perform their own credit risk analysis. This would be sufficient to reduce the 
risk of over-reliance or, better said, we should argue that the risk of over-reliance on external credit 
ratings does not exist in the structured finance sector. However, the 2007-2009 crisis revealed a 
different picture. As the first survey affirms the market participants’ independence from the 
structured finance credit ratings, what went wrong during the financial crisis? This is the question 
that the second survey sought to answer.561  
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IV.2.2.5 Finding the evidence 
The ‘value added’ by the CRAs in the rating of structured products emphasised by the pre-crisis 
survey was challenged by the evidence of inadequate rating methodologies, insufficient historical 
data for the assessment of the credit risk inherent to the products and conflict of interest issues 
which led to inflated ratings. As is widely known, these were the CRAs’ shortcomings. In any case, 
this is the context in which the second, post-crisis survey took place. The nature and limits of 
structured finance credit ratings and the investors’ and market participants’ approach to them fell 
under scrutiny as well. Vis-à-vis the first survey, it is desirable to evaluate whether the second one 
noted a change in the investors’ attitude towards credit ratings. In short, whether they over-relied on 
them to the extent that they neglected their own independent due diligence and credit risk 
assessment. 
  For investment managers, the survey noted that the ratings were only useful in order to 
narrow the field of choice to meet a given investment objective but not key drivers in choosing an 
investment in structured products. Likewise for issuers: ratings were an important requirement for 
marketing structured products to a broader investor base but not decisive for selling them to 
sophisticated investors such as hedge funds or pension fund managers.562 This appears to be in line 
with the pre-crisis survey which portrayed a scenario in which investors and market participants 
seemed not to be critically biased by the credit ratings.   
An important aspect emerges from the analysis of the two surveys, which is of significant 
relevance to the topic of this research. Both the surveys brought to attention the fact that investors 
and market participants did not admit that they over-relied before and after the crisis. They even 
denied the potential risk of unduly relying on the external credit ratings. This stimulates reflections 
and numerous questions. Should we conclude that in the structured finance sector over-reliance 
does not exist and that so far attention has been devoted to a false phenomenon? Furthermore, in 
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accordance with the results of the two surveys, should we conclude that there is not sufficient 
evidence of over-reliance so as to justify all the regulatory interventions which have been elaborated 
consequently? The answers are negative.  
 To start with, the two surveys are useful documents which help understanding how the 
structured finance sector works and, above all, the specificities of the credit ratings assigned to 
them. In both surveys, the conclusions on the degree of influence of the credit ratings and, thus, on 
the possibilities of over-relying were based on interviews with the investors who finally declared 
that they are not negatively biased by the credit ratings. This equals to a denial of over-reliance. In 
turn, this means that in the eye of the investors and market participants the phenomenon does not 
exist. In the first place, this would lead to the conclusion that the regulatory reforms aimed at 
addressing the phenomenon in the structured finance sector do not make sense if those who are 
regarded as over-reliant deny being as such. In reality, during the years leading up to the crisis 
investors did over-rely on the ratings assigned to the structured products. Consequently, the risk of 
over-reliance exists in the structured finance sector and the regulatory approaches are more than 
justified.  
This assertion is backed up by the crisis facts whose evidence and concreteness is stronger 
than the investors’ denial of over-relying. Sufficient evidence was found as to a lax approach on the 
ratings assigned to structured finance and, hence, as to the fact that the investors did not perform an 
adequate analysis of the risk characteristics of the products.563 Moreover, as stressed in the second 
chapter of this thesis there was not only imprudence but also ignorance on the specificities of the 
structured credit ratings and impossibility of conducting an accurate analysis due to scarce 
information on the products and their ratings. All this has been sufficiently demonstrated. There is 
evidence that those who invested in highly rated structured products had less information than those 
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who invested in low-rated securities.564 ESMA confirmed this drawback: ‘either the information 
provided was not sufficient to form an educated opinion and perform a risk assessment of deals, or 
investors did not do their own homework correctly, or both’.565 The same can be argued with 
specific regard to structured credit ratings: either the information provided by the CRAs was not 
sufficient to help investors understand the characteristics and limits of the structured finance ratings 
or they misunderstood the nature of these ratings.  
 The post-crisis reports, investigations and scholars’ studies on the structured finance sector 
and relating credit ratings identified the investors’ over-reliance, they brought to attention the risk 
of over-reliance, and the necessity of regulatory intervention to mitigate its effects. These data 
contradict any investors’ assertion that they did not over-rely or that the risk does not exist for them. 
Undoubtedly, an admission of over-reliance by them would help understand better the phenomenon 
and the suitability of any related approach. However, as the second survey underlined, the 
possibility of such an admission is somehow unrealistic. Notwithstanding, the crisis facts were 
stronger than the investors’ and market participants’ denial. Their lack of admission can be 
contradicted through the evidence of the approach that they finally had towards the structured 
products and their credit ratings. All things considered, there is sufficient evidence of over-reliance 
in the structured finance context so that it can be affirmed that the phenomenon exists in this sector 
and its potential risk must be reduced through the action of the regulators. Such an action is more 
than necessary where we consider that, despite evidence, investors would not admit the possibility 
of over-relying on the credit ratings assigned to these complex products. This makes the sector in 
question very critical and the reforms which have been undertaken until now are consistent with 
their objectives and fully justified. 
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IV.2.3 Evidence of over-reliance on credit rating legislative references 
 
IV.2.3.1 Investors’ and market participants’ view 
The same investigative path is now to be conducted in relation to the central topic of this research, 
namely over-reliance stemming from the hardwiring of the credit ratings into legislation and 
regulatory frameworks. In this regard, the approaches have already been analysed and constructed 
in the previous parts. Now, the evidence of the rationale behind them is to be discussed. 
Specifically, it is necessary to verify whether there is evidence that the hardwiring of the credit 
ratings has been perceived (or has the potential of being perceived) as an ‘official seal of approval’ 
of creditworthiness, so that investors and market participants neglected their own credit risk 
assessment and due diligence. To this end, the investigation aims to analyse the extent to which 
those who were required by law to use the credit ratings as main parameters for creditworthiness 
could be, or are, effectively biased by an investment grade rating requirement. 
  Significantly, interesting reflections can be made in relation to investment managers. As 
already explained, investment managers have investment mandates which may limit investments to 
top rated debt instruments. 566  In the occurrence of downgrades, the shift from investment to 
speculative grade may force the investment managers to sell the debt instruments which are below 
the investment grade threshold. During downturn periods, cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours 
may also occur and have impacts on the financial stability. These problems are associated with 
over-reliance on external credit ratings and they are accordingly supposed to be addressed through 
the guideline provided by FSB Principle III.3. This principle invites investment managers and 
institutional investors not to rely mechanistically on the credit ratings for assessing the 
creditworthiness of assets. The principle applies to the full range of investment managers and 
institutional investors, including money market funds, pension funds, collective investment 
schemes, insurance companies, and securities firms irrespective of the size and level of 
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sophistication of investment managers and institutional investors. 567  This guideline has been 
transposed into the new EU directives on IORP, UCITS and AIFM; while in the US, in accordance 
with Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act, amendments have been applied to rule 2-a7 which 
required investment managers to hold in their portfolio investment grade rated instruments. Given 
the context and the normative framework, it is to be assessed which effect credit ratings can have on 
investment managers. In other words, do they over-rely or perceive the risk of over-relying?  
 The basis for this discussion is a recent survey on the use of the credit ratings in investment 
management in the Europe and US. This survey identified four main purposes why investment 
managers refer to the external credit ratings: 1) to set minimum credit quality guidelines for bond 
purchasers; 2) to set maximum portfolio proportions by rating classes; 3) to set maximum single 
security exposures by rating category; and 4) to set retention guidelines for downgraded securities 
that no longer meet eligibility guidelines.568 Significantly and consistently with the analysis done in 
the second chapter of the thesis the survey noted that, between the EU and the US, the embedment 
of the credit ratings into investment guidelines is more prevalent in the US than in Europe. 
However, both areas have in common a major use of the credit ratings in investment mandates for 
bond purchasers and less for portfolio quality disclosure.569 Interestingly, the survey revealed that 
the investment managers used the external credit ratings because clients asked them, rather than 
because they were forced by regulation. A component of herd behaviour had a role as well. In fact, 
almost 20% of the investment managers in Europe and the US declared that they used the credit 
ratings simply because other managers did it.570 Finally, the survey shed light on how investment 
managers react in case of downgrades. With regard to this aspect, the survey draws mainly on the 
results of a previous study. In this respect, Haight et al found that 75% of investment managers did 
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not have any provision dealing with the rating downgrades. More specifically, it was highlighted 
that there was not uniformity of results with regard to the reactions to downgrades. While some 
fund managers declared that they usually conduct an internal review, others did not specify any 
internal procedure in case of rating downgrades.571  
 On the whole, both studies provided relevant data on the use of the credit ratings in the 
investment strategies of investment funds. Nonetheless, it must be observed that these results were 
brought forward before the 2007-2009 financial crisis occurred. The massive downgrades of 
financial products purchased in the years leading up to the turmoil and the consequent huge sell-off 
forced a re-discussion of many things. The use of the external credit ratings by investment managers 
and the cliff-edge effects associated to downgrades opened the debate at the national, international 
and regional levels with the view to finding suitable approaches to deal with these issues. For 
example, at the EU level, before the endorsement of the FSB Principles, other strategies were 
discussed to address the risk of over-reliance. While revising the European legislative framework on 
CRAs, the Commission asked for views as to the possibility of introducing a flexibility clause in 
investment mandates and policies. The purpose of this clause was to allow investment managers to 
temporarily deviate from the external credit ratings and to oblige them to set out measures with the 
view to reducing the part of portfolios that is only based on external credit rating.572 The proposal 
did not encounter any support from the majority of respondents. At that time, the UK FSA, HM 
Treasury and the Bank of England (the UK Authorities) stressed that certain types of institutional 
mandates state maximum and minimum exposures to particular credit ratings. According to the UK 
authorities, this already allowed a degree of flexibility if limits were breached for technical reasons 
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such as a downgrade, in that the manger is expected to modify the portfolio and bring it back into 
line in the event of rating changes.573   
 Similar views against the idea of introducing a flexibility clause and the obligation to reduce 
the reliance of portfolios on external ratings were expressed by other public authorities. For 
instance, the Czech National Bank (CNB),574 the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands and the 
Netherlands Authority for Financial Markets (Dutch Ministry of Finance), 575  the Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance,576 the Swedish Ministry of Finance, the Riskbank and the Swedish Financial 
Supervisory Authority (the Swedish authorities)577 warned against the idea of imposing limits or 
restrictions on investment mandates which are bilateral contracts between mangers and investors 
and are based on the specific risk profile/appetite of the investors. 578  Therefore, as the UK 
authorities stated further: ‘due care must be taken in considering any rules in this area, as this could 
have a significant impact on smaller investors that do not have the resources to perform all their 
research internally’.579 Ultimately, the proposal did not find any development in CRA Regulation 
III, whose provisions relating to over-reliance simply reproduced the FSB principle of not relying 
mechanistically on credit ratings for credit risk assessment purposes.  
 With regard to the investment managers, such a principle means not to be unduly biased by 
the credit ratings in their investment strategies and to perform a degree of independent credit risk 
analysis coupled with the one provided by the credit ratings and the other factors. But are 
investment managers negatively influenced by the credit ratings so that they neglect their 
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independent credit risk analysis? The abovementioned surveys helped clarify why credit ratings are 
used and why they are important for investment managers. Now, it is essential to verify the extent 
to which a triple A negatively influences them. Specifically, does an investment grade status 
legislatively required have the effect of diverting investment managers’ attention away from their 
own due diligence and credit analysis? Financial crisis reports claimed that it happened, but unlike 
the structured finance sector, there is not concrete evidence. This can be concluded by assessing 
what investment managers said with regard to their relationship with the credit ratings. In this 
regard, one of the respondents to the Commission consultation on over-reliance, the Association of 
British Insurers (ABI), underlined that ‘the degree to which some institutional investors relied too 
heavily on ratings is rarely, if ever, objectively evidenced’.580 All the other investment managers 
involved in the consultations echoed this statement. They emphasised that their use of credit ratings 
is in line with the basic principle that the major CRAs have always stressed in their disclaimers, that 
is to say, credit ratings must work as inputs for credit quality assessment and not as the exclusive 
benchmark.581 They denied any negative influence deriving by investment mandates, credit rating 
references, or by-law prescriptions.  
 There was a similar response in the US during the debate on the amendments to be applied 
to rule 2a-7 under Section 939A. In this respect, it is worth reporting some of the most significant 
comments as to the perception of ‘seal of approval’ of credit rating references in legislation:  
 
[…] we are not aware of any evidence to support the contention that the frequent 
reference to NRSRO ratings in the rules promulgated under the 1933 Act, the 1934 
Act, the Investment Company Act or the Advisers Act contributed in any way to 
investor over-reliance on credit ratings, or that these references are or were taken as 
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any sort of ‘seal of approval’ by the Commission as to the quality or accuracy of 
those ratings for any given security.582  
  
This view has been recently remarked in relation to the consultation launched by the IOSCO on 
good practices for the reduction of reliance on the external credit ratings in asset management. The 
IOSCO launched its consultation in accordance with the goal of the FSB set of principles to reduce 
mechanistic and parallel reliance on the credit ratings. In particular, the consultation is in line with 
the FSB’s exhortation for standard setters and regulators to take opportune steps to translate the 
principles into appropriate policy actions. To this end, the IOSCO tried to investigate the extent to 
which its Member jurisdictions’ regulation refer to the external credit ratings for investment 
managers and whether there is the potential of over-reliance.583  Among the best practices the 
IOSCO suggested and sought consultation, it is worth underlining that the first ones are the 
watchwords which support the final rules at the US and EU level, namely: 1) investment managers 
have to perform their own credit quality determinations with regard to the financial instruments they 
want to invest in, and they have to monitor their credit quality throughout the holding period; 2) 
external credit ratings may be, inter alia, one element that the asset managers’ internal assessment 
process can refer to, but they must not constitute the exclusive factor underpinning the internal 
credit risk analysis. Even though there is overall support for proposed best practices aiming at 
enhancing credit risk assessment capabilities so as to perform independent investment decisions, all 
the consultants affirmed that they have always put into practice the abovementioned two principles.  
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 To this end, it is interesting to analyse what the Asset Management Group (AMG) of the 
Security Industry and Financial Market Association (SIFMA) pointed out. Firstly, they declared 
that they do not rely mechanistically on the credit ratings to make their investment decisions. 
Though the external credit ratings are useful credit risk assessment guidelines, they are not the only 
variable asset that managers evaluate when dealing with the clients’ investment mandates. On the 
contrary, asset managers also consider a variety of other factors. Clearly, the zeitgeist of the denial 
of the risk of over-relying can be identified before, after the financial crisis, and during the debate 
concerning the implementation of the elaborated strategies. However, reference has been made to 
the SIFMA’s comments because there is another significant aspect that they brought to light. 
SIFMA also stressed that asset managers are not subject to cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours in 
their use of the credit ratings because they pursue different investment objectives. Furthermore, 
investors’ goals are different and asset managers try to offer products and services matching the 
objectives of a wide variety of investors. Accordingly, they do not seek the same investment 
opportunities for all their clients and do not react the same way to market events such as rating 
downgrades. Based on these arguments, SIFMA regarded as incorrect the assumption that asset 
managers rely mechanistically on the external credit ratings; and as exaggerated the claim of cliff-
edge effects and herd behaviours in the industry.584   
Reflecting on this position, it can be said that the SIFMA’s denial seems to weaken the 
fundamentals of over-reliance. In particular, the FSB first claimed that cliff-edge effects and herd 
behaviours are exacerbated by over-reliance on the external credit ratings and that rating-based 
regulation is the source of this problem. The same arguments were used at the EU level to justify 
the endorsement of the FSB principles and their transposition into the CRA Regulation III 
framework. Conversely, not only did SIFMA deny using the credit ratings as exclusive benchmarks 
for assessing creditworthiness, but that they are also not badly influenced by the rating downgrades. 
Their denial as to the cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours should be analysed in more detail with 
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specific reference to the asset management industry, and maybe there might be room to contradict 
their assertion. However, this denial has marginal importance in relation to how they approach the 
credit ratings. SIFMA declared that they use the credit ratings as one among other factors. This is 
sufficient for SIFMA to deny that asset managers are at risk of over-reliance since they have always 
pursued the approach which is now encouraged and implemented at the normative level. 
 
IV.2.3.2 Rating-based regulation versus the structured finance sector: the missed evidence 
Given these results, it is possible to reach a conclusion in comparison with the preceding analysis 
concerning over-reliance on the structured finance ratings. In the structured finance sector over-
reliance was deemed to have happened in the years leading up to the financial crisis due to the high 
level of sophistication and complexity of these products. Poor disclosure of information on them 
and, above all, on the specificities of the credit ratings assigned to them caused excessive reliance 
by investors and market participants. As stressed, the approaches which have been set out in this 
respect make sense because the risk of over-reliance in the structured finance sector can be regarded 
as real and critical in accordance with the increasing level of sophistication of the structured 
products. This argument can be supported despite the investors’ denial of over-reliance. Such a 
denial has been overcome by unquestionable circumstances of over-reliance. Conversely, the same 
cannot be said in relation to the over-reliance deriving from the embedment of the credit ratings into 
legislation. There is no empirical evidence to support the assertion that the credit rating references 
in legislation weakens the due diligence and credit risk analysis that the investors are supposed to 
perform.585 The investors’ denial as to their perception of the credit ratings as an official seal of 
approval of credit quality sounds like a strong negation of the existence of the phenomenon within 
the area of the rating-based regulation. In fact, their denial cannot be contradicted through opposite, 
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specific facts like in the structured finance area. This means that it is also difficult to discuss the 
potential risk of over-relying if specific facts cannot be identified and there is not helpful admission 
by those who are indicated as over-reliant either.  
 Significantly, their denial has a different connotation than the denial discussed in the 
structured finance sector. The difference can be understood by referring to the elements which 
characterise the phenomenon in the respective areas and which have been fixed in the second 
chapter of the thesis. While in relation to the rating-based regulation over-reliance is more a matter 
of laxness than ignorance, the latter characterises the risk of over-reliance in the structured finance 
sector. By comparing these two aspects, it can be argued that it is easier to admit ignorance rather 
than laxness.586 Whereas, the former can be a guiltless knowledge gap which can be closed by 
enhancing the investors’ education and by requiring more disclosure to the issuers of the structured 
products and to the involved CRAs, the latter is something that the users of ratings, in particular, 
large institutional investors cannot afford to admit. For example, in the case of investment 
managers, they have responsibility as to the management of investors’ portfolios and they will 
hardly admit any negative influence deriving from a rating-based rule. In short, admitting to 
perceive credit rating references as a seal of approval would be equal to admit that they feel 
discouraged from conducting their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. This, in turn, 
means being lax in their credit risk analysis. As illustrated, none of the above mentioned asset 
managers even admitted the potential of this risk as they claimed that they use credit ratings 
properly and not as an exclusive factor for the assessment of creditworthiness. The possibility of 
admitting laxness cannot exist for them, as well as for the other institutional investors who make 
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large use of the credit ratings. Unlike in the structured finance sector, there should not be, in their 
view, any gap to be closed.587  
 All things considered, the debate on over-reliance deriving from the rating-based regulations 
and the consequent normative approaches are based on a nebulous, not evidenced phenomenon. 
Consequently, it is difficult to regard as sensible an approach which deletes credit rating references 
and encourages more independent credit risk analysis; especially, when those who should be the 
beneficiary of such an approach have argued that there is no need to delete the credit rating 
references because they do not perceive them as seals of approval of creditworthiness from the part 
of the regulators; and underline that they have always performed independent credit analysis. For 
these reasons, this principle does not represent anything new to them. 
 
IV.3 ANTICIPATING THE POST-CRISIS DEBATE ON OVER-RELIANCE 
 
IV.3.1 The CRAs’ message to the regulators 
 
IV.3.1.1 The regulators’ over-emphasis on credit ratings 
It may be objected, however, that ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’ (Carl Sagan-
Astronomer).588 In any case, the purpose of this discussion was not to show whether over-reliance 
deriving from the credit rating references exists or not. Rather, to point out that the approaches 
elaborated to tackle this risk of over-reliance were not ex ante underpinned by sufficient 
investigation aimed at identifying concretely the danger of the tie between the credit ratings and 
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legislation, as well as specific cases of misperception by investors and market participants. These 
investigations would have been worthy and crucial, if only because during the consultation periods 
for finalising the normative approaches both the US and the EU commentators denied any negative 
influence deriving from the credit rating references. Had these positions been taken into account, 
the supposed phenomenon might have been evaluated in a different way, and perhaps other 
strategies might have been elaborated. Undoubtedly, this is something which the regulatory debate 
at the national, international and regional levels missed once the discussion on over-reliance took 
place and finally developed into the examined reforms. Furthermore, if the risk of over-reliance is 
traced back to the credit rating references embedded in legislation, in particular, to the role given to 
the credit ratings as main parameters for the assessment of credit quality, it is to be questioned the 
extent to which regulators should bear responsibility for the problem. As detailed in the second 
chapter, massive references to the credit ratings were particularly acute in the US regulators, while 
in the EU the use of the credit ratings is mainly within the banking regulation.589 In any case, over-
reliance should not be measured in relation to the quantity of the credit rating references. Even one 
reference in which the credit ratings are the exclusive benchmarks for assessing creditworthiness 
can be potentially dangerous and discourage the market participants from doing their own due 
diligence and credit risk assessment. As this is the way in which the phenomenon has been 
introduced at the beginning of the post crisis regulatory debate, it is to be considered whether 
regulators may have facilitated this risk and if so, how.  
 To begin with, it must be observed that the debate has always discussed over-reliance as an 
issue of best practice from the part of the investors and the market participants. The fact that now 
the debate underlines that the source of the problem lies in the hardwiring of the credit ratings into 
legislation may be interpreted as an implicit admission of responsibility by regulators in 
contributing to the risk of the investors’ misperception of the ratings as official seals of approval. 
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However, so far attention has been mainly devoted to the investors’ and market participants’ 
approach to the credit rating references, rather than to discuss possible others’ responsibilities. With 
specific regard to the regulators, it is necessary to go beyond the obvious assertion that they should 
have avoided facilitating the hardwiring of the credit ratings into legislation. Rather, it must be 
wondered whether regulators have ever considered that they were giving too much weight to the 
credit ratings in their legislation.  
 This line of investigation cannot be avoided. It arises from the fact that during the 
consultations launched within the post-crisis debate on over-reliance, the CRAs stressed that they 
have always warned against the undue use of the credit ratings in legislation.590 This statement is 
the basis to investigate and analyse why this use was not appropriate, which warnings were given in 
this regard, and the extent to which regulators listened to or ignored them. To this end, attention 
must be concentrated on the pre-crisis period. In the first part of the thesis it has been highlighted 
that over-reliance started being introduced only in the context of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. 
This conclusion was reached by analysing the debates on the CRAs which took place in the US with 
regard to the NRSRO status, while in the EU no regulatory attention was given until the crisis. 
Within the SEC consultations on the NRSRO status, a comment released by Moody’s in 1994 is 
relevant here. Even though the subject was the NRSRO status and its possible implications as a 
barrier to entry for new CRAs, Moody’s took the opportunity to express its view on the use of the 
credit ratings in the US financial legislation. It made specific reference to some rules and explained 
why the inclusion of credit ratings was not opportune. Its comments are of interest and worthy of 
discussion.591  
 
IV.3.1.2 Misunderstanding the nature of credit ratings 
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Firstly, Moody’s referred to some of the forms promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933 and 
1934. For instance, Form S-3 is available for registration of certain offers and sales of non-
convertible ‘investment grade securities’ (General Instruction I.B.2.) and ‘investment grade’ asset-
backed securities (General Instruction I.B.5.).592 Forms F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4 and 20-F all refer to the 
registration of offers and sales of securities by foreign private issuers. Each form grants some 
reductions in required disclosure where the registrant is issuing non-convertible, ‘investment grade’ 
debt.593 Form F-9 is relating to the registration of ‘investment grade’ debt or ‘investment grade’ 
preferred securities of certain Canadian issuers. For purposes of Form F-9, the term ‘investment 
grade’ includes ratings issued by Canadian rating agencies as well as by agencies recognised as 
NRSROs. In general, the Form permitted a registrant to use standards of disclosure which were set 
out in Canadian securities regulation.594 At that time, Moody’s had already suggested to remove the 
credit rating references and, in some cases, had also proposed some alternatives. To start with, 
Moody’s urged revising the instructions relating to Form S-3 to eliminate the ‘investment grade’ 
criterion and substitute this with a float test.595 Similarly, for Forms F-1, F-2, F-3, F-4 and 20-F 
Moody’s encouraged eliminating the reference to ‘investment grade’ debt provided by NRSROs. 
Likewise, with regard to Form F-9.   
According to Moody’s the credit rating references incorporated in all these forms had the 
effect of giving them an undue status, namely as a substitute for disclosure. Specifically, the 
regulator used external credit ratings as a transactional eligibility criterion. In a nutshell, the 
inclusion of credit ratings was based on the assumption that if a security has an ‘investment grade’ 
rating, this should be regarded as an adequate, exhaustive information about the security. 
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Significantly, Moody’s underlined the incorrectness of such a reasoning and stated the same 
principle that the current reforms on over-reliance have now crystallised: ‘for many types of debt 
securities, investors must consider important factors beyond merely interest rates and credit ratings’. 
Hence, already a rating agency had warned not to give the credit ratings any undue or exclusive 
role.596 
 
IV.3.1.3 Credit ratings as an exclusive benchmark for determining safe investments 
Secondly, Moody’s referred to rule 3a-7 of the Investment Company Act. As already explained, 
Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act provides a safe harbour for issuers of ‘investment 
grade’ asset-backed securities. Also in this context, Moody’s had stressed that the availability of the 
safe harbour depended exclusively on the rating assigned to any issue of asset-backed securities. 
Also, it pointed out how such exclusiveness ran counter to the purpose of the Investment Company 
Act. Indeed, the SEC had always acknowledged that the Act did not aim to protect investors from 
credit risk, but rather to prevent abusive practices such as self-dealing and overreaching by insiders, 
misevaluation of assets and inadequate asset coverage.597 In this regard, Moody’s stressed that the 
credit ratings only referred to the credit dimension of risk and were not concerned with the abusive 
practice that the Act aimed at addressing. Consequently, the agency brought to attention how the 
inclusion of the credit ratings in rule 3a-7 could have made them be regarded as measures of overall 
safety. Accordingly, deletion of the reference was encouraged so as to capture more appropriately 
the SEC’s concerns regarding the abovementioned abusive practices.598 
 Thirdly, Moody’s warned against how some other rules of the Investment Company Act 
used credit ratings as a means to allow otherwise impermissible conducts by dealers and investment 
companies. To this end, reference was made to rule 10f-3. As already explained, Rule 10f-3 of the 
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Investment Company Act freed certain purchases of securities from the prohibition under Section 
10(f). Subsection (c) of Rule 10f-3 extended the exemption to certain municipal securities that were 
either top rated by NRSROs or if the issuer had not been in continuous existence for at least three 
years, that were rated in one of the three highest rating categories.599 Again, well before that the 
financial crisis forced revisiting the role of the credit ratings into legislation, Moody’s expressed 
concerns as to the clear implication of the 1994 Release, namely that the rating standard used in 
Rule 10f-3(c) was mistakenly intended to serve as a measure of overall investment quality. The 
agency remarked that the ratings did not provide such a measure and should not be given any undue 
status. Accordingly, it suggested removing the rating standard from subsection (c) of Rule 10f-3 and 
to eliminate the exemption for securities rated at certain levels.600 
 
IV.3.1.4 Risk of mischaracterising the limits of credit ratings 
Fourthly, attention was devoted to the Net Capital Rule under the Exchange Act and its use of 
external credit ratings in connection with the determination of haircuts applied to securities in the 
calculation of a broker-dealer’s required net capital. Under the framework of the Net capital Rule, 
securities that had received an investment grade rating could receive a more favourable (smaller) 
haircut. 
 Even though the use of the credit ratings under the Net Capital Rule addressed some degree 
of credit risk, Moody’s noted that the rule primary focus was price volatility and liquidity concerns. 
In fact, the haircut system is predicated on the notion that securities held by a broker-dealer can be 
rapidly liquidated to raise cash. The agency observed that in this context the risk could be the 
perception that credit ratings issued by NRSROs addressed price volatility and liquidity in addition 
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to credit risk. Accordingly, the investment grade rating standard of Rule 15c3-1 should have been 
deleted and replaced with a standard based on price volatility.601 
 
IV.3.1.5 Encouraging more autonomous credit risk assessment and due diligence 
Interestingly, comments were also made as to rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act. The rule 
referred to the credit ratings to limit investment by money-market funds in commercial papers 
issued by all but the most creditworthy issuers. As is known, the purpose of the rule was to prevent 
money market fund shares from ‘breaking the buck’. The rating requirement was regarded as a 
valuable means to limit investment by money market funds in risky investments.602 As mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, commentators were against any amendment entailing deletion of the credit 
ratings under Section 939A, on the grounds that credit ratings were not given exclusivity as credit 
risk assessment tools.  
 Before the post-crisis reforms, Moody’s expressed a similar view stating that rule 2a-7 
referred to credit ratings in a manner consistent with their meaning, that is, as opinions which 
investors and market participants should not take at face value and not as an exclusive factor for 
credit risk assessment. Moreover, at that time Moody’s encouraged revisiting the rule in such a way 
as to give more credit risk assessment and due diligence responsibility to the funds’ board of 
directors and, thus, reduce any potential risk of excessive reliance on credit ratings.603  
 
IV.3.1.6 A critical review in relation to the post-crisis debate on over-reliance  
Given the results of the reforms which have been considered in the previous part at the US level, it 
can be said that the agency already gave in 1994 those recommendations which were finally 
transposed into the post-crisis rules implementing Section 939A. This means that its suggestions 
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should have been taken into consideration at that time. In greater detail therefore, even if these 
recommendations were not specifically concerned with over-reliance, in any case, they warned 
against the over-emphasis that the US regulators were giving to the credit ratings. Back in 1994 the 
CRAs anticipated what the current reforms on over-reliance have finally set out. Consequently, it is 
not surprising that in the debates concerning the implementation of Section 939A and the 
finalisation of the European CRA Regulation III, the CRAs were in support of the proposal to 
revisit, if not delete, the role of the credit ratings in legislation. On the one hand, it cannot be 
affirmed with absolute certainty that if the regulators had taken into consideration Moody’s 
suggestions nobody would have talked about over-reliance after the recent crisis. Nonetheless, since 
at that time the SEC was asking whether it was opportune to retain the legislative references to the 
credit ratings issued by NRSROs, evaluating Moody’s suggestions might have stimulated useful 
reflections on the public sector’s approach to the credit ratings and how this might have influenced 
the market participants in the future. 
 All things considered, the responsibility of the regulators does not exclusively lie on the 
embedment of credit ratings in their legislation but mainly in the fact that they were warned over 
twenty years ago by those that pioneered the use of the credit ratings and hence they are the ultimate 
experts on them, that is, the CRAs. This lack of consideration and the widespread use of the ratings 
in financial legislation has been decisive in consolidating the credit ratings as a ‘common language’ 
which is by now too eradicated among the market participants to be removed easily. This is also 
among the reasons why the current approaches to reduce over-reliance do not progress as expected 
in their implementation. Accordingly, it will not be easy to change a culture which has gone from 
strength to strength. Regulators could have listened to the message of the CRAs but they ultimately 
remained silent and opted for relying on the credit ratings. However, considering the fundamentals 
of the debate on over-reliance and what the agencies had anticipated before, this reliance proved to 
be undue. Changing the relationship now between the public sector and the credit ratings is not too 
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late, but surely this is not a quick process and, above all, it will hardly give the effects that the 
regulators and policymakers envisage on the market participants within a short time. 
 
IV.3.2 The CRAs’ message to the users of credit ratings 
As to the regulators, the above discussion went beyond the assertion that their responsibility stems 
mainly from having facilitated the hardwiring of the credit ratings into legislation. As seen, in 1994 
they were already warned against a wrong approach to the credit ratings by Moody’s, but the 
recommendations remained on paper. Hence, their responsibility must also be discussed in terms of 
a lack of consideration of the nature and limits of the credit ratings into legislation. This happened 
despite the CRAs, at that time, indicated the approach which the regulators have now translated into 
the current reforms to mitigate the risk of over-reliance. Now, we should reflect on the investors and 
the market participants. Since it was pointed out that over-reliance is ascribed to their behaviour and 
that the credit rating references and the structured finance sector may provide incentives to this end, 
it is to be analysed whether there could be any proper approach to the credit ratings by the market 
participants against the risk of over-reliance. In other words, the main question is how they could 
have mitigated the potential risk of over-reliance. Obviously, an answer could be found in the fact 
that they should have referred to the credit ratings as sources of information complementary to their 
analysis, instead of referring to them as the sole benchmark for the assessment of the credit risk. In 
fact, undertaking more autonomous credit risk analysis is the second watchword upon which the 
regulatory reforms on over-reliance are based. In reality, the gist of the investigation should be 
concerned with discussing whether such a watchword is new or it is something which has always 
been highlighted but definitely ignored by the market participants.  
 To this end, it might be desirable to refer to how the CRAs introduce and explain the credit 
ratings in their nature and limits. It must be noticed that the major CRAs have always illustrated in 
their respective disclaimers the meaning of their rating symbols and widely detailed their limits. 
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Essentially, they have always provided the necessary details so as to inform the users of the credit 
ratings on the proper approach they should have taken while referring to them. In practice, their 
disclaimers have never changed before or in the wake of the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In this 
respect, it can be useful to offer a comparison between the contents of the disclaimers of the three 
major CRAs before the outbreak of the recent crisis, and then reflect on them:  
 
[E]ach rating or other opinion must be weighed solely as one factor in any 
investment decision made by or on behalf of any user of the information contained 
herein, and each such user must accordingly make its own study and evaluation of 
each security and of each issuer and guarantor of, and each provider of credit support 
for, each security that it may consider purchasing, holding or selling (Moody’s 
2007).604 
 
[T]he credit ratings and observations contained herein are solely statements of 
opinion and not statements of fact or recommendations to purchase, hold, or sell any 
securities or make any other investment decisions. Accordingly, any user of the 
information contained herein should not rely on any credit rating or other opinion 
contained herein in making any investment decision (Standard & Poor’s 2007).605 
 
[C]redit ratings express risk in relative rank order, which is to say they are ordinal 
measures of credit risk. Thus, they should be seen as broadly consistent indicators of 
relative vulnerability, rather than predictive indicators of actual, cardinal default 
rates. Obligations that are highly-rated have lower credit risk than lower-rated 
obligations, but the individual ratings themselves are not intended to be predictive of 
a cardinal frequency of default or a percentage expected loss (Fitch 2007).606 
 
All these disclaimers make it clear what credit ratings are and how they should be interpreted by the 
investors and the market participants. Moreover, the limits of the credit ratings are clearly indicated. 
As already mentioned, these disclaimers were not elaborated in accordance with the post-crisis 
instances towards considering the credit ratings as one among several factors for independent credit 
risk analysis. They are all antecedent to the outbreak of the recent financial turmoil. Like for the US 
regulators, when they were advised by Moody’s that they were over-emphasising the role of the 
credit ratings into their legislation, the same conclusions may apply with regard to the investors and 
market participants. The CRAs’ disclaimers seem not to have been taken into due consideration. In 
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this regard, it may be argued that the investors’ responsibility is not dissimilar to that of the 
regulators’ in relation to what the CRAs have always remarked as to the nature, limits and proper 
use of the credit ratings. They both misused the credit ratings.  
 Nonetheless, while this assertion can find adequate back up as to over-reliance stemming 
from the structured finance sector, it remains a mere assumption in relation to over-reliance 
deriving from the rating-based regulation. As long as strong evidence is not provided with regard to 
an effective misperception of credit rating references as official seals of approval, it cannot be 
affirmed with sufficient certainty that observing the CRAs’ disclaimers would have curbed the 
problem. In any case, if the current debate on over-reliance is now discussing how to make 
investors more emancipated from the credit ratings by emphasising the limits of the credit ratings 
and encouraging more independent analysis, this means that the original message by the CRAs has 
always been the right one but finally never listened to. On the one hand, it cannot be proven that 
taking them into account would have avoided over-reliance being raised as an issue in the post-
crisis debate. On the other hand, it can be said that their observance might have avoided discussing 
how investors should relate to the credit ratings after the crisis. In other words, it appears not 
sensible that within the debate on over-reliance on credit ratings one of the ‘new’ watchwords is to 
incentivise more knowledge of the limits of the credit ratings so that more independent analysis can 
be facilitated. CRAs have always drawn a line of demarcation between the ‘dos and don’ts’ of the 
credit ratings in their disclaimers. Significantly, they have always provided incentives not to over-
rely on their credit ratings. Indeed, by looking at the disclaimers reported above it seems to be 
unquestionable that their wording reflects the behaviour that the second level of the FSB two-
pronged approach, Article 5(b) of the EU CRA Regulation III, the US debate on Section 939A, and 
the reforms in the structured finance sector have been encouraging. Importantly, if the regulators 
had taken into consideration Moody’s suggestions as to the over-emphasis given to the credit 
ratings in legislation, and had warned on the proper use of the credit ratings in accordance with the 
CRAs’ disclaimers, the over-reliance debate would probably have been reduced in scope. It might 
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have been circumscribed to the structured finance sector in which the credit ratings were not taken 
as opinions. As discussed, this is the area in which the reforms appear to make more sense and be 
more feasible vis-à-vis the approaches analysed in the context of over-reliance deriving from the 
credit rating references in legislation.  
 
IV.4 TAKING STOCK OF THE SITUATION 
 
IV.4.1 Still much to be seen 
As evidenced above, the strategy set out to tackle the risk of over-reliance deriving from the 
hardwiring of the credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks is lagging behind 
schedule in its implementation; and it has been shown why it may have a marginal impact on the 
behaviour of investors and market participants and, hence, effectively reduce the risk of over-
reliance. Also, it has been discussed how the debate on over-reliance on rating-based regulations 
failed to give concrete evidence of the phenomenon so as to support the regulatory strategies which 
have been elaborated. In particular, their assertion of the market participants’ misperception of the 
credit rating requirements in legislation as official seals of approval of creditworthiness, and the 
consequent effect of jeopardising their independent credit risk analysis were contradicted by the 
investors’ and the market participants’ denial of being biased in this way. Finally, it has been 
reflected over the rationale behind the current strategies. Beyond their intrinsic limits such as the 
difficulties in finding valid, accepted alternatives to the credit ratings and the costs associated to 
enhance the investors’ capabilities of conducting their own credit risk assessment, the approaches to 
tackle over-reliance do not represent anything new compared to what the CRAs have always 
indicated. Importantly, the problems brought forward in the post-crisis debate on over-reliance were 
anticipated long before. In this context, listening to the warnings against the improper use of the 
credit ratings in regulations, and giving proper consideration to the limits and nature of the credit 
ratings might have shaped the debate on the phenomenon of over-reliance in a different way. 
246 
 
 The investigation this research aimed to conduct into the phenomenon of over-reliance and 
its regulatory approaches has fulfilled its task. Quo vadis now? Given the overall picture, it is to be 
wondered what future these approaches can have, and whether it is possible to identify 
improvements to facilitate the implementation process as encouraged by the FSB. Firstly, despite 
the shortcomings which have been highlighted so far, abandoning the present strategies and 
elaborating new ones would not sound appropriate. In other words, suggesting that the approach 
should be scrapped and that the debate should re-start would not be sensible in light of the fact that, 
as pointed out in the previous parts, the approach of deleting credit rating references and in parallel 
encouraging more independent analysis has been endorsed at all levels and represents a no turning 
back point. Significantly, the debate started through the identification of a problem and indicated 
the opportune strategies to be translated. Accordingly, normative approaches have been elaborated, 
particularly in the US and the EU, and their implementation processes are still ongoing. 
Consequently, any suggestion should not be based on searching for alternatives to an endorsed 
approach which is still under development. In fact, at this stage there is still much to be seen. Only 
once the Commission have completed its review by 2020, the FSB has produced further results on 
its long-term monitoring of the FSB principles’ translation, and in the US other final rules are 
completed, and overall results are produced it will be possible to say whether the approaches are 
workable. At this stage, the research is based on the hypothesis that the risk of over-reliance is not 
reduced through the examined strategies which so far have failed to completely eliminate the credit 
ratings and have encouraged an enhancement of credit risk and due diligence capabilities that not all 
the market participants can afford. However, further results to reflect on are still to be expected. For 
these reasons, even though the limits that the strategies appear to have, it is too early to think of new 
ones.  
 
IV.4.2 Developing an assertion into certainty: providing evidence of over-reliance 
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Among other things, the suggestion of alternative approaches cannot be disjointed from providing 
stronger evidence that the credit rating references are perceived by investors and market participants 
as official ‘seals of approval’ of creditworthiness. In this regard, an empirical study on whether and 
how the rating-based regulation carries the risk of undermining the investors’ autonomy in their 
investment decisions might be desirable. In effect, the debate missed the opportunity to back up the 
assertion of the existence of the phenomenon when the investors and market participants 
unanimously denied the improper use of the credit ratings. Besides, the literature on over-reliance is 
still at an early stage and this specific study would be, inter alia, desirable.  
 However, it may be argued that now that the implementation of the approaches in the US 
and the EU have de facto eliminated the primacy of the credit ratings in legislation, the utility of 
such a study may be questionable. This specific study would have been more useful ex ante, when 
the debate on over-reliance had started. In reality, given the fact that all the approaches elaborated at 
the national, international, and regional levels have maintained the credit ratings, there is still need 
to ascertain and give evidence of the degree of influence that these may exercise. In essence, 
verifying whether the credit rating references could be perceived as official seals of approval of 
creditworthiness could have been desirable in light of the exclusivity given to credit ratings in 
legislation vis-à-vis other credit risk assessment factors; now it may be desirable to assess whether 
their influence is still strong despite their primacy being reduced in regulations. Specifically, it may 
be worth investigating the extent to which the credit ratings can retain a significant level of 
influence on investors and market participants even though other tools for credit risk assessment are 
proposed as alternatives. In this context, it should be verified whether their primacy remains in 
practice and the extent to which this may have the effect of discouraging the investors and the 
market participants to undertake their own, independent, credit risk assessment. Such a study would 
imply comparing the past situation of the primacy of the credit ratings in legislation with the current 
one aiming at reducing it and creating a level playing field with the other credit risk assessment 
tools. This, in turn, would provide more evidence as to the existence of the phenomenon of over-
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reliance deriving from the inclusion of the credit ratings into legislation. Indeed, the comparison 
between the previous and new legislative frameworks could give more light as to the scale of the 
risk and opportune countermeasures. Undoubtedly, this would be of benefit at the international level 
for the monitoring work that the FSB has started since the issue of the set of principles. In 
particular, the FSB could be able to provide competent authorities with further recommendations on 
the translation of the two-pronged approach.  
 
IV.4.3 Encouraging more dialogue and coordination at all levels 
In any case, having explained why it is not opportune to think of changing strategies vis-à-vis the 
elaborated approaches, it is to be discussed which possible improvements can be identified. To 
begin with, at the end of its first thematic review in May 2014, the FSB set out some 
recommendations to quicken the implementation process among its jurisdictions. These 
recommendations encourage more coordinated efforts among national competent authorities to 
translate into practice the two-pronged approach. Significantly, the FSB recommended the national 
authorities which have already implemented the approach or are in the process of completing their 
review to refine and implement their existing action plans in line with the agreed timelines. It is 
worth discussing this recommendation. The current picture provided by the FSB in its thematic 
review has revealed that some FSB jurisdictions, at the end of their review, did prefer to maintain 
the credit rating references in their regulatory frameworks. This aspect has a significant relevance. 
By reflecting over this, it can be argued that the process of implementation of the two-pronged 
approach has already been ended for some FSB jurisdictions. The FSB has expressed concerns 
about this choice in the sense that maintaining the credit ratings references as an exclusive 
benchmark for the assessment of creditworthiness would run counter to the aim of reducing the 
potential cliff-edge effects and herd behaviours and, hence, would facilitate mechanistic and parallel 
reliance on the credit ratings.  
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 In reality, the FSB did not stress the fact that its future monitoring is likely to be mainly 
concentrated on those jurisdictions which either still have to complete their credit rating references 
review or are setting out new rules with the view to reducing the primacy of the credit ratings and 
looking at other credit risk assessment tools to be used as alternatives. Those jurisdictions which 
opted for not eliminating or substituting the credit ratings in their frameworks are no longer part of 
the implementation process of the two-pronged approach. This has several implications. First, the 
recommendations that the FSB issued within its thematic review to improve the implementation 
process of the two-pronged approach can have value only for those jurisdictions which intend to 
reduce the credit rating references. Secondly, it cannot be said that the primacy of the credit ratings 
has been globally reduced through the proposed two-pronged approach. On the contrary, there will 
be a contrast between those jurisdictions which will follow the letter and spirit of the two-pronged 
approach and those which have finally decided to maintain the credit rating references in their 
legislation. The FSB must start to consider this aspect. In particular, it should evaluate the 
possibility that those jurisdictions which have not undertaken or completed the review of the credit 
rating references in their own legislation may finally decide to maintain the credit ratings as well. In 
that case, it is not appropriate to think of possible strategies to be pursued to avoid this occurrence. 
Indeed, the implementation of the two-pronged approach is something which the FSB expects its 
jurisdictions to complete; nonetheless, it is neither binding nor mandatory that the process should be 
completed with the removal and substitution of the credit ratings. As seen, this has not happened at 
the US and EU level and, after all, in the FSB set of principles it is remarked that the credit ratings 
are important tools, though they should not be given primacy for the credit risk analysis. However, 
the risk is that the overall picture in the future thematic reviews may highlight the divergence 
between those jurisdictions which still maintain the credit ratings references and those which 
maintain the credit ratings along with the other credit risk assessment tools.  
 Probably, a mistake which was made when the implementation of the two-pronged approach 
was encouraged, was to think of the FSB jurisdictions as a unique, monolithic group in which all 
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the national authorities would have responded identically in relation to the two-pronged approach. 
In this context, the only recommendation which seems to be plausible for the FSB is to keep on 
dialoguing with the FSB jurisdictions, even with those which have concluded their review not in 
line with the rationale behind the set of principles and decided to maintain the primacy of the credit 
ratings in their legislative frameworks. The FSB should keep on stressing the importance of 
reducing regulatory reliance on the credit ratings, in particular, it should promote more exchange of 
information among national authorities on the risk of giving primacy to the credit ratings. In 
essence, it should not convince the ‘reluctant’ jurisdictions to abandon the credit ratings but 
emphasise that it is desirable to create in legislation a level playing field between the credit ratings 
and other credit risk assessment tools. Consequently, whereas the FSB recommendation to national 
authorities not to delay their action plans for the translation of the approach is wise, those other 
jurisdictions which have opted differently cannot be left out of the dialogue. Where the FSB does 
not monitor properly this aspect and does not encourage more consistency with the current trend 
towards the reduction of the primacy of the credit ratings in legislation, the implementation process 
will be useless.  
 
IV.4.4 Ensuring more of a level-playing field among credit risk assessment tools 
Having said so, it cannot however be neglected that further recommendations may be now 
identified and discussed only in relation to those legal systems which have given normative basis to 
the two-pronged approach and start the implementation of their own rules. In this context, the 
positive aspects from the results which can be drawn from the third chapter are worth being 
mentioned; and possible suggestions to improve and consolidate the elaborated strategies are to be 
identified for the benefit of the current debate.  
 A positive aspect can be seen in the fact that the credit ratings are no longer referred to as 
being exclusive, but are among the factors to make reference for credit risk assessment. This puts an 
251 
 
end to the supremacy of the credit ratings which has mainly characterised the US legislation. 
Furthermore, even if late, these reforms are in line with what the CRAs had always recommended, 
that is, not giving undue emphasis to the credit ratings in legislation so that they are denaturalised in 
their role of forward-looking opinions subject to changes. This explains why the reforms were 
supported by the rating industry and other sectors. Nonetheless, reducing or eliminating the primacy 
of the credit ratings in legislation implies the parallel reduction of the risk that the credit ratings can 
be given primacy in practice by the users of the credit ratings. Indeed, it is realistic to reduce over-
reliance to the extent that it is unrealistic to think that investors and market participants will stop 
relying on the credit ratings.607 This is even more true as the reforms did not eliminate credit ratings 
but tried to create a level playing field between the credit ratings and other credit risk assessment 
tools. As argued in the third chapter, this can increase the risk of giving primacy in practice to the 
credit ratings vis-à-vis the other alternative tools. Consequently, the risk of over-reliance can still be 
critical.   
In this case, save the freedom of choice between the credit risk assessment tools spelt out in 
the reforms, it is essential that more literacy is provided with regard to the credit risk assessment 
tools indicated in addition to the external credit ratings. As seen in the US final rules, these are 
numerous.608 However, either the lists are not definitive or it is simply stated not to give exclusivity 
to credit ratings and take into consideration other tools. In this case, it is necessary to create 
uniformity among the final rules in the EU and US in the sense that all the amended rules or 
guidelines should provide specific indication of the credit risk assessment tools which can be used 
for credit risk assessment. Simply mentioning that the credit ratings must be used not as the 
exclusive credit risk assessment instruments but that other risk assessment tools can be used, 
without specifying them, it will increase again the risk of giving primacy to the credit ratings. As 
underlined, the risk is that they might appear the first port of call in the event that the other tools are 
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not known or clearly indicated. In the event that an adequate level of specification of the other tools 
is reached, it is necessary to specify their ‘dos and don’ts’ as the CRA’s rating disclaimers do. 
Absence of this, carries the risk that the credit ratings can be again the primary choice because their 
advantages and limits may be known better than the others. Accordingly, authorities should provide 
more information on the other tools or incentivise the investors and the market participants to 
acquire more knowledge on them. In practice, other than in theory, this would help create a more 
solid level playing field between the credit ratings and the other tools.  
 By creating this level playing field it is then necessary to avoid any of the chosen tools, 
different than the credit ratings, becoming the primary one. In this case, over-reliance will simply 
shift from the credit ratings to another instrument and all the discussed problems such as cliff-edge 
effects and herd behaviours would be discussed in relation to the new one. This risk has been 
underlined by the FSB in its interim report and thematic review on the degree of implementation of 
the two-pronged approach.609 Therefore, the FSB must keep on reminding competent authorities to 
encourage market participants to be prudent in the use of any other, alternative, credit risk 
assessment tools. Like the credit ratings, the other tools must not substitute an independent credit 
quality analysis.  
 Finally, whereas it is fair of the FSB to urge the competent authorities to provide incentives 
to market participants to disclose more on their approaches to credit ratings,610 such a principle 
should not be exclusively circumscribed to the credit ratings. The goal is making investors and 
market participants more autonomous and independent in their investment decisions and, thus, more 
disclosure on their use of the credit risk assessment tools they decide to rely on should be a 
universal principle in the sense that this should embrace all the other tools which are now listed 
with the credit ratings. This would permit having a broader assessment of the market participants’ 
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interaction with tools which should only serve the purpose to aid their investment decisions. Also, it 
would permit verifying the extent to which they may be influenced by them.    
 
IV.5 CONCLUSION 
Chapter four of this thesis has proposed a retrospective analysis of the research topic. It aimed at 
discussing the solidity of the basis upon which the debate on over-reliance began and elaborated the 
normative strategies analysed in the third chapter. By preliminarily discussing the etiological nexus 
between the CRAs’ failure in the wake of the recent crisis and the regulatory interventions which 
followed, an investigation has been conducted in relation to what underpins the legislation 
concerning over-reliance on the external credit ratings. In other words, the investigation dealt with 
finding evidence of over-reliance so as to justify what the regulators have so far produced to tackle 
the phenomenon and reduce its implications. To this end, the investigation has been broad in that it 
involved the two sectors which have been demarked in the second chapter as over-reliance risky. 
 In search of evidence of over-reliance, attention has been focussed on the relationship 
between the private sector and the credit ratings to verify whether they can be influenced by the 
credit ratings in terms of over-reliance and, thus, take them at face value with no independent 
analysis. It must be underlined that this analysis is different to the empirical research mentioned in 
the literature review, which mainly refers to credit ratings’ influence from the perspective of the 
users’ reactions to the rating changes. This investigation, instead, attempted to find their reaction to 
the argument that they over-relied and that they are still at risk of over-reliance. The conclusion of 
this enquiry, based on the results of some pre-crisis and post-crisis surveys, as well as of some 
direct comments released by the users of ratings during the regulatory consultations, is that the 
investors and market participants do not admit to the risk of over-reliance. Consequently, their 
denial leads to questioning the utility of the approaches which should benefit those who risk over-
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relying and have been accused of over-relying in the years leading up to the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis. As shown, their denial emerges in both the sectors in which over-reliance may arise.  
 Nonetheless, it has been brought to attention how the denial relating to the structured finance 
area is different than the denial relating to the hardwiring of ratings into legislation. In essence, it 
has been argued that the former can be overcome by the strong evidence of their over-reliant 
conduct before the outbreak of the crisis. In other words, it can be affirmed that valid 
counterarguments can be opposed to their denial. On the other hand, the latter cannot be 
contradicted to the same extent. In practice, the question whether there is evidence that investors 
misperceived the credit rating references as a seal of approval of creditworthiness and were 
discouraged from undertaking their own due diligence and credit risk assessment is answered 
negatively. As a result of this comparison, the regulatory approaches regarding over-reliance in the 
structured finance sector make sense because over-reliance depends on the combination of several 
factors: a lack of adequate knowledge of the risk characteristics of the structured products; a lack of 
adequate knowledge of the specificities of the structured finance ratings; a lack of sufficient 
disclosure by the issuers and by the CRAs of their respective products and credit ratings. Clearly, in 
this context the CRAs are involved as well, in their degree of disclosing the characteristics of a 
structured finance rating vis-à-vis the ratings assigned to other securities.  
 Instead, in the context of the rating-based regulation there is not a direct relationship with 
the CRAs. The tie is only between the credit rating references and the users of the credit ratings. In 
fact, the perception of the credit ratings as seals of approval of creditworthiness by the regulators 
does not depend on how much the investors know about their potential investments, their risk and 
the characteristics of the assigned credit ratings. Significantly, if they deny that they have ever over-
relied, are there any circumstances to be used as a counterargument? The answer was negative and 
thus the strategies which have been introduced in the second chapter and then critically analysed in 
the third chapter appear to be based on an issue of mere perception, rather than on the concreteness 
of a phenomenon. Therefore, the two-pronged approach seems not to make sense tout court, beyond 
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the intrinsic limits which currently slow down the implementation progress. The investors’ and 
market participants’ denial could lead to an assertion that there was no need to think of a removal 
and replacement of the credit ratings since they explained why the possibility of misperception and 
consequent over-reliance is to be excluded for them. This is one of the things that the debate has not 
adequately considered from the beginning; that is, finding strong evidence of over-reliance 
stemming from the rating-based regulation.  
 In reality, the debate on over-reliance could have been anticipated or, if not, be based on 
different premises had the regulators listened to the warnings launched by the CRAs in 1994. 
Already, at that time, their warnings sounded like a denouncement of over-emphasis given by the 
regulators to the credit ratings. Hence, intrinsic limits in the strategy, lack of sufficient insight into 
the phenomenon and past responsibilities from the part of the regulators are the real answer to the 
question why the implementation process of the two-pronged approach does not proceed as initially 
expected. However, the global two-pronged approach is a no turning back point. It is unrealistic to 
think or suggest new strategies in substitution of the present one. After five years some results could 
be seen and evaluated. The picture is of an approach which is still trying to develop. Quo vadis 
then? What should be discussed is a way to make it out of the quicksand which is jeopardising its 
implementation progress. As discussed, the credit ratings will not be replaced by any universally 
accepted alternatives, they will be retained in legislation along with other credit risk assessment 
measurement tools. As explained above, the debate should preserve its rationale by ensuring that the 
credit ratings’ hegemony has not only ceased in legislation but also in practice. More of a level 
playing field between the credit ratings and the other credit risk assessment tools indicated as 
alternatives is to be enhanced along with more disclosure on how the market participants use credit 
risk assessment tools. 
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CHAPTER V 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
V.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research was set out to explore the phenomenon of over-reliance on external credit ratings by 
investors and market participants. Specifically, the study was concerned with the problem of over-
reliance deriving from the hardwiring of credit ratings into legislation and regulatory frameworks. 
In this context, the study has sought to analyse the current status of implementation of the 
approaches elaborated at the national, international and regional levels to curb the risk of over-
reliance stemming from the concerned sector. Based on the results of such an analysis, the study has 
also widened the spectrum of reflection by discussing the extent to which the issue of over-reliance, 
which the post-crisis debate on the CRAs brought to our attention, was evidenced enough to justify 
the regulatory interventions which have been put in place to tackle it. As part of the fourth chapter, 
the search for evidence related to the over-reliance stemming from rating-based regulation. This 
was conducted through a comparison with the other area which this thesis identifies as critical with 
regard to over-reliance on credit ratings, notably the structured finance sector. Coherently, with the 
results of this discussion the research opened a final line of discussion in which it was questioned 
whether the phenomenon of over-reliance could have been anticipated at the time in which the 
reliance on credit ratings was the ‘good’ aspect and there was significant use of ratings as regulatory 
tools. Finally, the overall outcomes were concluded with the discussion of possible strategies to 
enhance the ongoing implementation process of the legislative approaches.  
 The study was built around a broad question: ‘quo vadis?’ This question fits in with all the 
chapters that comprise this thesis. In relation to the second chapter, ‘quo vadis?’ was referred to the 
need to set the context by identifying the issue of over-reliance and question what it is, where it 
arises and which strategies the related debate have set out to reduce the problem. New directions 
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derived from this context and the main question led us to critically analyse the approaches set out 
and implemented at the US and EU level through the paradigm of the FSB set of principles for 
reducing reliance on the credit ratings. The final direction is built upon the results of the 
implementation of the approaches since the start of the debate and their issuance and, thus, ‘quo 
vadis?’ referred to a discussion on the future of the elaborated strategies after their critical review.  
 The overall results will be revisited in this last part of the thesis in accordance with the 
following structure. Firstly, the empirical findings of this research will be highlighted in relation to 
each chapter of the thesis and to all the questions which have been addressed and answered. 
Secondly, there will be a discussion on the contribution that this work aims to give to the current 
understanding of the topic, and why it will enhance the theoretical studies on the CRAs. Thirdly, the 
policy implications deriving from this study, and how these may be beneficial to the current debate 
on the topic will be highlighted. Fourthly, there will be room for identifying future development of 
the present topic, as well as new possible areas for further research. Finally, some concluding 
remarks will bring this work to an end. 
 
V.II WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED? 
The investigation which has been conducted through the present research brought numerous results 
forward. Based on the fact that the regulatory strategies to address over-reliance are part of the 
broader reforms of the CRAs, the context was set by providing an illustration of the rating industry 
and the credit ratings with the view to highlighting the wide use of the rating services by the private 
and the public sector. To this end, the second chapter sketched the contours of the rating industry 
world by relying on the strand of legal studies which took stock of the evolution of the rating 
market from the origin to its current growth. This preliminary context was addressed within the 
realm of reliance on the credit ratings. In fact, in the first chapter it was underlined that the 
exploration into the phenomenon of over-reliance on external credit ratings, and consequent 
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regulatory strategies, would have been conducted by applying a separation between reliance and 
over-reliance on the credit ratings. Such a paradigm was founded on the interpretation of reliance as 
the ‘good’ aspects of the credit ratings, while the latter as the negative escalation of the former into 
the ‘bad’ aspects of credit ratings.611 Consequently, the second chapter made the dichotomy clear 
between the good and the bad aspects of the credit ratings, and the extent to which the latter can 
have systemic implications and turn out to be a threat to financial stability at the global level. 
Specifically, the crisis-related examples which were analysed gave a better understanding as to the 
unintended consequences associated with the widespread use of credit ratings by the private sector, 
and how the regulatory use of them may incentivise these through the hardwiring of ratings into 
legislation and regulatory frameworks.612 Coherently, the shift from the good to the bad aspects of 
the credit ratings was the platform upon which the concept of over-reliance could be introduced 
from the moment the regulators argued that the unintended consequences deriving from the credit 
ratings are exacerbated by over-reliance on them by the investors and market participants.613  
 Clearly, the paradigm of the good and bad aspects of the credit ratings applied in this chapter 
was the line of demarcation between reliance and over-reliance. Therefore, the broad research 
question, ‘quo vadis?’ in relation to the second chapter was indicative of the path towards the 
introduction of over-reliance by way of contrasting the good and the bad aspects of credit ratings. 
As over-reliance is circumscribed within the bad aspects, the chapter isolated the phenomenon in 
the regulatory debate at all levels which followed the 2007-2009 financial crisis. ‘Quo vadis?’ in 
this context referred to the direction which the investigation had to take in relation to the 
phenomenon. In practice, the investigation was concerned with the question of what over-reliance 
is. This could appear as an obvious start. However, the question was more than necessary due to a 
lack of definition of over-reliance by the FSB which first introduced the issue. In greater detail 
therefore, the analysis of the debate which was done in the second chapter revealed a certain 
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unclearness around the concept of over-reliance, which the FSB simply mentioned in two different 
areas; notably, the rating-based regulation and the structured finance sector.614 
 The different recommendations that the FSB gave on how to tackle the phenomenon in the 
two sectors made it essential to elaborate two different definitions of over-reliance. Based on this 
understanding, the second chapter closed the definitional gap by highlighting the nature of over-
reliance as a behavioural phenomenon in both sectors. In the first one, over-reliance can be referred 
to as a misperception of the nature and limits of the credit rating which results in laxness as to due 
diligence and credit risk assessment while in the second one, as a mischaracterisation due to 
ignorance and impossibility of understanding the nature and limits of the structured finance ratings. 
In other words, both have the effect of discouraging the investors from undertaking their own credit 
risk assessment and due diligence, and result in the exclusiveness given to the credit ratings in this 
respect. Nonetheless, over-reliance stemming from the rating based regulation implies laxness, 
while over-reliance in the structured finance sector demonstrates ignorance deriving from a lack of 
adequate disclosure by the issuers and the CRAs on the products and assigned credit ratings.615 This 
also escalates into the practical impossibility of doing a credit risk analysis independent from the 
credit ratings. These two definitions were elaborated through the interpretation of words such as 
‘seal of approval’ with regard to the rating-based regulation, and the problems inherent to the 
structured finance sector which the post crisis reports brought forward. As a result, there are two 
types of over-reliance in accordance with the hardwiring of ratings into legislation and the 
structured finance sector. In these paragraphs, the second chapter provided a clearer understanding 
of the phenomenon. In particular, the divisional line between the two types of over-reliance 
permitted narrowing the scope of the investigation to the central topic: over-reliance stemming from 
the hardwiring of the credit ratings into legislation.  
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 In this context, the broad question ‘quo vadis?’ was enriched by a third element. In essence, 
the availability of a definition pushed the exploratory path towards the regulatory approaches to 
address this type of over-reliance. The related section was not exclusively concerned with detailing 
the approaches elaborated in the US, EU and by the FSB. The respective approaches could be 
understood by first finding confirmation that they were concerned with over-reliance. In this 
context, what the investigation noticed with regard to the US and FSB debate on over-reliance was 
a sort of abandonment of the theme of over-reliance through the reference to reliance. The chapter 
identified this change as an evolution of the debate in line with the entry into force of Section 939A 
of the Dodd Frank Act in the US, and the issuance of the Principles for Reducing Reliance on 
Credit Ratings by the FSB. Both the rule and the principles were issued quite close together in 
2010, and the salient aspect is that both are the result of the initial debate on over-reliance initiated 
by the FSB. This raised the question of the relevance of over-reliance. In practice, from the initial 
problem of over-reliance the debate appeared to have diverted towards tackling reliance. This aspect 
urged verification of whether over-reliance was part of these approaches relating to reliance on the 
credit ratings. In particular, it was noticed that at the EU level Article 5(a) of the CRA Regulation 
III was denominated ‘over-reliance’ and reflected the contents of the FSB Principle II. Similarly, it 
was noticed that the FSB Principle I was quite similar to Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act in 
that it aims at reducing the regulatory references to credit ratings. Substantially, the puzzle was the 
following: both the FSB and the US started with over-reliance but they ended up with reliance. 
While in the US they produced a rule which aims to eliminate the credit rating references from 
regulations and substitute them with alternative standards of creditworthiness, the FSB produced a 
set of principles encapsulating a two-pronged approach. Such an approach provides for the 
reduction of credit rating references and substitution with alternative standards of creditworthiness 
and contextual enhancement of the investors’ and market participants’ capability of conducting 
independent credit risk analysis. This second level was then transposed into the EU Article 5(a) 
under the denomination of over-reliance.  
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 From this puzzle the relevance of over-reliance was questioned and thus discussed the 
assertion that there is a micro approach to over-reliance set out in the second level of the FSB 
approach. To be enacted, this approach needs the implementation of the first level. In other words, 
to reduce the risk of over-reliance, intervention must be first done at the source, that is, the rating-
based regulation, and then on those at risk of over-reliance by requiring them to develop more 
independent analytical capacity. This assertion was supported by arguing that both Section 939A 
and the FSB principles use the word reliance as a catch-all phrase which implicitly refers to over-
reliance as well. As to the US, this was confirmed by exploring and analysing the policymakers’ 
reports discussing the implementation of Section 939A. Clearly, they referred to over-reliance in the 
context of Section 939A and to the need to make all the necessary efforts to guarantee more 
independent analysis by investors once the credit rating references are eliminated from the 
regulations.616  As to the FSB, confirmation was found through the EU CRA regulation which 
explicitly refers to reliance and over-reliance through a body of rules which are the transposition of 
the FSB two-pronged approach. Therefore, this section of the second chapter showed what the 
regulatory strategy against over-reliance is at the national, international and regional levels by 
taking chart of the evolution of the debate since it started.  
 Overall, the second chapter marked the beginning of the investigation through the translation 
of the general question ‘quo vadis?’ into the specific one ‘in search of a meaning’. Such a question 
relates to the introduction of the phenomenon and it fits into the problems which were highlighted 
and solved in this chapter, such as the definitional gap, and the relevance of over-reliance through 
the evolution of the initial debate. Significantly, the context was set, developed towards a specific 
definition of over-reliance, and finalised into the regulatory approaches through the interpretation of 
their contents within the debates at all levels.  
 The knowledge of over-reliance deriving from the regulatory use of the credit ratings and 
from the structured finance sector, and the regulatory approaches developed to address the former 
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permitted this research to move towards the assessment of the effectiveness of the elaborated 
strategies. This was the aim of the third chapter in which the answer to the question ‘quo vadis?’ 
presumed to investigate the current status of implementation of the US and EU rules. The choice of 
these two legal systems was mandatory in that they are the only ones which have set out specific 
rules and undertook a process of implementation. To this end, the analysis referred to the FSB two 
pronged approach as the general platform upon which the progress made by the two systems could 
be verified. In this part, it was sufficiently underlined how only the EU could be regarded as the full 
translation of the FSB approach unlike the US in which Section 939A was issued before the 
elaboration of the principles. However, the US and the EU strategies have in common the aim to 
revisit the credit rating references and contextually enhance the investors’ capabilities of conducting 
their own due diligence and credit risk assessment. This is the approach indicated by the FSB as 
well and, thus, its two levels can be the paradigm upon which discussing the US and EU progress. 
 Preliminarily, in section 1 of chapter three a comparison was made between the US and EU 
rules. Their interpretation led to the conclusion that the US approach appears to be harsher than the 
EU one in pursuing the reduction of over-reliance on external credit ratings. The US approach under 
Section 939A has the ambitiousness of reviewing all the credit rating references in federal 
legislation, remove them, and substitute them with an alternative standard of creditworthiness. 
Conversely, and in line with the FSB approach, the EU rules aim to conduct a more selective review 
with the view to identifying only those credit rating references which can cause mechanistic and 
parallel reliance by investors and market participants. In this respect, the ESAs are in charge with 
this review with regard to their recommendations and guidelines. Besides, the Commission is 
mandated to undertake a similar review by 2020 with regard to the credit rating references in EU 
law and substitute them with possible alternatives. Accordingly, it was highlighted that unlike the 
EU rules, the US approach sounds like a prohibition from referring to credit ratings in regulations. 
Further implications deriving from this comparison were discussed in relation to the fact that both 
the legal systems are likely to implement their own strategies in an uncoordinated way. This is due 
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to the different aims of their respective reviews of the credit rating references, and to the fact that 
only the EU rules were elaborated in line with the FSB two-pronged approach which recommends a 
selective review of the credit rating references in legislation and regulatory frameworks. 
Nonetheless, they are both purported to the reduction of the risk of over-reliance, and taking the two 
levels of the FSB approach as the reference paradigm their progress could be discussed.617  
 With regard to the first level, that is, the review, removal and substitution of the credit rating 
references with alternatives, section 2 of chapter 3 analysed this as the most challenging feature of 
the approach. In particular, by analysing the US debate on the implementation of Section 939A it 
was noticed that the policymakers’ initial intention was to find a universally accepted alternative 
which could replace the credit ratings.618 This, in any case, found strong opposition by the users of 
the credit ratings which interpreted the letter and spirit of section 939A as a ban from using the 
credit ratings.619 As noticed, these comments were dated back to the start of the implementation of 
section 939A by the US federal agencies. It was shown through the analysis of the final and 
proposed rules elaborated by the mandated agencies how the difficulties in finding universally 
accepted alternatives, coupled with the opposition from the users of the credit ratings, played a 
decisive role in the formulation of them.620 The outcome of the analysis of the first level of the 
strategy from the US perspective was that all the concerned agencies maintained the credit ratings 
as credit risk assessment tools. In substance, credit ratings are simply one among other factors that 
investors and market participants can take into consideration for their credit risk analysis. This 
outcome is of significance from different angles. From the perspective of Section 939A and the 
regulators’ initial expectations, it was pointed out that the search for a universally accepted 
alternative to credit ratings found its major stumbling block in the opposition from the users of the 
credit ratings, who were afraid of being banned from using the credit ratings. Consequently, 
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maintaining the credit ratings in the final rules is not only an expression of the difficulties in finding 
something to be accepted as better than the credit ratings, but also it is a compromise with the users 
of the credit ratings. From the over-reliance perspective, it was argued that the risk is still latent as 
long as the credit ratings remain. Indeed, they are a common language more used and eradicated 
than the other alternative tools which have been indicated. The result can be that the ratings can still 
have exclusiveness in their use and, hence, reliance on the credit ratings can still escalate into over-
reliance.  
 On the other side of the Atlantic, the assessment of the EU progress in the implementation of 
the CRA Regulation III rules relating to the first level of the approach brought forward the 
following findings. The analysis was concerned with the review that the ESMA, EBA and EIOPA 
were mandated to be completed by the end of 2013. Such a review had to select credit rating 
references in guidelines and recommendations which could induce mechanistic and parallel 
reliance.621 The EBA identified this type of reference in its guidelines relating to the mapping of the 
credit risk weights. It concluded that it would have not taken any repeal, above all, because its 
guidelines draw on the Basel framework. Contrary to the global instances as to the reduction of 
credit rating references, the Basel Committee still makes wide use of them. Consequently, as long 
as changes do not come from the Basel arena, the EBA does not feel it opportune to intervene on its 
guidelines.622 The ESMA reviewed its guidelines on money market funds and amended paragraph 4 
of Box 2 and paragraph 2 of Box 3 so as to reduce the primacy of the credit ratings. Accordingly, 
credit ratings can be used as credit risk assessment tools ‘inter alia’.623 The EIOPA concluded its 
review by saying that there are not credit rating references in its guidelines carrying the risk of 
inducing mechanistic and parallel reliance. In relation to the research question which underpins the 
third chapter (‘in search of effectiveness’), the EU assessment revealed three outcomes. The EBA’s 
review remained on paper due to the possible conflict which there could be in relation to the 
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maintenance of the credit ratings in the Basel framework. The ESMA’s review proved to be 
superfluous in that the identified guideline had already mitigating factors ex ante. The EIOPA’s 
review was inconclusive as to the risk of over-reliance. As a result of this, the effectiveness of the 
strategy cannot be completed tested at the EU level. Furthermore, the EIOPA review led to 
formulate the prediction that the Commission review expected by the 2020 may lead to results not 
different than the EIOPA. This assertion was built up on a review of the credit rating references in 
the EU financial legislation that section 3 of the third chapter conducted. The review did not aim at 
identifying credit rating references carrying the risk of mechanistic and parallel reliance but to 
verify whether the same results as the EIOPA could be envisaged. Indeed, either there are not credit 
rating references or when credit ratings are referenced, they are not the exclusive credit risk 
assessment tools.624 Significantly, the risk of over-reliance seems not to be so high at the EU level. 
The source of over-reliance, namely the EU rating-based regulation, already has its mitigating 
factor or references are very limited if not absent. Consequently, at this stage, it is not possible to 
discuss the effectiveness at the EU level to the same extent as in the US.625 These were the results as 
to the first level of the two-pronged approach.  
 With regard to the second level relating to the enhancement of the investors’ ability to 
conduct independent credit risk assessment, the discussion was more general in relation to some 
results brought forward by the FSB in its thematic review of the translation of the two-pronged 
approach at the global level. Substantially, the important result is that the enactment of the second 
level risks being the privilege of sophisticated investors. These can afford the development of 
internal systems for the measurement of the credit risk, as well as the deployment of competent 
resources to this end. As opposed to them, small, less sophisticated investors who do not have the 
economies of scale to conduct their own credit risk analysis will definitely have to rely on 
something. In this section, it was accordingly argued that until now they relied mainly on the credit 
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ratings. Consequently, the risk of giving primacy to them can still be relevant even if the ratings are 
listed in legislation along with other credit risk assessment factors.626  
 To sum up, the research question on the effectiveness of the approach was answered 
negatively with regard to both levels. Importantly, it is not the process of implementation in itself 
which slows down because, as the FSB claimed, some FSB jurisdictions have not started any 
review yet. The US and EU have shown that it slows down because of other reasons. Finding 
alternatives remains challenging and it can be concluded that there will never be a unique, 
universally accepted one able to substitute the credit ratings. This will impinge on the review that 
the Commission has to complete by 2020 and it is reasonable to claim that its final rules may not be 
dissimilar to the US final rules in which credit ratings are still referenced. This risks ultimately 
diminishing the possibility of encouraging more independent credit risk analysis where reliance on 
the credit ratings is no longer exclusive in regulation but strong enough to risk encouraging their 
primacy in practice. These are the results of the implementation process after almost five years 
since the debate on over-reliance started. The process is still ongoing and there will be room for 
further assessment, above all at the EU level where the Commission has to meet its deadline by 
2020.  
 Nonetheless, these results have pushed this research into a reflection on the debate itself and 
on the investors’ conduct. This had, firstly, the aim to investigate whether there was something 
which should have been done or taken into consideration while discussing the opportune strategies 
to tackle over-reliance deriving from the rating-based regulation; secondly, to verify whether the 
relevance of the phenomenon of over-reliance could have been anticipated before the recent 
financial turmoil and perhaps monitored properly. These issues were addressed in the fourth 
chapter. Section 1 of this chapter answered the research question of whether the phenomenon of 
over-reliance stemming from the embedment of the credit rating references in legislation could be 
said to be adequately demonstrated to support an ambitious regulatory strategy based on the 
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removal of the rating references and contextual encouragement of independent credit risk analysis. 
As the discussed reforms are a part of the wider package of legislative interventions on the CRAs, it 
was preliminarily discussed how the post-crisis reports, investigations and studies by scholars gave 
sufficient evidence of CRAs’ failures, so as to make it necessary to elaborate an adequate legislative 
framework. This was answered positively in relation to the issue of conflict of interest deriving 
from the issuers-pay-model, which turned out to be particularly serious in the structured finance 
sector in the years leading up to the financial crisis.627 This raised the question of whether the same 
outcome could have been argued as to over-reliance. At this stage, the analysis was more 
circumscribed to the two types of over-reliance this research identified and defined. After providing 
an overview of the regulatory reforms at the US and EU level relating to the over-reliance in the 
structured finance sector, the chapter addressed whether this phenomenon was sufficiently 
evidenced. Significantly, an answer could be provided by referring to those who are regarded as in 
danger of over-relying, that is, investors and market participants. Pre-crisis and post-crisis surveys 
on the nature and limits of ratings assigned to structured finance products revealed that in both 
periods the investors denied the existence of the problem of over-reliance. In other words, they 
claimed that they were not negatively influenced by the credit ratings to the detriment of their own 
due diligence and credit risk assessment. In the first place, this could lead to cast doubt on the 
existence of the phenomenon and its risk, and deem the rules which have been set out as 
superfluous.628 However, it was shown how this denial could not be supported compared to the 
documented evidence of their over-reliant approach to the ratings assigned to complex structured 
products. Accordingly, the regulatory interventions were fully justified by the existence of over-
reliance and its implications.629 
 The same question and method of investigation based on pre-crisis surveys on asset 
managers as well as opinions expressed by institutional investors during the preparatory works of 
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the rules were applied with regard to over-reliance deriving from the credit rating references in 
legislation. The results were different. Again, the investors and market participants denied 
perceiving the credit rating references as ‘seals of approval’ to the detriment of their own due 
diligence and credit risk analysis. Counterarguments against this denial could not be found to justify 
the ambitious regulatory intervention which was set in motion, and which is currently progressing 
very slowly. Significantly, it was argued that it is in general unrealistic to think that investors will 
admit to over-reliance. However, while in the structured finance sector this can be validly opposed, 
the same cannot be argued with regard to the rating based regulation. Accordingly, not only does 
their denial make this type of over-reliance quite nebulous and substantially not concrete, but it also 
casts doubt on the sense of the consequent regulatory strategies. The investors’ denial combined 
with the absence of valid counterarguments to be opposed make the regulatory approaches lack 
their solid fundamentals. Hence, over-reliance deriving from the hardwiring of ratings into 
legislation has never been adequately demonstrated. In particular, the approaches appear to be not 
coherent in light of the investors’ denial that they over-relied and that they are at risk of over-
reliance. Accordingly, there is no evidence that investors misperceive the nature and limits of the 
credit ratings embedded in legislation.630  
 This outcome pushed the reflection beyond the post-crisis debate in which the issue of over-
reliance arose. The analysis the last section of chapter three dealt with aimed to verify whether the 
phenomenon of over-reliance could have been anticipated or whether the scope of the debate could 
be reduced where some corrective actions would have been taken ex ante. This investigation was 
originated from the outcomes relating to the analysed status of implementation of the approaches 
and the discussed lack of sufficient evidence of the phenomenon as to the rating-based regulation. 
In practice, the question that this context raised was the following: which actions could have been 
taken in the past to avoid or reduce the possibility that the 2007-2009 financial crisis introduced the 
problem of over-reliance? This question was vital for the suggestion of possible recommendations 
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for a better development of the ongoing implementation process. In addition, it gave completion to 
the exploratory aim this research proposed as to the phenomenon of over-reliance. 
 To answer this question, reference was made to the market participants and the regulators. 
The first are those who are at risk of over-reliance, while the second are those who can incentivise 
the phenomenon through a widespread use of the credit ratings in legislation. With regard to the 
investors and market participants, a proper answer could be found from the perspective of their 
relationship with the credit ratings. The zeitgeist of more independent analysis which the post-crisis 
debate constantly repeated was nothing new. In the past, the CRAs have always stressed in their 
disclaimers which limits the credit ratings have and how the users have to approach them. To this 
end, section 4.3 of the fourth chapter underlined the contents of these disclaimers in the period 
antecedent to the crisis and discussed how in the structured finance sector these limits were left on 
paper by the institutional investors.631  
 Similarly the regulators, in particular the US regulators, were warned by the major CRAs 
that they were putting too much emphasis on the credit ratings in their regulations. As noticed, this 
happened in 1994 and the warnings were not simply concerned with the amount of credit ratings in 
legislation. The word ‘over-emphasis on credit ratings’ that the agencies used meant a use of the 
credit ratings beyond their limits of simple forward-looking opinions. In this respect, Moody’s 
highlighted the unintended consequences that could derive from this wrong use of the credit ratings 
by the regulators. Among these, Moody’s hinted at the possibility of an undue perception of them 
by the market participants.632 In parallel, this research noticed that the rules that the US federal 
agencies amended under Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act were the same identified by Moody’s 
and, finally, the way these rules were amended reflected the early suggestions given by the agency. 
Moody’s did not explicitly talk about over-reliance but its warnings anticipated the possibility of the 
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phenomenon. In any case, these warnings remained on paper and the regulators perseverated with 
their wrong reliance on the credit ratings.633  
 Significantly, these results may be regarded as sufficient to argue that there were the 
preconditions to anticipate over-reliance ex ante and hence monitor the possibility of an escalation 
of reliance into over-reliance. Accordingly, blind reliance was not only a problem of market 
participants’ best practice but also a problem from the part of the regulators. While investors are not 
available to admit their over-reliant conduct, the regulators have, perhaps implicitly, admitted their 
early mistake through the elaboration of an approach which aimed at eliminating the credit rating 
references and contextually encouraging more independent analysis from the part of the users of the 
credit ratings. 
 
V.3 THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The exploration into the phenomenon of over-reliance on external credit ratings, and the analysis of 
the regulatory strategies issued to address, in particular, the problem deriving from the regulatory 
use of the credit ratings brought to attention the following drawbacks. Firstly, a lack of clear 
demarcation of the phenomenon with regard to the rating-based regulation and the structured 
finance sector. Secondly, a very slow progress in the implementation of the two-pronged strategy at 
the global level. Among the FSB jurisdictions which endorsed the approach, only the US and the 
EU issued specific rules to be analysed. Slowness in the implementation progress is mainly due to 
difficulties in finding valid, universally accepted alternatives to the credit ratings, and difficulties in 
enhancing the market participants’ capabilities of conducting a more independent due diligence and 
credit risk assessment. Thirdly, based on the critical evaluation of the US and EU reforms, it was 
claimed that the approach of maintaining the credit ratings in legislation and regulatory frameworks, 
along with other credit risk assessment tools, may not be effective in the reduction of the risk of 
over-reliance. In fact, the alternative tools are not commonly used as much as the credit ratings are 
                                                          
633
 Ibid. 
271 
 
used in practice. Consequently, even though the new rules indicate other alternative factors, the 
credit ratings may keep a primary role and this may jeopardise the efforts to reduce over-reliance on 
them. Fourthly, the phenomenon of over-reliance stemming from credit rating references in 
legislation was brought to attention by regulators and policymakers without providing strong 
evidence as to the assertion that investors and market participants are discouraged from undertaking 
their own due diligence and credit risk assessment because they misperceive the credit rating 
references as an ‘official seal of approval’ of creditworthiness. As shown in chapter 4, investors and 
market participants, strongly and unanimously, denied being influenced like that. Fifthly, the 
phenomenon, as it was introduced in the post-crisis regulatory debate on the CRAs, could have been 
anticipated a long time before. Early warnings were sent by the major CRAs to the US regulators 
back in 1994. These were concerned with the unintended consequences which could derive from an 
improper use of the credit ratings in their regulations. The way the US federal agencies have 
changed their rules under Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act, are basically in line with the 
amendments that the major CRAs suggested in 1994. Consequently, over-reliance is not exclusively 
a problem of investors’ best practices but, ex ante, there could have been more attention to the use 
of the credit ratings by both the public and private sector. This might have permitted consideration 
about the possibility of the phenomenon and to perhaps start monitoring the degree of influence that 
the rating-based regulation could exercise on the market participants.  
 The overall study conducted through this research and its results contribute to the theoretical 
literature on the credit ratings in several aspects. To begin with, the regulatory strategies against 
over-reliance are part of the package that the CRAs’ reforms took place in the wake of the recent 
financial crisis. These reforms address the operation of the CRAs and deal with issues such as 
conflict of interest, CRAs’ registration systems, rating methodologies and the agencies’ civil 
liability. Significantly, these reforms strictly relate to the agencies. In this context, the issue of over-
reliance that this research addressed appears to be the odd one out in that it is not directly in 
connection with the agencies, but is in relation to the use of the credit ratings by the public sector 
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and how this is perceived by the market participants. In any case, as was stressed throughout the 
thesis, its inclusion in the CRAs’ legislative package makes this topic a segment of the broad 
reforms of the agencies.634 Accordingly, the scientific contribution that this study aims to give can 
be discussed vis-à-vis the other CRAs’ reforms.   
 Even before the recent US and EU legislation on the CRAs, these issues were highly 
debated. For instance, scholars have devoted considerable attention to the conflict of interest 
inherent to the issuers-pay-model and to the absence of an adequate civil liability framework for the 
CRAs. Such issues are still under scrutiny in light of the new rules which address them and, 
consequently, new analysis has been brought forward. As underlined in the first chapter, the topic of 
this research is new in comparison to the ‘old issues’ that have raised the scholars’ interest. 
However, after five years since its introduction in the post-crisis regulatory debate and the issue of 
specific normative approaches, the research on the phenomenon of over-reliance on credit ratings 
and the regulatory approaches to tackle the problem appears to be at a standstill. The few works 
produced so far either illustrated the over-reliance in the context of the current reforms or expressed 
scepticism as to the implementation of the approaches.635 The present research not only gives a 
more holistic vision of the problem in comparison with these critical articles but also widens the 
historical and empirical literature upon which it draws. In more detail, the rating-based regulation 
has so far been studied from a historical perspective to detail the rise and growth of the rating 
industry. Within this, further studies analysed the rating-based regulation under a competition 
perspective and how it may have facilitated the dominance of the major CRAs. Also, other studies 
developed an analysis of the rating-based regulation as a factor facilitating conflict of interest with 
the issuers. Through the present studies this mosaic is enriched with a new perspective which takes 
place from the assertion that the regulatory use of the credit ratings may facilitate over-reliance. 
This assertion came from the side of the policymakers and triggered the regulatory strategies which 
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followed. However, the few studies which talked about this only endorsed and illustrated the 
regulatory strategies. This research widened the spectrum of knowledge on over-reliance. In doing 
so, it offered a more updated analysis on the progress of the approaches by illustrating them in their 
current status, and critically reviewing them in their effectiveness as to the risk of over-reliance.  
 To review its development, the research identified an initial definitional gap by the 
policymakers which was then, in 2014, confirmed by the ESAs when they had to conduct their 
review under Article 5(b) of the CRA Regulation III. This definition was elaborated by demarking a 
line between the rating-based regulation and the structured finance sector as over-reliance risky 
areas. These definitions have been elaborated through the understanding of the debate launched by 
the FSB. As such, they may be open to discussion and criticism. In any case, they may be useful in 
the event of an empirical study assessing concretely the potentiality of the rating references in 
legislation to be perceived as official seals of approval of creditworthiness. To this end, the 
definitions provided by the present research, as well as its results, may be the paradigm or the 
source upon which further aspects can be identified. On the whole, these definitions aim to be the 
milestones for understanding the phenomenon of over-reliance and the input for further discussions. 
 Similar conclusions can be drawn in relation to the discussion conducted in the third chapter. 
The analysis of the status of implementation of the strategies based on removing rating references, 
finding alternatives and contextually enhancing a more autonomous credit risk analysis, contributes 
to the existing literature on the CRAs’ reforms by providing a concrete picture of what has been 
done so far; which degree of consistency the final rules have with the initial aim of the debate; and 
whether these may be considered effective with regard to the mitigation of the risk of over-reliance. 
In comparison to the early studies which illustrated the rules and offered a preliminary forecast of 
the pace of their implementation, this part of the thesis gives a more updated picture because it 
provides an excursus of the progress, from the early draft of the rules until their translation into 
practice. From a legal perspective this analysis can give impetus to further critical studies since the 
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implementation process is still ongoing. Hence, the third chapter is to be considered as the first 
preliminary assessment of the progress after five years since the debate on over-reliance started.  
 Finally, contributions can also be derived from the fourth chapter. In the light of the CRAs’ 
warnings given in 1994, it was discussed the extent to which the phenomenon could have been 
anticipated and perhaps monitored over time. Such a discussion can contribute to the existing 
literature on the tie between the public sector and the credit ratings. In particular, this part gave 
room to the voice of the agencies. As explained in the first chapter, the agencies’ opinions are 
referred to by the economic literature for analytical and statistical purposes while assessing the 
adequacy of the rating methodologies and models.636 What this research brought to attention were 
different opinions. These were comments released by the agencies on pieces of legislation relying 
on the credit ratings. Such views, coupled with the comments by the users of the credit ratings, may 
stimulate legal studies to make more references to this kind of opinion when discussing the CRAs’ 
legislative frameworks. In the case of over-reliance, Moody’s comments were indeed anticipatory 
of a regulators’ wrong approach to the credit ratings. This wrong approach was ultimately 
acknowledged by the regulators after the recent crisis. Therefore, what this research has identified 
by investigating the agencies’ opinion can stimulate more consideration for their opinions in the 
legislative arena.  
 All things considered, this work achieved its aim to provide an exploratory, holistic vision of 
the issue of over-reliance so as to give impetus to further studies, and contribute to raise the same 
level of interest around the topic that ‘old’ topics on the credit ratings are still stimulating. 
 
V.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This thesis analysed the introduction of the phenomenon of over-reliance within the post-crisis 
regulatory debate. Furthermore, it analysed the evolution of the normative approaches from the 
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guidelines provided at the international level by the FSB until the current process of implementation 
of the rules finalised at the US and EU level. This exploratory study has implications which can 
give a contribution from a policy perspective. As explained in the previous paragraph, this research 
contributed to make the line of demarcation between the two types of over-reliance less blurred. In 
practice, the lack of a proper definition and distinction of the two areas was a source of confusion to 
the extent that the reliance and over-reliance were used as synonyms. Therefore, providing specific 
definitions based on the interpretation of the policymakers’ debate, and then contrasting these 
definitions on the basis of the suggested regulatory interventions, not only can be the platform for 
further studies on the phenomenon, but also an adequate reference for the monitoring of the 
implementation process of the two-pronged approach.  
 The FSB is in charge of the monitoring tasks. As shown, the FSB developed the initial 
FSB’s general recommendations into the two-pronged approach. This was then fully translated at 
the EU level and somehow endorsed at the US level, with particular regard to the enhancement of 
the investors’ independence in their credit quality judgement. Nonetheless, the FSB did not develop 
any definition of over-reliance either. It talked about ‘mechanistic and parallel reliance’ on the 
credit ratings which was then transposed into the European Regulation on the CRA. As seen, this 
lack of definition was a drawback the ESAs had to preliminarily solve to pursue their review 
mandate under Article 5(b) of the CRA Regulation III.637 Consequently, the specific definition this 
study proposed can be a source the FSB, and the EU and US policymakers can refer to while 
monitoring the implementation process which is still ongoing. In greater detail, if further guidance 
and recommendations are to be provided to guarantee the optimal pace of the implementation 
process, it is necessary to specify what over-reliance deriving from the embedment of credit ratings 
into legislation is. This is particularly essential for the FSB since it monitors the implementation of 
the two-pronged approach among the FSB jurisdictions and sets out its recommendations for the 
future in accordance with the results of its review. Practical recommendations cannot suffice 
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without the basis provided by a clear understanding of what the phenomenon they are dealing with 
is. Through the elaborated definition, this research helps to give policymakers a tool which can 
enhance the common understanding of the phenomenon and pave the way for the coordinated 
dialogue on over-reliance which is still missing at all levels.  
 Moreover, this research discussed the reasons why the implementation process does not 
have the pace envisaged by the FSB. This was done through the analysis of the US and EU final 
rules. More than the results brought forward by the FSB in its thematic review on the 
implementation of the two-pronged approach among the FSB jurisdictions, a thorough discussion 
on the limits of the approaches was taken. This led to the conclusion that the risk of over-reliance is 
still immanent in the new rules that the regulators have so far developed. This outcome, if 
acknowledged, may be helpful to regulators and policymakers to develop further strategies to 
contain the risk within the approaches they have elaborated and are trying to implement. In 
particular, the discussion the fourth chapter engaged in with regard to the investors’ denial as to 
their misperception of the credit rating references as ‘seal of approvals’ has the aim to urge the 
regulators and policymakers to test in a more effective way this type of over-reliance. A constant 
dialogue with those who are considered at risk of over-reliance is essential to this end.638 Likewise, 
giving due weight to the necessity of providing strong evidence of the problem they asserted may 
permit them to look into the future of the approaches they set out, and think of possible 
improvements.639  
 Ultimately, this thesis tried to propose a constructive critique of the strategies against over-
reliance. Despite some discouraging results, the positive aspect is that the primacy of the credit 
ratings seem to have changed in legislation, but risk continues in practice because of the major 
impact the credit ratings can still have vis-à-vis the alternative factors that the new and proposed 
rules indicate along with them. However, the balance that the rules attempt to create between the 
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credit ratings and the other credit risk assessment tools is a sufficient basis to argue that the two-
pronged approach cannot be erased but deserves a chance to go on. Among other things, this 
research pointed out that this approach is a no turning back point and that a new one can hardly be 
discussed. In line with this, a further contribution this research aimed at giving from a policy 
perspective was concerned with the tentative suggestions on how to consolidate the reduction of the 
risk of over-reliance under the present approach. In particular, the suggestion to strengthen the level 
playing field between the credit ratings and the possible alternatives should make the regulators and 
policymakers reflect over the possibility of providing more knowledge and assessment of the new 
ones. The credit ratings are commonly regarded as ‘a common language’ among the market 
participants. This means that where a level playing field is not provided between the ratings and the 
other credit risk assessment tools, the former will always be the strongest.640 Consequently, this 
work tried to stimulate the standard setters and regulators to consolidate the basis for a new culture 
alternative to the credit ratings, and reduce the possibility of maintaining their primacy in practice, 
and the risk of over-reliance.  
 Also, it has been demonstrated that the opinions of the CRAs have significant relevance 
when discussing the use of the credit ratings. The present research wanted to underline that the 
agencies should not be mainly studied by the theoretical literature. Their expertise and opinions on 
the reforms can be constructive and constitute a valuable point of reference for regulators as well. 
All things considered, the results produced through this research are an adequate platform to 
influence the development of the strategies against over-reliance on the rating-based regulation and 
to offer the debate additional reasons for reflection. 
  
V.5 PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
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As discussed in the first chapter, the literature on the phenomenon of over-reliance on external 
credit ratings is still at an early stage in comparison to other issues on the rating industry which 
generated a considerable amount of studies. These studies have been further enhanced once new 
legislative frameworks of the CRAs were set out at the US and EU level after the 2007-2009 
financial crisis. Currently, dealing with issues such as the CRAs’ conflict of interest, the civil 
liability regime and the reduction of the oligopolistic structure of the rating market is facilitated by a 
considerable amount of research which can increase the debate and create room for further work 
which will inevitably draw on a large platform of sources. The present research could only 
marginally be developed upon a large amount of studies which have been produced on the 
phenomenon, in particular, with regard to the type of over-reliance which was analysed.641 In the 
first place, this can be regarded as a limitation for the work. As mentioned above, the topic was 
mainly raised in the context of the post-crisis regulatory debate at the national, international and 
regional levels. The subsequent regulatory strategies were developed within five years and their 
implementation process is still ongoing. Over this time, there was not so much interest for this 
topic. However, the lack of a substantial amount of literature was the reason for this research.642 In 
other words, the absence of specific studies gave the input for the holistic approach which 
characterised this study towards an analysis which could embrace the phenomenon from its 
definition until the set up and feasibility of the proposed approaches, and their current degree of 
implementation. Mainly, these results were achieved by looking into the debate and the formation 
of the normative approaches. Also, the comments provided by the users of the credit ratings and the 
agencies were valuable sources.  
 As discussed above, this study and its results aim to create a platform for raising more 
interest in the topic so as to bring the level of contributions to an amount as considerable as the 
‘old’ topics. For numerous reasons the present research cannot be regarded as exhaustive. The 
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process of implementation of the elaborated approaches is still ongoing at all levels. At the 
international level, the FSB is constantly monitoring the translation of its principles. As it indicated, 
further thematic reviews are expected over the next year to have a more definitive picture of the 
progress. Undoubtedly, this can be the ground for new discussions as to the success or failure of the 
implementation process of the rules. Likewise in the US, not all the agencies have completed their 
review under Section 939A of the Dodd Frank Act; while others have elaborated final rules which 
entered into force at the time of writing or will be effective in the next years. Consequently, there is 
still room to analyse the effectiveness of the US final rules in relation to the purpose of reducing 
over-reliance. The time will provide sufficient space to assess whether and how the market 
participants are using other credit risk assessment tools indicated along the credit ratings. In turn, 
this will be an adequate test to verify whether the use of the credit ratings is still exclusive in 
practice and thus, the strategy, as highlighted by this research, has only eliminated their primacy in 
legislation. Specifically, this will permit scrutinising the degree of independence investors and 
market participants can have in their credit risk assessment and due diligence. Similarly at the EU 
level, the Commission has the task to complete its review of the credit rating references in EU law 
by 2020 and remove them once alternatives are found. Importantly, all these aspects are still to be 
verified, in particular, whether the Commission will be able to identify possible alternatives to the 
credit ratings. Given this, the present study provided a picture which is not definitive yet, and hence 
there is still much to be seen and discussed.  
 However, broadly speaking, the over-reliance topic can be expanded into new lines of 
research which involve other rules of the legislative framework of CRAs in the US and EU. In 
greater detail therefore, prospects for future research may be founded on questioning the extent to 
which the rules on the other CRAs’ issues may run counter to the purpose of reducing over-reliance. 
For example, the CRAs object that the creation of a civil liability regime can facilitate over-reliance 
on the credit ratings instead of reducing them. In practice, the possibility of suing the CRAs for 
gross negligence under Article 35(a) of the European CRA III, and for reckless negligence under 
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Section 947 of the Dodd Frank Act, would diminish the purpose of encouraging more independent 
credit risk analysis; the investors would over-rely on the CRAs knowing that the possibility of 
bringing legal actions against them would hide their own possible negligence in the credit risk 
analysis.643  
 Moreover, the over-reliance could be discussed in relation to the supervisory rules under the 
US and EU frameworks that strengthened the controlling powers of institutional bodies such as the 
SEC and the ESMA. In this respect, it could be questioned the extent to which these controlling 
powers on the operation of the agencies may have the effect of creating a new perception of a ‘seal 
of approval’ on the quality of the credit ratings given by supervisors through their controls.644  
 Finally, it could be questioned how other rules conceived to reduce over-reliance can create 
the opposite effect. This, for instance, can be the case for some structured finance rules set out in 
the EU CRA framework, notably Article 8(c) which requires hiring two agencies for the structured 
finance ratings. This raises the question of how the requirement to hire two CRAs can facilitate the 
risk of over-reliance to the detriment of independent analysis.645  
 All these issues were simply brought forward but they are not yet thoroughly discussed in 
relation to the phenomenon of over-reliance. Significantly, these other issues cannot be addressed 
without a proper basis. This basis is the clarification of what over-reliance is, in which areas it 
arises, and how the regulatory interventions to address this problem have developed. This is actually 
what this research proposed to do. Nonetheless, there is still much to be seen and to be researched.   
 
V.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The exploratory purpose of this study has been fulfilled through a holistic investigation into the 
phenomenon of over-reliance from the post-crisis regulatory debate on the CRAs until the issue and 
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 See Commission (n 320). 
644
 House of Lords, ‘The Future of EU Financial Regulation and Supervision’ (2009) Volume II: Evidence, 
26. 
645
 Amtenbrink & De Haan (n 311). 
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implementation of specific rules aiming at mitigating its risk. Over-reliance on external credit 
ratings is to be addressed by first reducing the regulatory reliance on credit ratings and then by 
enhancing the investors’ and market participants’ capability to conduct their own due diligence and 
credit risk assessment. As the research has shown, this strategy is at the core of a phenomenon 
which was neither adequately defined to have a clear understanding of it nor sufficiently 
demonstrated in its premises to back up an approach which is progressing very slowly due to 
several limits. The implementation process is still ongoing and there is still much to be seen. 
 Studying this topic was of relevance because it is a new subject which is encapsulated in the 
CRAs’ reforms with other issues to which a considerable amount of studies have always been 
devoted. This topic needs to be developed and further literature must flourish in relation to the 
elaborated regulatory strategies. This work has the aim to provide inputs to raise interest on a 
subject which has so far received marginal attention by the literature on the CRAs. The gaps that 
this research identified and discussed in the related parts, as well as the reflections posed on how the 
phenomenon was introduced and discussed within the regulatory debate can be the platform upon 
which a new debate and new studies can be built. Therefore, this research cannot be considered 
exhaustive to the extent that new review processes and implementations are expected in the next 
years. Nonetheless, the work provided an understanding of the problems relating to over-reliance 
which was lacking. ‘Quo vadis?’ found adequate answers when it was needed to define over-
reliance, analyse the approaches and their feasibility, and suggest possible future improvements. 
Further results that the ongoing implementation process will bring forward will renew this question. 
Accordingly, new studies may find adequate groundings in this contribution.  
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